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Abstract: We suggest that human culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary properties, and argue that the structure of a science of
cultural evolution should share fundamental features with the structure of the science of biological evolution. This latter claim is tested
by outlining the methods and approaches employed by the principal subdisciplines of evolutionary biology and assessing whether there
is an existing or potential corresponding approach to the study of cultural evolution. Existing approaches within anthropology and
archaeology demonstrate a good match with the macroevolutionary methods of systematics, paleobiology, and biogeography,
whereas mathematical models derived from population genetics have been successfully developed to study cultural microevolution.
Much potential exists for experimental simulations and field studies of cultural microevolution, where there are opportunities to
borrow further methods and hypotheses from biology. Potential also exists for the cultural equivalent of molecular genetics in
“social cognitive neuroscience,” although many fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. It is argued that studying culture within
a unifying evolutionary framework has the potential to integrate a number of separate disciplines within the social sciences.
Keywords: cultural anthropology; cultural evolution; cultural transmission; culture; evolution; evolutionary archaeology; evolutionary
biology; gene-culture coevolution; memes; social learning.
1. Introduction
Parallels or analogies between biological and cultural evol-
ution have been noted by a number of eminent figures
from diverse fields of study (e.g., Darwin 1871/2003;
Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1995; Dobzhansky et al. 1977;
Hull 1982; Huxley 1955; James 1880; Medawar 1982;
Popper 1979; Skinner 1981), and in the last few years a
burgeoning literature exploring this relationship has
emerged (e.g., Aunger 2000b; 2002; Blackmore 1999;
Boyd & Richerson 2005; Danchin et al. 2004; Mace &
Holden 2005; Mesoudi et al. 2004; Mufwene 2001; Pagel
& Mace 2004; Plotkin 2002b; Richerson & Boyd 2005;
Runciman 2005; Shennan 2002; Wheeler et al. 2002;
Ziman 2000).
The implication of this growing body of theory is that
culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary properties.
If this is accepted, it follows that the same tools,
methods, and approaches that are used to study biological
evolution may productively be applied to the study of
human culture, and furthermore, that the structure of a
science of cultural evolution should broadly resemble
the structure of evolutionary biology. In the present
paper we attempt to make this comparison explicit, by
examining the different approaches and methods used
by evolutionary biologists and assessing whether there is
an existing corresponding approach or method in the
study of cultural evolution. Where such an existing corre-
spondence is not found, we explore whether there is the
potential to develop one. We also explore potential differ-
ences between biological and cultural evolution.
The purpose of this comparison is primarily to stimulate
a more progressive and rigorous science of culture.
Although evolutionary biology has become enormously
productive since Darwin’s theory of evolution was formu-
lated, the discipline that professes to be most directly
engaged in the study of culture – cultural or social anthro-
pology – has been much less demonstratively productive
over the course of the same time period, particularly in
terms of establishing a secure body of data and theory
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that earns and deserves the attention of researchers
working in sister disciplines. This is increasingly acknowl-
edged by many of its own practitioners (e.g., Bennett 1999;
Bloch 2000; Kuper 1999). For example, in a recent review
of the history of anthropology, Bennett (1999) states that
“the cultural side of the discipline tends to smother its
data with personal and arcane theorizing” (p. 951), while
another anthropologist, Bloch (2000), states that cultural
anthropology “with time, has become theoretically more
and more vague, pretentious and epistemologically unten-
able” (p. 202).
Why has biology been so much more successful than
anthropology and many related fields of social science
during the past 150 years? We do not believe that bio-
logists are on average more able than researchers who
have traditionally studied culture, nor is biology signifi-
cantly easier to study than culture. Rather, we suspect
that two factors are of particular importance. First is the
relative willingness of biologists to make simplifying
assumptions and use what may be comparatively crude
but workable methods, in order to make complex
systems tractable and contribute to the steady accumu-
lation of reliable knowledge that will ultimately form the
basis of a sophisticated understanding of the phenomena
in question. Although many social scientists frequently
object that human culture is too complex to be amenable
to such simplifying assumptions and methods, the relative
success of biologists in studying enormously complex bio-
logical systems renders such objections open to question.
Second, and particularly relevant to this article, the
theory of evolution encompasses and integrates a multi-
tude of diverse subdisciplines within biology, from beha-
vioural ecology to paleobiology to genetics, with each
subdiscipline stimulating and contributing to several
others (see Mayr [1982] for further details of this “evol-
utionary synthesis”). The social sciences, in contrast,
have no such general synthesising framework, and the
greater part of disciplines such as cultural anthropology,
archaeology, psychology, economics, sociology, and
history remain relatively insular and isolated, both from
each other and from the biological and physical sciences.
Adopting an evolutionary framework can potentially
serve to highlight how these disciplines are, in fact, study-
ing complementary aspects of the same problems, and
emphasise how multiple and multidisciplinary approaches
to these problems are not only possible but necessary for
their full exposition. At present, many of the individual
studies considered below are the result of independent
developments at the fringes of separate fields of study.
Placing these disparate studies side-by-side within a
broader evolutionary framework, as is done here, will,
we hope, contribute towards creating a coherent unified
movement and bring evolutionary analyses of cultural
phenomena into the mainstream.
An evolutionary framework also brings with it a set of
proven methods that have rich potential within the study
of culture. We note below a number of cases in which
methods developed within evolutionary biology have
been adapted for use in the study of culture, such as phylo-
genetic analyses or population genetic models. As we shall
see, several of these evolutionary methods have already
contributed to significant advances over more traditional
non-evolutionary methods.
The left side of Figure 1 illustrates the overall structure
of evolutionary biology, as described by Futuyma (1998,
pp. 12–14) in what is, perhaps, the most widely used
undergraduate textbook in the field. The study of biological
macroevolution deals with change at or above the species
level, whereas biological microevolution concerns
changes within populations of a single species. The
former comprises systematics, paleobiology, and biogeo-
graphy, whereas the latter involves population genetics
(theoretical, experimental, and field-based), evolutionary
ecology, and molecular genetics. In sections 2 and 3, we
examine each of the subdisciplines of evolutionary
biology in turn, first outlining their general methods and
then briefly describing examples of recent studies to illus-
trate how those methods are applied and the kind of results
they yield. This is followed in each case by a discussion of
existing analogous or equivalent methods within the social
sciences regarding human culture, again describing recent
key studies. These cultural disciplines, and the way in
which they map onto the structure of evolutionary
biology, are illustrated on the right side of Figure 1.
Although there may be no obvious precedent for two
distinct fields to exhibit the same internal structure, the
similarity of underlying processes (Mesoudi et al. 2004)
leads us to expect a correspondence. We believe that
this mapping will (1) help make sense of actual
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developments in the study of cultural evolution; (2)
suggest new research programmes and hypotheses; and
(3) help identify the most promising research strategies.
It is important first to define “culture” explicitly and to
specify the precise theory of cultural evolution that we
are advocating. Following Richerson and Boyd (2005),
we define culture as “information capable of affecting indi-
viduals’ behaviour that they acquire from other members
of their species through teaching, imitation, and other
forms of social transmission” (p. 5). “Information” is
employed as a broad term incorporating ideas, knowledge,
beliefs, values, skills, and attitudes. Cultural evolution is
characterised as a Darwinian process comprising the
selective retention of favourable culturally transmitted
variants, as well as a variety of non-selective processes,
such as drift (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman 1981). This contrasts with the progressive, uni-
linear theories of “cultural evolution” (e.g., Tylor 1871),
in which human societies were seen as progressing
through a fixed set of stages, from “savagery” through “bar-
barism” to “civilisation.” This erroneous view of evolution
drew more from Spencer than Darwin, and such flawed
evolutionary ideas persisted within anthropology until
the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Steward 1955; White
1959). The development of a genuinely Darwinian
theory of cultural evolution remained in its infancy (e.g.,
Campbell 1960) until the pioneering works of Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson
(1985). These researchers not only provided a rich theor-
etical groundwork for analysing culture in terms of
modern evolutionary theory, but also developed rigorous
mathematical treatments of cultural change inspired by
population genetic models (see Richerson & Boyd 2005
for an accessible account of this work).
We also emphasise that the theory of cultural evolution
is distinct from the field of evolutionary psychology (e.g.,
Barkow et al. 1992; Pinker 1997), which deals with biologi-
cally evolved features of the human mind shaped by
genetic rather than cultural inheritance. Evolutionary
psychology therefore more accurately belongs on the left
side of Figure 1 (although it is not shown) and should be
distinguished from the separate cultural inheritance
system outlined on the right side. Although some
evolutionary psychologists tend to downplay the role of
transmitted culture (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides 1992,
pp. 115–117), there is ample evidence that culture plays
a powerful causal role in determining human behaviour
and cognition (Richerson & Boyd 2005; Tomasello 1999).
Of course, biologically evolved features of cognition do
affect cultural processes in important ways, as emphasised
by gene-culture co-evolutionists (e.g., Durham 1992b).
This interaction is discussed further in section 3.4.2.
To illustrate the Darwinian nature of a modern evol-
utionary theory of culture, and build an empirical case
for such a theory, Mesoudi et al. (2004) explicitly com-
pared the empirical evidence for biological evolution pre-
sented by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species (1859/
1968) with present-day evidence from the social sciences
regarding human culture. In The Origin of Species,
Darwin presented meticulous evidence for variation in
the characteristics of individuals within a species, for the
selection (natural or artificial) of individuals possessing
certain characteristics, and for the inheritance of those
selected characteristics to the next generation. Mesoudi
et al. (2004) collated equivalent evidence that culture simi-
larly exhibits these key properties. For instance, there is
evidence for considerable variation in terms of the diver-
sity of cultural knowledge, beliefs, and artifacts, as illus-
trated by the 4.7 million patents issued in the United
States since 1790 (Basalla 1988) and the 6,800 languages
spoken world wide (Grimes 2002). Cultural selection
occurs as a result of competition for limited attention,
memory, and expression. For example, psychologists
have demonstrated interference in the recall of similar
(competing) words (Baddeley 1990), and archaeologists
have tracked increasing frequencies of one artifact and
the corresponding decreasing frequencies of competing
artifacts (O’Brien & Lyman 2000). The inheritance of
Figure 1. Major subdivisions within evolutionary biology (left side; after Futuyma 1998) and corresponding disciplines currently or
potentially employed in the study of cultural evolution (right side).
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successful cultural traits has been demonstrated in numer-
ous studies of the transmission of skills and beliefs in tra-
ditional societies (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen &
Dornbusch 1982; Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza 1986) and in
studies of social learning in children (e.g., Bandura 1977;
Whiten et al. 1996).
These three basic characteristics (variation, selection,
and inheritance) generate a number of other phenomena
observed by Darwin in biological evolution and which
are also evident in human culture (Mesoudi et al. 2004).
Cultural traits go extinct as a result of competition, as
occurred with the gun in Japan (Perrin 1979) and with
bone tools in Tasmania (Diamond 1978). Basalla (1988)
amassed extensive historical evidence for the gradual
accumulation of modifications through time, such as
Joseph Henry’s 1831 electric motor, which borrowed
many features from the steam engine, or Eli Whitney’s
1793 cotton gin, which was based on a long line of
Indian devices. Cultural traits can be said to adapt to
their environment, as demonstrated by the work of
human behavioural ecologists (Smith & Winterhalder
1992). Evolutionary principles can account for the geo-
graphical distribution of cultural variation, such as the dif-
fusion or descent of various traits in African societies (e.g.,
Hewlett, De Silvestri & Guglielmino 2002). Culture exhi-
bits the convergent evolution of similar forms in unrelated
lineages, such as the tendency for both teddy bears (Hinde
& Barden 1985) and cartoon characters (Gould 1980) to
become increasingly neotenous over the course of time.
Finally, cultural traits change in function or become vesti-
gial, as documented by Basalla (1988) for numerous tech-
nological artifacts, such as the no longer optimal
QWERTY keyboard layout of Edison’s gramophone,
which was originally used for dictation. A more detailed
account of the case for cultural evolution can be found
in Mesoudi et al. (2004) and Richerson and Boyd (2005).
Finally, Mesoudi et al. (2004) noted that, just as Darwin
formulated his theory of evolution with little understand-
ing of genes or Mendelian inheritance, a theory of cultural
evolution likewise does not necessarily have to rest on the
existence of memes or particulate cultural transmission, a
topical issue but one of great contention (Henrich & Boyd
2002; Aunger 2000b).
This last point highlights the fact that, although there
are many fundamental similarities between biological
and cultural change, the two processes are certainly not
identical, and biological methods and models cannot and
should not be unthinkingly applied to cultural phenomena
without careful consideration of any potential differences
(Plotkin 2002b). On the other hand, critics (e.g., Bloch
2000; Gould 1991; Pinker 1997) commonly reject outright
any evolutionary analysis of culture by appealing to puta-
tive differences that are frequently illusory or unfounded.
In the following sections and in section 4 we assess the
validity of each of these potential differences and their
implications for a science of cultural evolution.
2. Macroevolution
This section sketches the principle approaches to macro-
evolution adopted by biologists, namely systematics,
paleobiology, and biogeography, and considers corre-
sponding approaches in the study of cultural evolution.
2.1. Systematics
2.1.1. Biology. Systematics is the study of the diversity of
organisms and of the relationships between them. Modern
systematists adopt the principles of cladistics, which holds
that these relationships should be based exclusively on
phylogeny, or descent (Futuyma 1998; Harvey & Pagel
1991; Hennig 1966). Hence modern systematists seek to
reconstruct the evolutionary history of species based on
similarities in their morphological, behavioural, or
genetic characters. (A biological character is defined as
an inherited trait or feature, whereas a character state
describes the form or value of that character. For
example, “blue” and “brown” are character states of the
character “eye colour.”) This section concerns only the
analytical techniques used to identify these relationships,
rather than the methods used to obtain the geographical
or archaeological data used in these analyses, which are
discussed in the following sections.
Two species might share a character or character state
either because they each inherited it from a common
ancestor (homology) or because the character evolved
independently in the two species’ separate lineages
(analogy). In order to eliminate the latter and determine
phylogenetic relationships, systematists identify shared
derived characters, that is, traits that evolved only once
in a pair of species’ common ancestor but are not observed
in close relatives. Because shared derived characters are
unique to species directly related by descent, they can
be used to identify branching points in the phylogeny.
The principle of parsimony (or some equivalent method)
can then be used to construct a phylogenetic tree which
requires the fewest number of these branching points,
often using computer programs such as PAUP (Swofford
1998) or MacClade (Maddison & Maddison 1992).
For example, Burns et al. (2002) recently applied phylo-
genetic analyses to the morphological features of 88
species of Darwin’s finches of the Galapagos Islands,
finding that all were descended from a common ancestor
originating in the Caribbean, rather than South America
as had commonly been thought. The evolutionary history
of specific traits can also be studied using phylogenetic
methods, such as Whiting et al.’s (2003) finding that,
although the common ancestor of all insects is thought
to have possessed wings for flight, the common ancestor
of the stick insects was wingless, and wings re-emerged
in the stick insect lineage on a number of independent
occasions.
Phylogenetic methods are also used to identify general
patterns of evolution. For example, Goodwin et al.
(1998) found that “mouthbrooding” behaviour in cichlid
fish, in which eggs are incubated in the mouth of the
parent, has evolved on 10 to 14 independent occasions
from the ancestral state of guarding eggs in nests, illustrat-
ing convergent evolution. The association of mouthbrood-
ing with reduced fecundity and larger eggs additionally
illustrates the selective effects of one trait on others.
2.1.2. Culture. Just as biologists seek to reconstruct a
species’ evolutionary history using shared characters,
anthropologists seek to reconstruct the history of groups
of people based on cultural traits, such as language, tools,
customs, or beliefs. In doing so, anthropologists have
faced the same problem as evolutionary biologists, that of
Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
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distinguishing between homologous and analogous traits.
Indeed, this was recognised within anthropology as long
ago as 1889 by Francis Galton, which has led to it being
referred to as “Galton’s problem” (Galton 1889, p. 270).
The fact that Galton’s problem is virtually identical to
the problem faced by biologists has recently led a
number of anthropologists to adopt the same solutions.
Mace and Pagel (1994) argued that the phylogenetic ana-
lyses used by systematists are superior to previous attempts
to solve Galton’s problem, such as Murdock’s cross-
cultural sample (Murdock & White 1969) or the statistical
removal of inherited traits (e.g., Dow et al. 1984), both of
which involve the loss of important aspects of the data.
Mace and Pagel (1994) treated cultural traits as equivalent
to biological characters, with independent instances of cul-
tural change occurring when a cultural trait is invented,
acquired from another culture, changed, or lost. Shared,
derived characters can then be identified, and the parsi-
mony-based computer programs developed by syste-
matists can be used to reconstruct the most likely
evolutionary history of those cultural traits of interest.
For example, Holden (2002) applied cladistic methods
to linguistic data from 75 Bantu languages spoken in
sub-Saharan Africa. Items of basic vocabulary whose
meanings were common to all groups (e.g., “man,”
“woman”) were taken as characters, and the different
lexical forms used to represent these meanings were
treated as character states. A shared character state
was therefore one in which the same word form was
used for the same meaning in both languages. Geographi-
cal and archaeological data were also obtained (see next
sections). It was found that the linguistic data showed a
good fit with the phylogenetic tree model, and that this
tree correlated with geographical proximity and archaeolo-
gical data suggesting that language was associated with
the spread of farming across prehistoric Africa. A further
study on the same populations (Holden & Mace 2003)
suggested that the acquisition of cattle led to a change
from matrilineal to patrilineal inheritance of wealth.
Using similar methods, Gray and Jordan (2000) found
that the distribution of 77 Austronesian languages was
most consistent with a single common ancestral form in
Taiwan which rapidly spread through the region, and
Gray and Atkinson (2003) found evidence supporting the
theory that the Indo-European language group was associ-
ated with the spread of agriculture from Anatolia around
8,000 to 9,500 years ago.
The recognition that cultural traits may be directly
acquired from other cultures, that is, transmitted horizon-
tally (within a generation), raises possible objections (e.g.,
Gould 1991; Moore 1994) to the use of these biological
methods, which were originally developed to deal only
with vertical (parent-to-offspring) transmission and
hence might be unsuitable for studying some cultural evol-
ution. However, as noted by Mesoudi et al. (2004), any
putative dichotomy contrasting a “divergent, branching
biological evolution” with a “convergent, cross-fertilising
cultural evolution” is a distortion of both biology and
culture. Significant cross-lineage transfer occurs in bio-
logical evolution, especially for microbes (Doolittle 1999;
Rivera & Lake 2004) and plants (Abbott et al. 2003),
whereas the convergent nature of culture is an empirically
testable hypothesis rather than a statement of fact. Tack-
ling the issue systematically and quantitatively, Tehrani
and Collard (2002) found a greater role for branching
“phylogenesis” than convergent “ethnogenesis” in
Turkmen textile patterns, and Collard et al. (2005) have
found that the best available cultural data sets show just
as good a fit with a branching phylogenetic model as do
biological data sets. In the short term, there are likely to
be plenty of data sets for which these methods may be
useful, whereas ultimately, it may be mutually beneficial
for biological and cultural evolutionists to develop mathe-
matical techniques that incorporate both horizontal
transfer and vertical descent.
Another potential objection to the use of cladistic
methods in anthropology is the difficulty of identifying dis-
tinct “characters” in cultural artifacts (see also criticisms of
memetics in section 3.5.2.). The identification of charac-
ters in culture is undoubtedly difficult (O’Brien &
Lyman 2003, p. 143), but it is important to acknowledge
that it is also difficult for biological characters, and this dif-
ficulty has not prevented biologists from producing valu-
able work using the character concept (Wagner 2000).
2.1.3. Conclusions. Treating cultural traits as equivalent
to biological characters allows anthropologists to apply
the same rigorous phylogenetic methods to cultural data
as are used by evolutionary biologists. This is because
anthropologists and biologists share the same crucial
goals: to reconstruct the history of certain traits and to
identify general patterns of change. A number of studies
applying phylogenetic methods to cultural data demon-
strate that such methods can be successfully used to
achieve these goals, for example in determining whether
a group of traits are related by descent, whether their
spread was associated with other traits, or whether they
generated selection for other traits.
2.2. Paleobiology
2.2.1. Biology. The aim of paleobiology is to use the fossil
record to identify prehistoric species and reconstruct their
evolutionary history (Futuyma 1998; Simpson 1944), con-
sequently helping to explain the present diversity and dis-
tribution of living species. The principle methods involve
the collection of fossils and analysis of their features,
with age and environment reconstructed based on these
features and the characteristics of the surrounding rocks.
Analysis of these data often involves the use of the phylo-
genetic methods described above in order to distinguish
between homologous and analogous traits. The fossil
record is a much more direct (albeit incomplete) source
of evidence about the evolutionary past than the distri-
bution of existing species, and, additionally, allows paleo-
biologists to provide an absolute timescale for
evolutionary events using radio-decay dating techniques.
For example, Zhou et al. (2003) describe exceptionally
well-preserved fossils from north-eastern China from the
Early Cretaceous period, the forms of which support the
theories that birds are direct descendants of the dinosaurs,
that feathers evolved before flight, and that there was rapid
adaptive radiation of bird ancestors. Seiffert et al.’s (2003)
phylogenetic analysis of strepsirrhine primate fossils,
meanwhile, suggests that the group is much older than
was previously thought and has an Afro-Arabian origin.
These studies, and countless others, show that fossil evi-
dence can be used to date evolutionary events, support
Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4 333
hypotheses concerning the origin of traits, and reveal
general evolutionary patterns such as adaptive radiation.
2.2.2. Culture. In general, archaeologists have similar
goals to paleobiologists: identifying prehistoric artifacts,
reconstructing lineages of these artifacts and of the
people associated with them, and revealing the evolution-
ary relationships between these lineages. The basic meth-
odology – extracting specimens from the ground – is also
similar. It is only recently, however, that some archaeolo-
gists have begun to adopt explicitly evolutionary models
and tools (for overviews, see O’Brien & Lyman 2002b;
Shennan 2002). The key assumption underlying both
paleobiology and archaeology is that similar forms that
vary through time are causally connected by inheritance
(which O’Brien & Lyman [2000] term the assumption of
“heritable continuity”). Such sequences of causally con-
nected forms constitute evolutionary lineages. Simpson
(1961) proposed that evolutionary lineages should be
used as a means of defining a species, rather than requiring
reproductive isolation (Mayr 1963), and this “evolutionary
species” concept is increasingly being used in evolutionary
biology (Wiens 2004). The same lineage-based-species
concept has been suggested by Hull (1982) for culture,
and extended by O’Brien and Lyman (2000) specifically
for prehistoric artifacts.
O’Brien and Lyman (2000) have argued that evolution-
ary lineages can be reconstructed using the method of
seriation, in which a collection of artifacts is ordered
according to their similarity: the more features two arti-
facts share, the closer they are in the order; the fewer
they share, the further apart they are placed. Where
such orderings exhibit gradual, overlapping change, it
can be assumed that the seriation represents an evolution-
ary lineage causally connected by cultural transmission.
Early archaeologists used the method of seriation to
identify lineages of coins (Evans 1850), stone tools (Pitt-
Rivers 1875), and Egyptian pottery (Petrie 1899). The
method fell out of favour, however, in the mid-twentieth
century, which O’Brien and Lyman (2000) attribute to
the increased popularity of an essentialist stance in archae-
ology, in which types are perceived to have distinct
“essences” and change occurs only when one type sud-
denly transforms into another. This contrasts with evol-
utionary “population thinking” (Mayr 1982), which
recognises naturally occurring variation within populations
rather than focusing on typological essences. O’Brien and
Lyman (2000) have consequently made efforts to reintro-
duce seriation into archaeology as a method of studying
evolutionary change in artifacts. This is demonstrated by
their analysis of projectile points from the Southwestern
United States, which, they show, exhibit continuous,
gradually changing variation rather than a small number
of distinct types. O’Brien and Lyman (2000) argue that
forcing artifacts into distinct categories often distorts
their true phylogenetic relationships.
The method of seriation is nonetheless vulnerable to the
same problem as similar methods in paleobiology: dis-
tinguishing between homologies and analogies. Hence,
O’Brien et al. (2001) and O’Brien and Lyman (2003)
have argued that it is also necessary to adopt the cladistic
methods described above to reconstruct evolutionary
lineages accurately. For example, O’Brien et al. (2001)
and O’Brien and Lyman (2003) carried out a phylogenetic
analysis of 621 Paleo-Indian projectile points from the
Southeastern United States (see Fig. 2), and Tehrani and
Collard (2002) used similar methods to reconstruct the
history of Turkmen textile patterns.
Other evolutionary archaeologists have adapted neutral
drift models from evolutionary biology (e.g., Crow &
Kimura 1970) to account for “stylistic variation” in arti-
facts. For example, Neiman (1995) demonstrated that
changes in decorative styles of Illinois Woodland ceramics
can be predicted by a model incorporating the selectively
neutral but opposing forces of drift and innovation.
Bentley and Shennan (2003) found that the frequencies
of West German pottery decorations over the course of
400 years can be predicted by a similar model of unbiased
cultural transmission, with some anti-conformist bias in
later periods.
As well as prehistoric artifacts, past cultures – unlike
past species – have often left detailed written records or
Figure 2. A phylogenetic tree of 17 projectile points from the
Southeastern United States, from O’Brien and Lyman (2003),
illustrating divergence from a single common ancestor.
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direct historical evidence of their knowledge, skills, and
technology. For example, Hinde and Barden (1985)
found that the facial dimensions of teddy bears became
increasingly baby-like during an 80-year period, which
they attributed to a biologically evolved human preference
for baby-like faces. Basalla (1988), meanwhile, collected
numerous examples of technological change which exem-
plify the gradual modification of preceding technology (see
also Petroski 1994; Ziman 2000). For example, although
Eli Whitney’s cotton gin is commonly described as unpre-
cedented, it was in fact based on existing mechanical
cotton gins used to extract other varieties of cotton seed,
which were in turn derived from previous Indian gins
and before that from an even older sugar-cane press
(Basalla 1988, pp. 32–33). Such gradual, cumulative
change suggests the presence of evolutionary lineages of
artifacts linked by cultural transmission.
Methods developed within evolutionary biology can also
be applied to relatively recent historical data. Howe et al.
(2001) describe how different manuscript versions of the
same text can be used to reconstruct the evolution of
that text. This was demonstrated by Barbrook et al.
(1998), who used cladistic methods to reconstruct the his-
torical relationships between 58 different manuscripts of
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, improving on previous non-
phylogenetic reconstructions. Bentley et al. (2004), mean-
while, found that the frequencies of first names and patent
applications in twentieth-century United States both
conform to a simple model of random copying originally
developed in evolutionary biology (Crow & Kimura
1970). This neutral model represents a useful null hypo-
thesis describing the case where no selection is operating.
2.2.3. Conclusions. Archaeologists face essentially the
same task as paleobiologists – to identify earlier forms of
the phenomena of interest (often now extinct or super-
seded) and reconstruct their history. It is therefore not
surprising that the tools and approaches used by paleobiolo-
gists have been successfully imported into archaeology.
Adopting evolutionary “population thinking” (O’Brien &
Lyman 2000), using the methods of cladistics (Mace &
Holden 2005), and importing models of selection or drift
(Neiman 1995) can produce a more accurate understand-
ing of the past than traditional archaeological methods.
Historical records of cultural artifacts will often be more
complete and accurate than the fossil record, offering a
potentially important role for historians in the study of
cultural evolution.
2.3. Biogeography
2.3.1. Biology. Biogeography is the study of how biolo-
gical, ecological, geographical, and historical factors deter-
mine the spatial distribution of organisms (Brown &
Lomolino 1998; Futuyma 1998). Members of a population
may adapt to their new environments when they disperse,
or populations may be divided by physical barriers and
evolve distinctively. Islands are often of particular interest
to biogeographers (e.g., MacArthur & Wilson 1967)
because of their isolation from other terrestrial ecosys-
tems. Long-term geographical factors such as climate
change or tectonic plate movement can affect organisms’
spatial distribution, as can shorter-term ecological factors
such as competitors or pathogens. Fossil evidence and
phylogenetic analyses are used to infer the past distri-
bution of organisms, which can help to explain their
present distribution, and which has led biogeography to
become intimately linked with both paleobiology and
systematics.
The methods of biogeography can be classed as either
descriptive or analytical. Descriptive methods consist of
documenting the present distribution of organisms in
space, along with their ecology and physical environment.
Once these data have been gathered, analytical models,
including the cladistic techniques described above, can
be constructed and tested to try to explain this distribution.
For example, Stephens and Wiens (2004) sought to
explain the geographical distribution of emydid turtles in
eastern North America, which exhibit two broad patterns
of community structure. Phylogenetic analyses of morpho-
logical and molecular data combined with details of habitat
and diet revealed that the differences between the two
groups are predominantly owing to “phylogenetic conser-
vatism” (i.e., descent from two distinct evolutionary
lineages), although the dispersal of several species from
one group to the other has reduced these differences.
Roca et al. (2004) used fossil data to explain the distri-
bution of an island species. Phylogenetic analyses of
genetic and fossil evidence suggest that around 76
million years ago the solenodons – small, burrowing insec-
tivores from the West Indies – diverged from other insec-
tivores rather than from the tenrecs or the rodents. This
date coincides with the separation of the islands from
mainland North America on account of tectonic move-
ment and/or rising sea levels, supporting the hypothesis
of divergence due to geographical separation.
2.3.2. Culture. The geographical distribution of cultural
traits is shaped, at least in part, by factors similar to
those affecting the distribution of organisms. Just as the
past dispersal of organisms can help to explain the
present distribution due to biological inheritance, cultural
traits can also persist through time because of transgene-
rational cultural transmission. Whereas organisms can dis-
perse to new environments, cultural traits can spread by
the movement of culture-bearing people or the diffusion
of ideas and technology among non-kin. Cultural traits
may also arise as adaptations to local ecological conditions.
The field of social science most equivalent to biogeo-
graphy is again anthropology. One of the main goals of
cultural anthropology has been to document and map
the worldwide distribution of cultural traits, in a manner
resembling the descriptive methods of biogeography.
This has resulted in databases such as Murdock’s Ethno-
graphic Atlas (Murdock 1967), the Human Relations
Area Files (Murdock et al. 1987), and, for languages, the
Ethnologue (Grimes 2002).
More recently, evolutionarily informed analytical
models have been developed to attempt to account for
the distributions of cultural traits captured by these data-
bases. The field of human behavioural ecology (see section
3.4.2) operates, with some success, on the premise of a
correspondence between cultural and ecological variation
(Smith & Winterhalder 1992). Other researchers have
endeavoured to distinguish ecological from “inherited tra-
dition” explanations. Guglielmino et al. (1995), for
example, used the Ethnographic Atlas to analyse the distri-
bution of 47 cultural traits in 277 African societies. Most of
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the traits, particularly family and kinship traits, correlated
with linguistic group, suggesting vertical transmission. A
minority of traits were distributed according to geograph-
ical proximity, consistent with horizontal diffusion
between groups, whereas the distribution of none of the
traits could be explained by ecology alone.
Similarly, Hewlett et al. (2002) combined data from the
Ethnographic Atlas and the Ethnologue with newly emer-
ging genetic data to study the distribution of cultural traits
in 36 African populations. Twenty of these traits were dis-
tributed according to language and/or genes, suggesting
vertical cultural transmission, twelve traits correlated
with geographical proximity, suggesting diffusion, and
four followed ecology, suggesting independent adaptation
to local conditions.
A further parallel with biogeography lies in the use of
cladistic methods to help explain the present distribution
of cultural traits, which we have already seen, for
example, for African and Austronesian languages (Gray
& Jordan 2000; Holden 2002). Yet another parallel lies
in the value of physical barriers in studying the spatial dis-
tribution of culture. For example, Cavalli-Sforza and
Wang (1986) applied a “stepping-stone” model, developed
within biology to study genetic distributions, to linguistic
data from 17 Micronesian islands, finding that the
degree to which languages shared words declined with
the negative exponential of the distance between those
islands, just as has been found for biological traits.
Another example of the use of islands to study cultural
evolution involves the case of the prehistoric inhabitants
of Tasmania, whose cultural repertoire significantly
decreased in size and complexity after their isolation
from mainland Australia (Diamond 1978; McGrew
1987). Henrich (2004b) developed a model showing that
the reduction in population size caused by this physical
separation was sufficient to cause the breakdown and
loss of relatively complex cumulative skills and tools,
because of the paucity of models from which to learn
such skills. Henrich’s analysis demonstrates the interactive
effects of demography and geography on the distribution
of cultural traits.
2.3.3. Conclusions. There is a clear parallel in the aims,
methods, and findings of biogeography and anthropology.
Both disciplines aim to explain the spatial distribution of
traits, and do this descriptively by documenting spatial
variation in forms and analytically by developing theor-
etical models to account for patterns in this variation.
Whereas the descriptive stage has been carried out by
anthropologists for decades independently of a Darwinian
model of cultural evolution, analytical models have bene-
fited from biological tools such as the methods of cladistics
and population-genetic and fitness-maximisation models.
Similar factors have, moreover, been found to influence
the distribution of biological and cultural traits, such as
transmission dynamics (e.g., vertical/descent or horizon-
tal/diffusion), geographical phenomena (e.g., physical
barriers), and ecological factors.
However, we see potential here for the science of
cultural evolution to become more predictive, along the
lines of evolutionary biology, by specifying a priori which
traits should follow these different evolutionary dynamics
and under which conditions. For example, Boyd and
Richerson (1985) predict that cultural traits that constitute
adaptations to relatively rapidly changing environmental
conditions should be transmitted horizontally, whereas
cultural traits that constitute adaptations to environmental
conditions that are stable across biological generations
(although not stable enough to have become genetically
specified) should show evidence of conservative vertical
transmission. Further predictions are given in section 3.3.
2.4. Macroevolution: General conclusions
The evidence concerning macroevolutionary patterns
reveals a broad fit between the methods and approaches
of evolutionary biology and those of the social sciences.
This is primarily because a number of anthropologists
and archaeologists are already importing biological
methods and models into their fields, with considerable
success. Phylogenetic methods have been used by anthro-
pologists to explain the spatial distribution of various cul-
tural traits, and by evolutionary archaeologists to
reconstruct evolutionary lineages of material artifacts.
As this suggests, there is already considerable cross-
fertilisation of ideas and methods in these disciplines,
which, we argue, is a key benefit of adopting a unified
evolutionary framework. We have also seen cases where
the evolutionary methods have proved significantly more
effective than traditional non-evolutionary methods, such
as the adoption of evolutionary “population thinking” in
archaeology, or the cladistic solution to Galton’s problem.
3. Microevolution
One of the central principles of the evolutionary synthesis
of the 1930s was that large-scale macroevolutionary pat-
terns of change are the result of small-scale microevolu-
tionary changes in gene frequencies within populations
(Mayr 1982). A complete theory of cultural evolution
would therefore require studies of small-scale changes in
populations of cultural traits. The following sections
outline the approaches to microevolution developed by
evolutionary biologists – population genetics (theoretical,
experimental, and field), evolutionary ecology, and mole-
cular genetics – along with corresponding methods in
the study of cultural evolution.
3.1. Theoretical population genetics
3.1.1. Biology. Significant advances were made in the
study of biological evolution before its molecular basis
was understood, in no small part through the use of simpli-
fied mathematical models, pioneered by Fisher (1930),
Wright (1931), and Haldane (1932). In the simplest
models, sexually reproducing individuals in a large
(“infinite-sized”) population all contribute to an aggregate
gene pool. Under the assumptions of random mating, and
with no migration, selection, or mutation, allele frequen-
cies will remain constant through successive generations
(the Hardy-Weinberg principle). Deviations from this
simple case can be incorporated into population genetic
models, such as mutation, non-random (e.g., assortative)
mating, or the impact of processes such as natural
selection or random genetic drift. Overall allele or geno-
type frequencies in successive generations can be
tracked mathematically to simulate the process of
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evolution, often to find out whether a particular genetic
trait can invade and spread through a population, and if
so, to explore the possible evolutionary consequences of
this invasion.
For example, McKone and Halpern (2003) developed a
population genetic model of androgenesis, a rare phenom-
enon seen in freshwater clams, Saharan cypress trees, and
stick insects, where the offspring acquire nuclear DNA
from the male parent only. The model predicts that
mutations causing androgenesis will often spread rapidly
to fixation in an initially non-androgenetic population,
and in some cases cause extinction of that population
because of the loss of females, perhaps explaining the
rarity of such mutations.
3.1.2. Culture. Models of cultural evolution and gene-
culture coevolution adopt essentially the same methods
as above. The latter (sometimes also referred to as dual-
inheritance theory) assimilates cultural inheritance into
population genetic models, developing mathematical
models that incorporate both biological and cultural evol-
ution simultaneously and interactively, whereas “cultural
evolution” models are formulated exclusively at this cul-
tural level (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza 1976; Laland
et al. 1995a). These models exploit parallels in the demo-
graphic consequences of biological and cultural change
with, for example, differential adoption and innovation in
culture modelled as equivalent to natural selection and
mutation within biology, and with other processes such
as drift, migration, and assortative mating operating
equivalently in both cases.
In gene-culture coevolution models, each individual is
often described in terms of a combination of genetic and
cultural traits, or “phenogenotype.” This requires that
transmission rules for both genes and culture must be con-
sidered, with selection on genes affecting the adoption of
cultural traits, and vice versa. As well as adopting the
same general methods and principles as population gen-
etics, in many cases gene-culture coevolution researchers
have adapted specific established population genetic
models to render them suitable to features of culture
that are not directly analogous to their biological
counterpart.
Researchers in these fields recognise that cultural trans-
mission can be very different from biological transmission.
Whereas the latter is primarily vertical, Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) have modelled the consequences of
horizontal and oblique (from unrelated members of the
parental generation) cultural transmission. Boyd and
Richerson (1985) and Henrich and Boyd (1998) have
demonstrated mathematically that a “conformist” cultural
bias, in which individuals are predisposed to adopt the
most popular cultural trait in a group, can evolve in a
wide variety of environmental conditions and leads to
stable differences between cultural groups, potentially
leading to cultural group selection (Boyd & Richerson
1985). Other models consider a variety of other forms of
transmission biases (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza
1976). Importantly, many of these biases are unique to cul-
tural transmission and will generate evolutionary dynamics
with no obvious parallel in biology. Such differences do
not, however, invalidate an evolutionary analysis of
culture.
Models have also been developed for specific cases of
gene-culture coevolution. For example, Feldman and
Cavalli-Sforza (1989) modelled the coevolution of genes
for lactose absorption and the cultural trait of dairy
farming, finding that the allele for lactose absorption will
spread provided there is a high probability that the off-
spring of dairy farmers themselves become dairy
farmers, but not otherwise, even with a significant viability
advantage. Another case study examined the evolution of
handedness (Laland et al. 1995b), proposing a model
that gave a better fit to patterns of handedness in families
and among twins than do leading purely genetic models.
As well as population genetic methods, biological
models of neutral genetic drift (Crow & Kimura 1970)
have been adapted to study the evolution of cultural
traits such as names and patents (Bentley et al. 2004),
demonstrating that the distribution of such traits can be
accounted for by chance events. Boyd and Richerson
(1985), meanwhile, have developed a model of runaway
cultural selection similar to runaway sexual selection,
which they argue can account for a range of cultural
traits, from oversized yams in Ponapae to extensive tattoo-
ing in Polynesia (paralleling elaborate sexually selected
biological traits such as the peacock’s tail).
Mathematical models such as these are often treated
with suspicion and even hostility by some social scientists,
who consider them to be oversimplifications of reality (see
Laland et al. 1995a, and associated comments). The
alternatives to gene-culture coevolution analyses,
however, are usually either analysis at a single (purely
genetic or purely cultural) level or vague verbal accounts
of “complex interactions,” neither of which we believe to
be productive. Gene-culture analyses have repeatedly
revealed circumstances under which the interactions
between genetic and cultural processes lead populations
to different equilibria than those predicted by single-
level models or anticipated in verbal accounts (Laland
et al. 1995a), as illustrated by the aforementioned
examples of dairy farming and handedness.
Interestingly, fifty years ago the same reservations about
simplifying assumptions were voiced about the use of
population genetic models in biology by the prominent
evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr (1963). He argued that
using such models was akin to treating genetics as
pulling coloured beans from a bag (coining the phrase
“beanbag genetics”), ignoring complex physiological and
developmental processes that lead to interactions
between genes. In his classic article “A Defense of
Beanbag Genetics,” J. B. S. Haldane (1964) countered
that the simplification of reality embodied in these
models is the very reason for their usefulness. Such simpli-
fication can significantly aid our understanding of pro-
cesses that are too complex to be considered through
verbal arguments alone, because mathematical models
force their authors to specify explicitly and exactly all of
their assumptions, to focus on major factors, and to gener-
ate logically sound conclusions. Indeed, such conclusions
are often counterintuitive to human minds relying solely
on informal verbal reasoning. Haldane (1964) provided
several examples in which empirical facts follow the
predictions of population genetic models in spite of their
simplifying assumptions, and noted that models can
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often highlight the kind of data that need to be collected to
evaluate a particular theory.
Ultimately, Haldane won the argument, and population
genetic modelling is now an established and invaluable
tool in evolutionary biology (Crow 2001). We can only
echo Haldane’s defence and argue that the same argu-
ments apply to the use of similar mathematical models
in the social sciences (see also Laland 1993; Laland et al.
1995a; Mace & Pagel 1994; Pagel & Mace 2004).
3.1.3. Conclusions. A number of researchers have
imported the methods of theoretical population genetics
to study the coevolution of genes and culture, and the
dynamics of cultural change through time. These
methods have provided a rigorous analysis of many cul-
tural evolutionary processes and case studies. The differ-
ences between biological and cultural inheritance are
not ignored and do not invalidate such models, and
many of the criticisms of the use of such analytical
models in the social sciences have been addressed in a
parallel debate within evolutionary biology.
3.2. Experimental population genetics
3.2.1. Biology. As well as using the theoretical models
described above, population geneticists have studied
microevolutionary processes experimentally by breeding
multiple generations of study organisms in the laboratory,
in order to simulate evolution under controlled conditions.
Laboratory-based experiments have been used to estimate
the rate and effect of mutation, detect adaptation to exper-
imentally induced environmental conditions (e.g., differ-
ent temperatures), and measure responses to the
artificial selection of single or multiple traits (Futuyma
1998; Hartl & Clark 1997).
In a typical artificial selection experiment, a population
of a species, such as E. coli or Drosophila, is measured for
some desired trait (e.g., temperature resistance). In each
generation only a subset of the population is allowed to
reproduce, with the reproducing individuals chosen
according to the desired trait (e.g., those most resistant
to high temperatures). After a number of generations,
the population is again tested for the trait to estimate the
response to this selection regime.
For example, Torres-Vila et al. (2002) employed a
laboratory-based artificial selection paradigm to investi-
gate the genetic basis of polyandry (females mating with
more than one male) in a normally non-polyandrous
species of moth. Initially 150 pairs of moths were
allowed to mate freely, and all of the fertilised females
were assessed for their tendency to solicit further
matings. In five subsequent generations only females dis-
playing polyandrous behaviour were allowed to mate,
resulting in a significant increase in the frequency of poly-
andry and indicating the successful artificial selection of
this trait.
Natural selection can be simulated by manipulating
environmental conditions and allowing the population
members to compete naturally amongst themselves, with
those individuals best suited to the imposed conditions
out-breeding less-suited individuals. After a number of
generations, the population is tested for adaptation to
the imposed conditions. Kennington et al. (2003), for
example, experimentally simulated the natural selection
of body size in Drosophila in response to humidity. Separ-
ate populations were maintained at either high or low
humidity and were allowed to breed freely. After 20
weeks (5–10 generations) it was found that the low humid-
ity lines were significantly larger than the high humidity
lines, which Kennington et al. argued occurred because
large flies have a low surface area relative to weight, lose
less water, and so are better adapted to low humidity.
This experimental result also helps to explain the geo-
graphical distribution of Drosophila in the wild, with
large body sizes found at high latitudes with low humidity.
3.2.2. Culture. One parallel with this work lies in
laboratory-based psychological experiments simulating
cultural transmission. Where population genetic exper-
iments simulate biological evolution by studying the
transmission of genetic information from generation to
generation through the reproduction of individuals,
psychological experiments can potentially simulate
cultural evolution by studying the transmission of cultural
information (e.g., texts or behavioural rules) from one
individual to another through social learning.
One method for simulating cultural evolution was devel-
oped by Gerard et al. (1956) and Jacobs and Campbell
(1961). A norm or bias is established in a group of partici-
pants, usually by using confederates, and one by one these
participants are replaced with new, untrained participants.
The degree to which the norm or bias remains in the group
after all of the original group members have been replaced
represents a measure of its transmission to the new
members.
For example, Baum et al. (2004) studied the trans-
mission of traditions using a task in which participants
received financial rewards for solving anagrams. Groups
of individuals could choose to solve an anagram printed
on either red or blue card: the red anagrams gave a
small immediate payment, whereas the blue anagrams
gave a larger payoff but were followed by a “time-out”
during which no anagrams could be solved. By manipulat-
ing the length of this time-out, the experimenters were
able to determine which of the two anagrams gave the
highest overall payoff (i.e., where the blue time-out was
short, blue was optimal, and where the blue time-out
was long, red was optimal). Every 12 minutes one
member of the group was replaced with a new participant.
It was found that traditions of the optimal choice emerged
under each experimental condition, with existing group
members instructing new members in this optimal tra-
dition by transmitting information about payoffs and
time-outs, or through coercion.
Key similarities exist between this study and the exper-
imental simulations of natural selection described above.
In Kennington et al.’s (2003) study with Drosophila,
where the experimentally determined conditions of low
humidity favoured large body size, larger individuals out-
reproduced smaller individuals. Hence, genetic infor-
mation determining “large body size” was more likely to
be transmitted to the next generation through biological
reproduction, and the average body size of the population
became gradually larger. In Baum et al.’s (2004) study,
where the experimentally determined conditions favoured
red anagrams (when the blue time-out was relatively long),
choosing red anagrams gave a larger payoff to the partici-
pants. Hence, the behavioural rule “choose red” was more
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likely to be transmitted to the new participants through
cultural transmission, and the overall frequency of choos-
ing red gradually increased.
Baum et al.’s (2004) method could easily be adapted to
study the cultural evolution of attitudes or beliefs. Groups
of participants could be asked to discuss a contentious
issue, then for every generation the participant with the
most extreme opinion in a certain direction would be
removed and replaced with a random participant. After a
number of generations, the group should hold more
extreme views (in the opposite direction to those of the
removed participants) than average members of the
larger population.
Experimental economists have also recently begun to
study the transmission of behavioural traditions that
emerge when chains of successive participants play econ-
omic games. For example, Schotter and Sopher (2003) had
successive pairs of participants play a game in which two
players chose one of two options without communicating.
If they chose different options, neither got any payoff,
encouraging coordination. If both chose the first option,
then the first player benefited more than the second,
whereas if both chose the second option, the second
player benefited more, creating conflict. Transmission
was effected by allowing each player to view the beha-
vioural history of all previous players and/or to receive
explicit advice from the preceding player in the chain. It
was found that stable conventions emerged in which
both players consistently chose one option, and that
these conventions were mainly due to explicit advice
rather than behavioural history.
A similar methodology exists within experimental psych-
ology. The transmission chain method, as developed by
Bartlett (1932), involves a text or picture being passed
along a linear chain of participants. The first participant
in such a chain reads or views the stimulus material and
later recalls it. The resultant recall is then given to the
next participant in the chain to recall, the result of which
is given to the third, and so on along the chain. Studying
how the material changes as it is transmitted, and compar-
ing the degradation rates of different types of material, can
reveal specific biases in cultural transmission (e.g.,
Mesoudi & Whiten 2004; Mesoudi et al. 2006).
Mesoudi and Whiten (2004) used this method to study
the cultural transmission of event knowledge. Everyday
events, such as going to a restaurant, are thought to be
represented in memory hierarchically, in which a global
high-level proposition (e.g., “go to restaurant”) can be
subdivided into lower-level propositions (e.g., “sit down,”
“order,” “eat,” “pay”), each of which can be subdivided
further (e.g., “look at menu,” “select food,” “call waiter”).
Mesoudi and Whiten found that when descriptions of
such events expressed entirely at a low hierarchical
level were passed along multiple chains of participants,
they were spontaneously transformed into higher
hierarchical levels.
Linear transmission chain studies such as those of
Schotter and Sopher (2003) and Mesoudi and Whiten
(2004) bear less similarity to the experimental paradigms
of population genetics. Nevertheless, Schotter and
Sopher’s study provides important data on the mode of
cultural transmission (explicit advice versus behavioural
history), data which might be needed as a preliminary to
more advanced experimental manipulations. Studies
such as Bartlett (1932) and Mesoudi and Whiten (2004),
although not imposing a selection regime on the trans-
mission of cultural traits, are in a sense simulating selec-
tion “in the wild” (see section 3.3.2), as cultural
information is being shaped by the minds of the partici-
pants it passes through. In Mesoudi and Whiten (2004),
the implicit hierarchical structure of memory causes the
selection of event knowledge at high hierarchical levels;
hence, there is selection due to evolved or implicit features
of human cognition. A design more explicitly along the
lines of a natural-selection population genetic experiment
might involve exposing different chains of people to
different experimental conditions, or having each chain
composed of different types of people with alternative
pre-existing knowledge.
Finally, as well as simply detecting the presence of direc-
tional selection, population geneticists may obtain quanti-
tative estimates of the strength of selection. Cultural
transmission experiments would benefit from the develop-
ment of similar measures, and once again there are oppor-
tunities to borrow usefully from biology. Stabilising
selection might also be studied in this manner, by testing
whether certain beliefs or ideas are converged upon
following an experimentally induced deviation (see
section 3.3).
3.2.3. Conclusions. Although laboratory-based exper-
iments are an established approach to the study of bio-
logical evolution, relatively little experimental work exists
in psychology or economics that has studied the dynamics
of cultural transmission. Such studies are essential for a
full understanding of cultural evolution. Psychological
studies of cultural transmission would benefit from expli-
citly drawing on the methods of experimental population
genetics, both in the design of experiments and in the
analysis of data.
3.3. Population genetics: Field studies
3.3.1. Biology. The third approach within population gen-
etics is the study of evolution in naturally occurring popu-
lations. Observational studies or field experiments can give
estimates of the heritability of traits by measuring parent-
offspring correlations, and measures of mortality and
reproductive success can be used to estimate the mode
and strength of selection on those traits (Endler 1986;
Futuyma 1998).
The mode of selection (Endler 1986; Simpson 1944)
refers to whether selection is directional (i.e., individuals
at one end of a distribution are favoured, causing a
change in the mean trait value), stabilising (i.e., intermedi-
ate individuals are more successful than those at the
extremes, decreasing variation in the trait), or disruptive
(i.e., extreme individuals do better, increasing variation
in the trait).
The strength of selection is commonly represented by
the selection gradient, a multiple regression-based
measure of the relationship between relative fitness and
variation (Arnold & Wade 1984; Lande & Arnold 1983).
Selection gradients have become a common currency
within evolutionary biology for estimating the strength
and mode of selection, and for making comparisons
between populations (e.g., Endler 1986; Hoekstra et al.
2001; Kingsolver et al. 2001). The actual methods used
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to obtain these measures are varied. Endler (1986) lists ten
common methods for detecting natural selection in the
wild and for the corresponding results that would
suggest its operation, as summarised in Table 1.
There are literally hundreds of examples of natural
selection being demonstrated in natural populations of
organisms by the above methods (Endler 1986). Recent
examples include Donley et al.’s (2004) analysis of
similar morphological and biomechanical specialisations
in lamnid sharks and tuna, such as a “thunniform” body
shape, in both cases caused by selection for fast movement
through water. This convergent evolution (Endler’s third
method) has occurred independently during the 400
million years since the two groups diverged from a
common ancestor. Marko (2005), meanwhile, found evi-
dence for character displacement (Endler’s second
method) in two closely related species of rocky-shore
gastropods. Significant differences in shell shape were
observed only where the two species overlapped, caused
by divergent selection as a result of competition.
3.3.2. Culture. Cultural traits have similarly been studied
in natural human populations, although mostly not within
an explicit evolutionary framework and hence without the
formalised hypotheses, methods, and measures of selec-
tion employed within evolutionary biology, as seen
above. We briefly discuss three relevant research tradi-
tions – anthropological field studies, rumour research,
and the diffusion of innovations – before outlining how
more formal, theoretically driven methods developed
within biology might be applied to cultural data.
First, anthropological field studies have examined the
acquisition of cultural knowledge in traditional societies.
Members of a community are typically interviewed to
find out from whom they acquired their knowledge or
skills. For example, Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986)
interviewed members of the Aka of central Africa,
finding that the majority (80.7%) of practical skills were
said to be acquired from parents, 5.2% from other family
members, and 12.3% from unrelated individuals. Simi-
larly, Aunger (2000a) found that food taboos are acquired
predominantly from biological parents in a horticultural
society in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with a sub-
sequent less influential phase of learning from non-kin.
Second, the field of social psychology devoted to rumour
research (Rosnow 1980; 1991) has generated a number of
field studies examining the transmission of rumours
through naturally occurring populations. A rumour is
defined as a belief passed from person to person without
secure standards of evidence being present (Allport &
Postman 1947, p. ix). Studies have used questionnaires to
track either naturally occurring or experimentally intro-
duced rumours through a small population. Jaeger et al.
(1980), for example, used confederates to plant a rumour
in a college that some students had been caught smoking
marijuana during final exams, with Jaeger et al. obtaining
details of transmission using questionnaires. Bordia and
Rosnow (1998) have more recently studied the trans-
mission of a rumour through an Internet community,
with the electronic record of communications allowing
the longitudinal study of all stages of transmission, rather
than relying on retrospective accounts.
Finally, research in sociology on the diffusion of inno-
vations (Rogers 1995) examines how new ideas and tech-
nologies are transmitted through naturally occurring
populations. Typically, questionnaires or interviews are
employed to assess the past and present use of the inno-
vation by the respondent, and used to compile a picture
of diffusion through the population. Classic studies have
examined the diffusion of new types of seed among
farmers (Ryan & Gross 1943) and antibiotic among
doctors (Coleman et al. 1966). A recurring finding from
more than 3,000 diffusion studies is an S-shaped cumulat-
ive adoption curve (Rogers 1995), which indicates a slow
initial uptake, followed by a rapid increase in adoption,
and finally another slow period as the population reaches
saturation (similar sigmoidal dynamics characterise the
diffusion of alleles).
Table 1. Methods for the detection of natural selection in the wild and results that would suggest the presence of selection as given by
Endler (1986, Ch. 3, esp. Table 3.1)
Method Result indicative of selection
1 Exploring the relationship between a trait and an
environmental factor (source of selection)
Correlation between the trait and an independent environmental
(selective) factor
2 Comparing closely related species living in the same
region
Homologous traits affected in same manner, e.g., divergence in
similar traits due to competition (character displacement)
3 Comparing unrelated species living in similar habitats Similarities in analogous traits due to convergent evolution
4 Comparing gene frequencies with those predicted by a
null (no selection) model
Deviation of gene or genotype frequencies, number of alleles, or
disequilibrium from the null model
5 Long-term study of trait distribution Long-term stability or regular directional change in the trait
6 Perturbation of natural populations Trait divergence from the new postperturbation mean
7 Long-term study of demography (e.g., survivorship,
fecundity)
Particular demographic patterns associated with particular trait
values over time
8 Comparing the trait distribution of different age –
classes or life-history stages
Differences in trait frequency distributions between age classes
9 Using knowledge of fitness, genetics, physiology, etc., to
predict short-term change in a trait
Predictions confirmed
10 Using fitness-maximisation models to predict an
observed trait frequency or distribution at equilibrium
Predictions confirmed
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Many of these diffusion studies, however, can be criti-
cised for not clearly identifying a priori the putative selec-
tion pressure responsible for the diffusion and then testing
this prediction in natural populations, as is commonly
done in evolutionary biology (Endler’s first method).
Instead, diffusion of innovations research has produced a
list of a posteriori and somewhat vague qualities that sup-
posedly explain diffusion rates, such as “trialability” or
“complexity” (Rogers 1995). One recent study that did
specify a priori a hypothesised selection pressure is
Bangerter and Heath’s (2004) study of the “Mozart
effect,” the idea that exposure to classical music enhances
intelligence, especially during childhood. Although it has
very weak scientific support, this idea has gained wide cur-
rency in the United States mass media, which Bangerter
and Heath (2004) hypothesised was because it offers a
cheap and easy way of supposedly enhancing one’s
child’s development. This hypothesis predicts that the
Mozart effect should be more prevalent in the mass
media of states where there is poor academic performance
and low spending on education, which Bangerter and
Heath showed to be the case.
3.3.3. Conclusions. There are some weak similarities
between the methods used by evolutionary biologists to
study evolution in naturally occurring populations of
organisms and those which have been used to study cul-
tural change “in the wild.” Rumours and innovations are
studied as they colonise novel environments, whereas
anthropological studies provide estimates of heritability.
The shorter timescale of some cultural evolution and the
ability of people to report its means of transmission
suggest that cultural evolution might be easier to detect
than biological evolution (although such verbal reports
would need to be supplemented with observational data).
The study of cultural evolution, however, is distinctly
lacking in formal tests for cultural selection, as opposed
to other forms of cultural change such as drift. Laland
and Brown (2002) have argued that each of Endler’s
(1986) methods for detecting natural selection in the
wild (Table 1) can be adapted for studying the selection
of naturally occurring cultural traits. As mentioned
above, sociological studies have successfully tracked
changes in the frequencies of various traits following
their natural or artificial introduction into a novel environ-
ment. The next step would be to demonstrate that these
changes in frequency are the result of selection, for
example, by comparing the frequency of a newly intro-
duced idea with the frequency of the idea in the parent
population from which it diffused, predicting directional
change. An alternative approach would be to test
whether stabilising selection was operating on the charac-
ter prior to the perturbation by investigating whether it
returns to the original equilibrium, as predicted. We also
encourage more studies like that of Bangerter and Heath
(2004), which identifies a priori a putative selection pres-
sure – anxiety about child development – responsible
for the spread of a cultural trait, and successfully predicts
the distribution of the trait from that selection pressure.
Another method is to investigate cultural character dis-
placement, in which two competing cultural lineages in
the same region diverge in order to reduce direct compe-
tition (Laland & Brown 2002). We might, for example,
predict that the religious beliefs of people who live side
by side with people of different, opposing beliefs (e.g.,
Muslims and Jews in the West Bank, or Catholics and Pro-
testants in Northern Ireland) will be more divergent and
extreme than the beliefs of people not in immediate
contact with competing beliefs (e.g., Muslims in neigh-
bouring Islamic countries such as Syria and Jews in
Jewish-only regions of Israel, or Catholics in the Republic
of Ireland and Protestants in mainland Britain).
Convergent cultural evolution, meanwhile, might be
detected where cultural lineages from distant yet similar
environments have evolved similar features. History is
likely to be littered with examples of similar, indepen-
dently evolved solutions to common problems, such as
the independent evolution of writing by the Sumerians
around 3000 B.C., the Chinese around 1300 B.C., and the
Mexican Indians around 600 B.C., all in response to a
need for stocktaking (Diamond 1998).
Studies of cultural evolution could also adapt the
measures of selection strength developed by biologists,
such as the selection gradient. Quantitative measures of
the rate of microevolution, like the darwin or the
haldane (Hendry & Kinnison 1999), might also be
adapted to the cultural case. There is much opportunity
here for the fertile transfer of good ideas from biology to
the social sciences, with many of the methods currently
being used by evolutionary biologists to investigate
natural selection in the wild yet to be tried by researchers
studying culture.
3.4. Evolutionary ecology
3.4.1. Biology. Ecology is the study of interactions
between organisms and their environments (Begon et al.
1996). Evolutionary ecology focuses on the evolutionary
processes by which organisms have become adapted to
their environments (Cockburn 1991; Futuyma 1998).
Such environmental features can be abiotic, such as temp-
erature or rainfall, or biotic, such as food sources, preda-
tors, parasites, competitors, or helpers of both the same
and different species. Ecologists have adopted a range of
methods to study these processes, including field studies,
natural and laboratory experiments, and mathematical
models. There is, therefore, a great deal of overlap with
biogeography and population genetics.
For example, Korpima¨ki et al. (2002) set out to deter-
mine whether predation was responsible for the 3-to-5-
year cycles in population densities of voles in northern
Europe. By experimentally reducing numbers of the
voles’ predators, Korpima¨ki et al. (2002) were able to
show a corresponding increase in the population density
of voles compared to non-manipulated vole populations.
This response was supported by a demographically based
population model which predicted that reduced predation
produces a shift from 3-to-5-year cycles of vole population
density to 1-year cycles.
3.4.2. Culture. Cultural traits can also be said to interact
with, and adapt to, their environment. The environment
in this case can be divided into three categories, two of
which roughly correspond to the abiotic and biotic features
that affect organisms. Hence, cultural traits may adapt to
physical features of the environment such as temperature
or rainfall. Cultural traits may also compete with and
adapt to other cultural knowledge, equivalent to the
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biotic environment. Finally, cultural traits may adapt to
biologically evolved or implicit features of human cogni-
tion. This has no exact equivalent in the biological world,
although perhaps there is a loose parallel in genetic or
developmental constraints on adaptation, or in the coevo-
lution of symbionts and hosts (Dennett 2001; 2002).
As their names suggest, cultural ecologists (e.g., Steward
1955) and human behavioural ecologists (e.g., Smith &
Winterhalder 1992) have studied the adaptation of cultural
traits to the physical and social environment. We discuss
here the rigorous and explicitly Darwinian field of
human behavioural ecology, which is directly equivalent
to (and indeed emerged from) behavioural ecology
within biology, usually using the same theoretical tools
and models, such as optimal foraging theory (Stephens
& Krebs 1986). Although human behavioural ecologists
often choose to downplay transmitted cultural processes,
such work is valuable within a cultural evolutionary frame-
work in specifying the microevolutionary process of cul-
tural adaptation and the adaptive cultural characters that
may be transmitted to subsequent generations.
The practical methods of human behavioural ecology,
like those of anthropology in general, involve observing
and recording behaviour in natural environments, typically
in small communities within traditional societies. Unlike
conventional anthropology, however, these observations
are guided by the predictions of formal mathematical
models. This fieldwork, as well as the theoretical models
it is designed to test, resembles the methods of evolution-
ary ecology. An example is the occurrence in Tibet of poly-
andry, which has been shown to be functionally adaptive
under the particularly harsh environmental conditions of
the region (Crook & Crook 1988).
As well as adapting to the physical environment, cultural
traits may also adapt to other pre-existing cultural infor-
mation. The study of this form of adaptation would incor-
porate competition between cultural traits, for which
ecological concepts such as exploitation or interference
might be useful. Mufwene (2001) has recently proposed
a detailed ecological theory of language evolution along
these lines.
Finally, because cultural traits rely predominantly on
human minds for their storage and transmission, there is
the possibility of adaptation to biologically evolved or
developmentally acquired cognitive features of those
minds. Hence, transmission experiments and field
studies can draw on findings from cognitive and develop-
mental psychology concerning implicit memory
structures, such as Mesoudi and Whiten’s (2004) demon-
stration that the hierarchical structure of memory shapes
the cultural transmission of event knowledge. Evolution-
ary psychology (e.g., Barkow et al. 1992) also provides a
rich theoretical and empirical body of research on bio-
logically evolved features of human cognition that might
be predicted to bias cultural transmission in particular
directions. Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) similarly argue
that the diversity of some cultural traits, such as religious
beliefs or classifications of animals and plants, is the
result of adaptation to biologically evolved domain-specific
cognitive capacities (e.g., folk biology; Atran 1998). There
is also evidence that biomechanical properties of the
human vocal apparatus significantly constrain the form
of words (MacNeilage & Davis 2000). The infant vocal
tract, for example, favours simple consonant-vowel
alternations such as “dada” and “mama” (MacNeilage &
Davis 2000), which may explain why such word forms
are used in many languages to denote parents.
Of course, cultural knowledge does not exist solely in
human brains and does not rely exclusively on face-
to-face communication for transmission. It may also be
fruitful to study the adaptation of cultural traits to alterna-
tive transmission media such as printed documents or the
Internet, and to examine whether such media are merely
direct extensions of cognitive capacities or whether they
generate their own novel transmission constraints (see
Donald 1991).
3.4.3. Conclusions. Cultural traits may adapt to the phys-
ical environment, to other cultural knowledge, or to bio-
logically evolved or implicit features of human cognition.
Although behavioural and cultural ecologists have pro-
duced a large body of work relating ecological factors to
cultural beliefs, knowledge, and skills, there is much less
work on adaptation to the latter two “cultural environ-
ments.” Anthropological fieldwork and psychological
experiments are needed which measure features of these
environments (pre-existing cultural knowledge and bio-
logically evolved or implicit aspects of cognition) and
make testable predictions regarding corresponding
features of culture.
3.5. Molecular Genetics
3.5.1. Biology. One of the major achievements of
twentieth-century biology was the discovery that sequences
of DNA comprise the major part of the molecular basis of
biological inheritance. Considerable progress has been
made in biology as a result of this knowledge. The fields
of molecular biology and genetics involve the study of the
structure of DNA, RNA, and proteins and the processes
involved in their inheritance and expression (Futuyma
1998; Watson et al. 1987).
Molecular genetics has a number of specific uses in
evolutionary biology (Futuyma 1998). As mentioned
above, molecular markers can be used to reconstruct
and date phylogenetic relationships, as well as provide
information on genetic variation, population structure,
and gene flow. Molecular techniques can also be used
to investigate the functions of specific genes in the devel-
opment of biochemical, morphological, or behavioural
phenotypic features.
3.5.2. Culture. One approach to culture that is explicitly
analogous to genetics is memetics. In order to illustrate
the universality and substrate-neutrality of his replicator-
centred theory of evolution, Dawkins (1976) coined the
term meme to describe a cultural replicator, or a unit of
cultural transmission. Memetics has been developed
further by Hull (1982), Dennett (1995), Blackmore
(1999), and Aunger (2000b; 2002), amongst others. A
common assumption of memetics is that cultural knowl-
edge is stored in brains as discrete packages of semantic
information, comparable to how biological information is
stored as genes. Once expressed in behaviour or artifacts,
these packages of learned information can be replicated in
the heads of other individuals through social learning.
The recently burgeoning literature promoting memetics
has attracted a number of criticisms (Laland & Brown
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2002). Some of these, such as the need to accommodate
the merging of lineages, apply equally to a general theory
of cultural evolution and have been discussed elsewhere
in this target article. Specific to memetics is the criticism
that culture cannot be divided into discrete units with
clearly specified boundaries (Bloch 2000; Midgley 2000).
However, the same putative “criticism” could equally be
levelled at modern concepts of the gene (Laland & Brown
2002). As documented by Portin (1993; 2002), the concept
of the gene has undergone significant changes through the
past 150 years. The classical view, held from the time of
Mendel (1866) until the 1930s, saw the gene as an indivi-
sible unit of transmission, recombination, mutation, and
function. That is, a gene is a unit of information that is
transmitted whole, within which no recombination
occurs, which mutates independently from other genes,
and which produces a single molecular product (as cap-
tured by James Watson’s famous canon, “DNA makes
RNA makes protein”). This simple and dated gene
concept seems to be the view of the gene held by many
social anthropologists who are critical of memetics.
Advances in genetics since the 1930s, however, have
shown this unitary gene concept to be inadequate and
overly restrictive. Further reconceptualisation began in
the 1970s following the discoveries of such phenomena as
overlapping genes, where the same stretch of DNA codes
for more than one protein;movable genes, DNA sequences
that move around the genome; and nested genes, which
reside inside other genes. Such revised conceptions have
continued in the wake of modern discoveries, such as
alternative splicing, nuclear and messenger RNA editing,
cellular protein modification, and genomic imprinting.
In alternative splicing, for example, one of several
alternative versions of an exon is transcribed into a
coding segment. Depending on which one is chosen,
different proteins can be produced from the same gene.
Exons can even be spliced in from other genes, and in
some cases this produces not just one or two variants,
but hundreds or even thousands. Alternative splicing is
not a rare or occasional event and it seems to occur in
approximately half of all human genes (Modrek & Lee
2002). Gone is the notion of “one gene–one protein.” In
fact, genes seem much more like ideas – information
that can be expressed in a multitude of different ways.
The modern concept of the gene is hence characterised
as abstract, general, and open, with fuzzy boundaries that
change depending on the context in which the term is
used (Portin 1993; 2002). Indeed, there are now multiple,
mutually incompatible gene concepts prevalent within
biology (Stotz & Griffiths 2004). So, although the critics
of memetics are probably correct in pointing out the
vaguely and flexibly specified nature of the meme
concept, exactly the same problem applies to the gene
concept, which undoubtedly has been of enormous value
in the study of biological evolution. The crucial point
here is that both empirical and theoretical traditions
within population biology have thrived in spite of this bio-
logical complexity, by using simple, discrete gene concepts.
However, there is still a gap between the detailed under-
standing of the cellular and molecular bases of genetic
inheritance and the somewhat informal ideas of memetics.
A more detailed picture of the mechanisms of cultural
transmission requires an understanding of how the brain
processes relevant information. Here, the most obvious
analogy might be between molecular genetics and the
molecular and cellular bases of learning and memory.
However, such learning can be usefully studied at levels
other than themolecular, ranging frompurely cognitive ana-
lyses that say little directly about underlying neural bases, to
studies that explicitly focus on supracellular aspects of how
imitative and related processes are executed in the brain,
studied through methods such as fMRI. These consider-
ations suggest that because the storage and transmission of
culturally transmitted information is so physically different
from the genetic, it is here that scientists studying cultural
transmission will need to venture further beyond the analo-
gies between cultural and biological evolution that we have
focused on so far. Already, one can perceive the beginnings
of what has been called a “social cognitive neuroscience”
that aims to integrate all the required levels of analysis.
Three of these levels – the neural, the whole-brain, and
the cognitive – are outlined here.
First, at the neural level, the social learning community
(see Hurley & Chater 2005) has hailed as highly significant
the discovery of “mirror neurons” in the prefrontal cortex
of monkeys, which activate both when the monkey observes
a specific goal-directed hand action, such as grasping an
object, and also when the monkey performs that same
action (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996). This
match between observation and execution of motor actions
has led some researchers to suggest that the mirror-neuron
system forms the basis both for imitation (Meltzoff &
Decety 2003; Rizzolatti et al. 2002; Williams et al. 2001),
which is one possible cultural transmission mechanism,
and for theory of mind (Gallese & Goldman 1998), which
has also been argued to be important in human cultural
transmission (Tomasello 1999; Tomasello et al. 1993).
However, it has long been argued that rather than single
memories or functions being determined by single
neurons, memory is more likely to be determined by pat-
terns of activation within neural circuits and the resulting
connection strengths between neurons (Hebb 1949).
Phenomena such as long-term potentiation (Bliss &
Lomo 1973) and long-term depression (Dunwiddie &
Lynch 1978), as well as a multitude of pre- and post-
synaptic changes in neural tissue, offer potential electro-
physiological and biochemical mechanisms underpinning
certain long-term memories (see Keysers & Perrett 2004
for a Hebbian-based model of social cognition). These
views of memory, in which single neurons are implicated
in a range of functions, and functions are determined by
more than one neuron, resemble the complexity found
in the genetic system discussed above, where one gene
has a potentially wide range of functions and expressions.
Aunger (2002) has recently attempted to integrate
memetics with neuroscience, arguing that a robust con-
ceptualisation of the “meme” must specify its material
basis in the brain. He proposes that memes should be
seen as electrochemical states of multiple neurons, and
offers a definition of a “neuromeme” as “a configuration
in one node of a neuronal network that is able to induce
the replication of its state in other nodes” (p. 197). As
Aunger acknowledges, however, any attempt to provide a
more detailed description and theory of a neuromeme is
severely limited by the current lack of understanding
within neuroscience concerning the precise neural and
molecular basis of how learned information is stored in
the brain. One problem specific to the present discussion
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is that rat and monkey models may be limited in their
relevance to studying culturally acquired information,
given these species’ limited capacity for culture, whereas
invasive single neuron recordings are not performed on
humans and other great apes.
Notwithstanding these complications, there is evidence
from cognitive neuropsychology that cultural knowledge is
often chunked and aggregated into higher-order know-
ledge structures that may be separable (Plotkin 2002b).
For example, there are several reports of category-specific
naming impairments of human patients with brain damage
who have been found to recognise and correctly name all
items except those in a specific category, such as fruits and
vegetables or country names (Crosson et al. 1997). Such
studies suggest that at least some learned knowledge
stored in human brains is organised into separable seman-
tic categories. There is also recent evidence that single
neurons in the human medial temporal lobe respond to
the higher-order abstract representation of a specific
person or building (Quiroga et al. 2005).
Second, the charting of imitation and related processes
at the whole-brain level has focused principally on
humans, including the study of neurological cases such
as apraxia and its associated imitation deficits (Goldenberg
& Hermsdorfer 2002) and fMRI studies of imitation in
normal (Iacoboni et al. 2001; Rumiati et al. 2004) and
other groups, such as autistic individuals who experience
difficulties in imitation (Avikainen et al. 1999).
Third, if neuronal studies have been largely restricted to
monkeys and whole-brain studies to adult humans, it is
research at the cognitive level regarding social learning
in great apes and, more recently, human children that
has generated the richest current taxonomies of cultural
learning, delineating such processes as program-level imi-
tation, emulation, and affordance learning (Byrne &
Russon 1998; Tomasello et al. 1993; Want & Harris
2002; Whiten & Ham 1992; Whiten et al. 2004). Cognitive
models that seek to explain how these operate have begun
to proliferate but remain few and quite crude in compari-
son to our understanding of genetic transmission mechan-
isms; they include Meltzoff and Moore’s (1997) active
intermodal matching (AIM), Heyes’s (2005) associative
sequence learning (ASL), and Byrne’s (1999) string
parsing models. Interestingly, all of these models appeal
to a foundation of mirror-neuron function, leading
Whiten (2005a) to question whether they really solve, or
instead merely assume to be solved, the essential “corre-
spondence problem” (Nehaniv & Dautenhahn 2002) of
mapping between equivalent actions in a model and a cul-
tural learner. Others have explicitly tackled this problem in
offering neural network models proposed to be capable of
learning the appropriate correspondences (Keysers &
Perrett 2004; Laland & Bateson 2001). Keysers and
Perrett (2004) review data consistent with their hypothesis
that in monkeys this is achieved by circuits linking pre-
motor area F5, inferior parietal cortex PF/PFG, and the
superior temporal sulcus, and by the homologues of
these areas in humans.
3.5.3. Conclusions. Whereas genetic information is rep-
resented in sequences of DNA molecules, cultural infor-
mation is represented primarily in the brain. Viewing
culture as comprised of discrete units of information, or
memes, can potentially make a complex system
theoretically and empirically tractable, in the same way
as the gene concept advanced biologists’ understanding
of biological evolution. Although memes can be character-
ised as vague entities with flexible and fuzzy boundaries, so
can the modern concept of the gene. It should be remem-
bered that there were at least 50 years of productive inves-
tigation into biological microevolution before the
molecular basis of genetic inheritance was determined,
and even now it is only partly understood.
A deeper understanding of the neural and molecular
basis of culturally acquired information must rely on tech-
nological advances in, for example, neuroimaging tech-
niques. However, we should also reserve the possibility
that the same cultural information is specified by different
neural substrates in different brains, severely limiting such
methods for studying cultural transmission. In this case
there may be no cultural equivalent to molecular
biology, although models and methods examining cultural
transmission at the behavioural and cognitive levels can
still provide important insights.
Another possibility is that such methods will reveal that
certain aspects of cultural transmission are not particulate
and are better characterised in terms of a blending
process. Even in this case, however, evolutionary models
are still applicable (Henrich & Boyd 2002). Indeed,
Darwin formulated his theory of evolution with little
understanding of genes or Mendelian inheritance.
Delineation of the neural basis of cultural information
will also bear on another oft-cited putative dis-analogy
between biological and cultural evolution: that there is no
clear equivalent to the genotype-phenotype (or replicator-
interactor) distinction in culture. Loosely, we can speak
of culturally acquired semantic information stored in
brains as replicators and the expression of that information
in behaviour or artifacts as their interactors. However,
without further advances in memetics and neuroscience,
such a division is somewhat speculative. It may prove
that forcing cultural inheritance too tightly into the biologi-
cal model is in this case unproductive (Aunger [2002], for
example, has developed an alternative model of cultural
transmission based on signal theory).
The delineation of the genotype-phenotype distinction
will also bear on whether cultural inheritance can be
described as “Darwinian” or “Lamarckian,” the former
maintaining Weismann’s barrier between replicator and
interactor, and the latter involving the inheritance of
acquired phenotypic variation. Ultimately, we do not
think that researchers should get too distracted by
whether strict analogies to the replicator-interactor dis-
tinction can be drawn or whether cultural inheritance is
Darwinian or Lamarckian, especially when the necessary
neuropsychological evidence is lacking. Many of the
methods described elsewhere in this article can be
pursued despite a poor understanding of cultural trans-
mission at the neural level.
3.6. Microevolution: General conclusions
The comparison between biological and cultural micro-
evolution has produced mixed results. First, a well-
developed body of theory exists which has drawn on the
mathematical population genetic models within biology to
provide a rigorous and successful analysis of cultural evol-
ution. This is predominantly the work of gene-culture
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coevolution, although neutral models of genetic drift
have recently also been successfully applied to cultural
traits.
Second, experimental and field studies of cultural
microevolution typically lack the rigour of equivalent
studies within experimental and field population genetics.
Explicit tests for selection, such as the artificial selection
paradigm or Endler’s (1986) various tests for selection in
natural populations, and quantitative measures of the
strength of that selection, such as selection gradients,
have not yet been employed. A number of opportunities
exist for psychologists, field anthropologists, sociologists,
and experimental economists to adapt some of these
tools and methods developed in biology to the study of
cultural microevolution.
Third, there is currently a limited correspondence
between our understanding of molecular genetics and the
molecular or neural basis of cultural inheritance. This is pri-
marily due to limitations in the tools of neuroscience, such as
imaging techniques, which cannot yet reveal exactly how
information is acquired by and stored in the brain, nor the
relationship between models of social learning and models
of memory. Much potential exists, however, to develop
further cognitive models of social learning.
4. Differences between biological and cultural
evolution
Despite the plethora of studies reviewed above, which we
have argued can be viewed as part of a larger field of cul-
tural evolution, many of these studies, as well as the evolu-
tionary approach in general, have yet to gain acceptance by
mainstream cultural anthropology and related social
sciences. One reason for this resistance is that many
social scientists see a number of fundamental differences
between biological and cultural change that, they argue,
invalidate an evolutionary analysis of culture. We have
already seen that upon closer examination of either the
biological or the cultural evidence, a number of these pur-
ported differences become either illusory or unimportant
to the validity of the comparison (e.g., the horizontal trans-
fer of cultural information causing cultural lineages to
blend and merge [sect. 2.1.2]; the apparent lack of discrete
particles in culture equivalent to genes [sect. 3.5.2]; and
the lack of a clear equivalent to the genotype-phenotype
distinction and the related issue of Lamarckian inheritance
[sect. 3.5.3]).
Another putative difference is the frequent argument
that, whereas biological evolution is “blind” with respect
to long-term goals (i.e., mutation is independent of selec-
tion), cultural change is often intentionally directed
toward some specific goal (e.g., Bryant 2004; Pinker
1997, pp. 208–210). However, the extent to which
culture is intentionally directed and the precise effect of
this intention on long-term cultural change are empirical
issues. In fact, studies of technological innovation (e.g.,
Basalla 1988) and creativity (e.g., Simonton 1995)
suggest that successful inventions and discoveries are fre-
quently either the result of trial and error or the un-
intended by-products of attempts to solve unrelated
problems. Conversely, biological evolution is also to a
degree directed in the sense that potential mutations, par-
ticularly the minority that will be subject to selection, are
heavily constrained by a species’ history of selection (see
Hull et al. 2001; Mesoudi et al. 2004). This is not to
suggest that there are no differences here – on the con-
trary, “smart variants,” biologically evolved biases in cogni-
tion and other cultural traits, may guide behaviour in a
non-random direction (Laland et al. 2000). There is evi-
dence of both directed and undirected variation in
human culture, and the relative importance of each is cur-
rently unknown. We maintain that critics must empirically
demonstrate that the existence of intent does in fact
invalidate an evolutionary account of human culture, and
moreover, must explain why many of the evolutionary
methods discussed above (e.g., the phylogenetic analyses)
work equally well for both biological and cultural evolution
despite this alleged difference.
One potentially valid criticism of some accounts of cul-
tural evolution is the treating of all cultural traits as equiv-
alent. In previous sections we have described beliefs,
behaviour, technological artifacts, languages, and social
systems as examples of a somewhat simplistic notion of
the “cultural trait.” Undoubtedly, cultural evolutionary
processes will sometimes act differently on different
forms of cultural variation, frequently generating distinct
evolutionary dynamics for each. It is already well estab-
lished that vertically and horizontally transmitted traits,
conformist transmission, and direct and indirect biases
will each exhibit different but characteristic dynamics
(Boyd & Richerson 1985). We have no doubt that the
pattern and intensity of selection acting on fads and
fashions will be quite different from that acting on estab-
lished norms and institutions. In a sense, this is not too dis-
similar to the biological case, where alternative traits may
be subject to different forms of selection and where multi-
level selection models are commonplace.
Plotkin (2002b) has furthermore argued that “social
constructions,” cultural traits such as justice or money
that exist only because of shared agreement, require a fun-
damentally different explanation from concrete traits such
as technological artifacts, and have no real equivalent in
the biological domain. Like Plotkin, we do not believe
that this invalidates an evolutionary approach to culture;
rather, it requires a different evolutionary treatment
from the one developed within biology. An evolutionary
consideration of social constructions and a detailed taxo-
nomy of cultural traits are, however, beyond the scope of
this article. The important point is that deviations from
the biological case such as this do not necessarily invalidate
an evolutionary approach to culture; they merely require
novel treatments of cultural phenomena within a general
evolutionary framework.
5. Nonhuman culture
We end by considering the burgeoning literature that has
emerged in the last few years regarding nonhuman social
learning and culture (see Avital & Jablonka 2000; Byrne
et al. 2004; Fragaszy & Perry 2003; Laland & Hoppitt
2003; Whiten 2005b; Whiten et al. 2003), which suggest
parallels with the work on human learning and culture dis-
cussed above. Irrespective of the similarities and differ-
ences between human and animal culture, here we ask
whether the above methods can be fruitfully employed
to study the behavioural traditions of other species.
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First, there is evidence from a number of species of
behavioural traditions not obviously attributable to
genetic or ecological differences, and hence thought to
constitute socially learned cultural patterns. For example,
Whiten et al. (1999; 2001) documented 39 putative cultural
traits in chimpanzees from various regions of Africa, such
as tool usage and grooming behaviour. Similar regional
differences inferred to be cultural in origin have been
observed in orangutans (van Schaik et al. 2003) and capu-
chins (Fragaszy & Perry 2003; Perry et al. 2003a), as well as
in the vocalisations of birds (Catchpole & Slater 1995) and
mammals (especially cetaceans: Janik & Slater 1997), and
behavioural traditions in fish (Helfman & Schultz 1984;
Warner 1990). There are obvious parallels here with the
databases compiled by cultural anthropologists documen-
ting worldwide geographical variation in human culture.
Second, Mercader et al. (2002) have used traditional
archaeological techniques to excavate a site in Africa
used by chimpanzees for at least the past 20 years to
crack nuts using stone hammers and wooden anvils. Con-
siderable evidence of past nut-cracking behaviour was
uncovered, specifically nutshell and fractured stone, the
latter of which the authors claimed was indistinguishable
from a subset of the earliest and simplest stone tool assem-
blages left by hominid ancestors. Although the finds were
probably very recent compared with the cultural artifacts
studied by archaeologists, this study suggests that the
same methods can potentially be used to uncover evidence
of past nonhuman cultural behaviour.
Third, a number of studies have tracked the diffusion of
innovations within nonhuman communities, paralleling
the research tradition of the same name for human tech-
nology (Rogers 1995). The most famous case is the diffu-
sion of potato-washing in a community of Japanese
macaques (Kawai 1965). Lefebvre (1995) found that 16
of 21 reported cases of the diffusion of foraging inno-
vations in primates exhibit a rapid accelerating pattern of
adoption characteristic of cultural transmission (an
example of which is the S-shaped distribution reported
by Rogers 1995), although Laland and Kendal (2003)
and Reader (2004) have expressed reservations about
inferring learning mechanisms from diffusion curves.
Whiten et al. (2005) have recently employed a more
experimental approach to studying the spread of alterna-
tive foraging techniques in different groups, creating the
potential to track diffusion dynamics more reliably.
Fourth, population genetic modelling has been used to
analyse patterns of nonhuman culture, specifically birdsong.
Lynch and Baker (1993) found that the geographical distri-
bution of chaffinch songs can be accounted for by a neutral
model in which mutation, migration, and drift are at equili-
brium. Lachlan and Slater (1999) adopted gene-culture
coevolutionmethods to find that vocal learning can bemain-
tained in a “cultural trap” formed by the interaction between
genes (which specify the constraints on songs) and culture
(the songs themselves). Gene-culture coevolutionary
methods have also been used to explore how song learning
might affect speciation (Beltman et al. 2004) and the
evolution of brood parasitism (Beltman et al. 2003).
Fifth, the experimental transmission chain method
devised by Bartlett (1932) has been used to study the
social learning of mobbing in blackbirds (Curio et al.
1978) and food preferences in rats (Laland & Plotkin
1990; 1993). Jacobs and Campbell’s (1961) replacement
method has been used to study the transmission of food
preferences in rats (Galef & Allen 1995) and route prefer-
ence in guppies (Laland & Williams 1997; 1998).
These various studies demonstrate that many of the
same methods used to investigate biological evolution or
human cultural evolution can be applied to nonhuman
culture. Studying human and nonhuman culture within
the same theoretical framework is likely to provide import-
ant insights into the evolutionary origins of human culture
and the psychological mechanisms underpinning it.
6. Conclusions
The evidence discussed in this article suggests that much
potential exists for a comprehensive science of cultural
evolution with broadly the same structure as the science
of biological evolution, as outlined in Figure 1. This poten-
tial is already being realised for the study of cultural
macroevolution and the mathematical modelling of
cultural microevolution, with methods developed within
evolutionary biology, such as phylogenetic analyses and
population genetic models, being applied to cultural
data. A number of opportunities exist for psychologists,
sociologists, and experimental economists to adopt the
experimental methods and tools developed in population
genetics to simulate cultural microevolution and detect
cultural evolution “in the wild.” Finally, the study of the
neural basis of cultural transmission is seemingly depen-
dent on advances in new technologies that should reveal
how culturally acquired information is represented in
the brain.
We have also seen some examples where the explicit
adoption of an evolutionary framework or evolutionary
methods has provided significant advances over traditional
nonevolutionary methods. For example, phylogenetic ana-
lyses have provided a solution for Galton’s problem when
comparing societies related by descent, and evolutionary
“population thinking” allows more accurate descriptions
of archaeological artifacts than does an essentialist
perspective.
One reason why evolutionary biology has been relatively
successful is that a unifying evolutionary framework
encourages and stimulates cross-disciplinary work. Some
cross-disciplinary borrowing has already been seen in the
study of cultural macroevolution, with phylogenetic
methods increasingly used in both archaeology and
cultural anthropology. As more researchers adopt the
evolutionary framework outlined here, we anticipate the
occurrence of more such borrowing. For example, exper-
imental studies of cultural transmission might explicitly
test the predictions of theoretical models, and empirical
findings might in turn be used to inform the assumptions
of further models. Experimental work might also simulate
the findings of archaeologists and anthropologists to deter-
mine the possible transmission mechanisms underlying
certain historical and geographical macroevolutionary
patterns.
Although we advocate the adoption of a number of
methods and approaches developed within evolutionary
biology, we do not advocate the slavish and dogmatic
imitation of evolutionary biology. Cultural inheritance is
undoubtedly different in many respects from biological
inheritance, and novel mathematical analyses and
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empirical investigations into cultural dynamics that deviate
from the biological case are necessary (Richerson & Boyd
2005). As noted above, cultural phenomena such as social
constructions have yet to be dealt with in evolutionary
terms. At the same time, however, these deviations do
not invalidate an evolutionary framework. For example,
subtle refinements of traditional biological methods have
been found to enhance the validity of the mathematical
modelling tradition described in section 3.1.2.
Furthermore, despite the impression perhaps given in
this target article, we should also bear in mind that evolu-
tionary biology is, like any other science, far from perfect
and is continually changing and updating its methods.
Indeed, evolutionary biologists may well benefit from con-
sidering evolutionary systems alternative to their own, or
from utilising methods developed by social scientists.
In short, we submit that the argument that culture exhi-
bits a number of key Darwinian properties is well sup-
ported and we advocate taking advantage of this in order
to use evolutionary biology as a model for integrating a
multitude of separate approaches within the social
sciences and, where appropriate, borrowing some of the
methods developed by evolutionary biologists to solve
similar problems. Putting disparate studies from presently
unconnected disciplines together into a broad evolution-
ary context adds value to each of the individual studies
because it illustrates that the degree of progress in this
area is far more impressive than hitherto conceived. We
suggest that these studies can now be said to be aligned
within a unified “movement” and that if this Darwinian
evolutionary movement could be better coordinated, a
more persuasive and important direction could be given
to much work in the social sciences.
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Open Peer Commentary
Culture evolves only if there is cultural
inheritance
Robert Aunger
Hygiene Centre, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London
WC1E 7HT.
robert.aunger@lshtm.ac.uk www.robertaunger.net
Abstract: Mesoudi et al. argue that the current inability to identify the
means by which cultural traits are acquired does not debilitate their
project to draw clear parallels between cultural and biological
evolution. However, I suggest that cultural phenomena may be
accounted for by biological processes, unless we can identify a cultural
“genotype” that carries information from person to person
independently of genes.
In their Introduction, Mesoudi et al. argue that culture is socially
acquired information, and that cultural evolution is the selective
retention of favourable cultural variants (plus drift). They also
argue that cultural phenomena exhibit the necessary character-
istics of an evolutionary process: variation, selection, and inheri-
tance. Here, I would like to suggest that the cultural evolutionary
literature has not yet determined whether the inheritance
relation holds for cultural traits.
The authors argue that cultural evolutionary studies are cur-
rently in the state that characterized evolutionary biology prior
to identification of genes as the unit of inheritance – we merely
lack our Watson and Crick to identify the “memes” of culture.
However, this historical analogy is a false one, because culture
need not be independent of biology – indeed, genetic evolution
may be able to account for the phenomena we consider to be cul-
tural. The lack of knowledge about inheritance relationships was
not such a problem for evolutionary biology because it was
obvious that some sort of transmission process was necessary to
account for the intergenerational similarity of phenotypes, with
variation, observed in populations of organisms. However, it is
possible for genetic or environmental processes to account for
what many consider to be cultural behaviour, making cultural
explanation superfluous (Aunger 2002). Richerson and Boyd
(2005) argue, on the contrary, that there are many cases where
the only explanation for group-specific behaviours is cultural
transmission, because no environmental variable correlates
with the distribution of such behaviours spatially, making an
environmentally determinist explanation impossible. Such a
case, they believe, implies the existence of cultural genotypes
being passed from person to person through a social learning
process which operates independently of physical environments.
However, evolutionary psychologists counter with the
“jukebox model” – the idea that evolution may have stored
sophisticated behavioural repertoires in our brains through
prior natural selection which are triggered by environmental
cues, much as a jukebox plays a particular record when a specific
button is pushed (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). In the case of
jukebox-like causation, the cues could be social, and as
complex as the observation that most people in the local area
are exhibiting a particular behaviour. The consequence is thus
a change of behaviour by the observer of conspecifics – but the
cause of the behaviour itself is not acquired as a result of obser-
ving the conspecific, only the choice of the behaviour. What has
occurred is simply the operation of a bias rule: “when in
Rome . . .” Such rules, coupled with the retrieval of pre-existing
behavioural knowledge from a mental storehouse, could
account for the apparent group-specific and frequency-
dependent nature of many cultural traits. Both the cultural
transmissionist and jukebox accounts involve a form of social
learning; however, the resulting evolutionary dynamics are
quite different, because the jukebox model suggests that new
behaviours are acquired only through individual learning and
genetic assimilation, whereas the cultural transmissionist
account can rapidly produce novel behaviours through a
Lamarckian process of knowledge exchanged through imitation.
Neuroscientific advances concerning how brains acquire and
store information can help us understand how individuals learn
from their surroundings. However, even a precise understanding
at a molecular level of how the brain stores information does not
answer the central cultural evolutionary question: whether infor-
mation is replicated through transmission between individuals.
We need to establish that, in the process of communication,
one brain produces speech (for example), and that this speech
transforms the hearer’s brain. But we also need to know that
the communication introduces new information to the hearer’s
brain which resembles the information in the speaker’s brain
that caused the speech in the first place. That would be a true
relationship of inheritance and would constitute a process of
information acquisition from others through a mechanism
other than gene replication (Aunger 2002). Hence, models of
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social learning must be matched to models of memory before we
can determine whether units of cultural inheritance (cultural
genotypes) exist.
A related argument often used to justify the assumption that
there must be cultural transmission is the fact that human
culture is cumulative: For each generation, there seems to be a
larger store of knowledge which cannot have arisen through
genetic causes; culture changes too fast to be genetic, in effect
(Tomasello et al. 1993). However, it is possible that this accumu-
lation is occurring not in people’s brains but in the technological
world we have created. Niche construction can result in
the inheritance of information through the persistence of
information-bearing artefacts from generation to generation
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The interaction of social learning
with artefacts makes humans such a powerful force for environ-
mental change (Aunger 2002; Donald 1991). Again, the exact
nature of the exchange of information between people and
their technological products is not clear. It is possible that
much of the “knowledge” associated with technological practices
is embodied in “cognitive artefacts” themselves (Hutchins 1995),
which “afford” humans the perception of increased intrinsic
power (Norman 1988).
There are obvious examples of Darwinian processes involving
information replication – and hence inheritance – through pro-
cesses not involving genes. In one case, units of computer code –
call them “instructions” – exist as states of computer memory
(the instruction’s genotype), but also have consequences that
lead to the production of exact replicas in other machines
through infection – epidemics of computer viruses, in effect.
Similarly, prions are infectious proteins which can cause other
proteins to acquire their information by reshaping them; the
prion’s genotype is an abnormal shape that can be duplicated
through a process of refolding of another protein via contact
with an existing prion molecule (Prusiner 1995). In both cases,
non-genetic information is duplicated and spreads through a
population of hosts (computer memory and protein molecules,
respectively).
In some ways, it is thus clearer that evolutionary processes are
occurring in the environment than in social groups of human
beings. This is because it is still not known whether culture as
normally considered – as a pool of information in people’s
heads modified via the inter-individual transmission of informa-
tion – involves the transfer from person to person of a cultural
genotype. As a result, it is still unclear whether culture evolves
independently of DNA. We therefore need to identify a cultural
inheritance process – and thereby exclude the possibilities of
jukebox-like recall or niche construction as accounts of how indi-
viduals come to exhibit similar “cultural” behaviours – before the
analogy the authors make between genetic and cultural evolution
will be secure. How this project will be undertaken is not clear.
Vertical/compatible integration versus
analogizing with biology
Jerome H. Barkow
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4P9, Canada.
Barkow@dal.ca http://is.dal.ca/barkow/home.htm
Abstract: Vertical/compatible theoretical integration provides an
alternative way of unifying sociocultural anthropology and related
disciplines. It involves analyzing theoretical statements for their implicit
and explicit assumptions at multiple levels of analysis and then
determining whether these assumptions are compatible with consensus
in the relevant disciplines (e.g., does the sociological theory include an
assumption at odds with consensus psychology?). Incompatibilities
indicate a need for further research. This approach is much more likely
to salvage the bulk of humanities-oriented anthropology than is that of
the authors.
Mesoudi et al. are to be congratulated for their survey of biology,
and I agree with much of what they say. For example, sociocul-
tural anthropology clearly has not progressed in the cumulative
fashion of evolutionary biology. (Goody [1982, p. 8] is probably
right in arguing that the former field tends to mistake mere
changes in emphasis for progress.) I also agree with the
authors’ implicit position that training in biology (and psycho-
logy!) should be a prerequisite for training in anthropology.
But here our reasons differ.
Biology may owe its integration to Darwin, but not necessarily
its success. I have met biologists who know little of Darwin,
whereas that branch of biology known as medicine achieved
much even in its pre-Darwinian, pre-Ewald, and pre-Nesse
and Williams days (Ewald 1994; Nesse & Williams 1994). No
doubt the social sciences would benefit if more of its practitioners
were trained in some area of biology. I suspect, however, that had
the authors’ expertise combined meteorology and anthropology,
they would have made a similarly convincing case for the
former field’s probabilistic models promise of unity for the
human sciences.
The authors’ proposal neglects most of sociocultural anthropo-
logy and related fields. What they include is worthy, but they pay
scant attention to the likelihood that very few of the field’s prac-
titioners are interested in modeling their endeavor on any
science, whether biology or meteorology. Perhaps this is why we
are reading this article where we are reading it, and not in
Current Anthropology. Most of sociocultural anthropology has,
in the past 25 to 30 years, joined the humanities.When social scien-
tists speak of “theory” nowadays, they usually mean social philo-
sophy and political commentary, and the research they conduct
only occasionally involves hypothesis testing. This is not the place
to discuss why this is true, but a glance at the table of contents of
any issue of the American Anthropologist will confirm that it is
indeed so. My point, however, is neither to condemn nor to
lament this state of affairs but to recommend salvage.
Rather than seeking to rebuild the social sciences (largely)
from those bits and pieces that have analogues in biology, an
alternative both more modest and more feasible exists: the
approach of vertical/compatible explanation (Barkow 1989a;
1989b; 2006; Cosmides et al. 1992; Walsh 1997). Not just
biology but the sciences as a whole have been so successful in
part because they take vertical integration for granted. This
means, for example, that a chemist does not seek to reduce chem-
istry to physics but does assume that the principles of physics
apply to every chemical process. Biologists do not reduce evolu-
tion to nothing but chemistry but do assume that biological pro-
cesses are compatible with what we understand of chemistry.
Scientific psychologists take care to ensure that their theories
are compatible with biology (including evolutionary biology), as
well as with chemistry and physics. And so forth. If we are to
apply this idea to sociocultural anthropology and the rest of the
human sciences, then their theories must be tested for compat-
ibility with psychology (and biology, etc.). This is not a reductio-
nistic argument, and “compatible” does not imply “nothing
but” – each level has its own theories, and no one would think
to reduce ecology to chemistry or the social sciences to psycho-
logy. The approach is not necessarily even entirely hierarchi-
cal – theories of consciousness need to be compatible with
what we know of neurophysiology but they may or may not be
at the same level of organization.
Vertical/compatible integration is usually ignored in the
human sciences as a matter of ideology (confusingly labelled
“theory”). Most of sociocultural anthropology and sociology
interprets Emile Durkheim as having established the principle
that one must ignore the psychological. In practice, a non-
psychological (often anti-psychological) approach is a group-
identity marker and hence never questioned (see Barkow
1989b for discussion and exceptions). But vertical/compatible
integration can, unlike the admittedly useful analogize-
with-biology approach argued by the authors, rescue (in the
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sense of “become part of mainstream science”) much of sociocul-
tural anthropology and related fields.
The “rescue” involves applying the compatibility test. This task
is possible and worth doing but not necessarily easy, given the
often vague vocabulary and ever-changing buzzwords of the
disciplines involved. The goal is to salvage the bulk of existing
sociocultural anthropology – all those studies of that change-
in-scale phenomenon now labeled “globalization,” all those
multi-sited ethnographies, all those moral mission ethnographies
seeking to expose social injustice – all of this simply wonderful,
even if humanities-rather-than-science-oriented – anthropology.
The material now becomes ore to mine and then to refine by
passage through the compatibility sieve. Wherever a sociological
assumption (e.g., the “glass ceiling” is socially constructed rather
than a reflection of different male/female fitness interests) rings
the incompatibility bell, there is a problem to be addressed.
Perhaps one discipline is right and the other wrong, perhaps
both are wrong – let us seek a grant to study the issue.
Academic disciplines are fairly autonomous, and it is very
doubtful that most sociocultural anthropologists will pay atten-
tion either to the authors’ call for biology or to my own for
vertical/compatible integration. Instead, humanities-oriented
anthropologists will probably simply lose the turf war as policy-
makers and the educated public turn to the hypothesis testers,
the data gatherers, the mathematical model builders for their
understanding of human societies. But I think that vertical/
compatible integration represents a way of salvaging much of
the existing discipline. Both the efforts advocated by the authors
and the approach for which I am here spreading propaganda,
are entirely compatible, and I would like to see both proceed.
Why we need memetics
Susan Blackmore
31 Berkeley Road, Bishopston, Bristol BS7 8HF, United Kingdom.
susan.blackmore@blueyonder.co.uk
http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/index.htm
Abstract:Memes are not best understood as semantic information stored
in brains, but rather, as whatever is imitated or copied in culture.
Whereas other theories treat culture as an adaptation, for memetics it
is a parasite turned symbiont that evolves for its own sake. Memetics is
essential for understanding today’s information explosion and the
future evolution of culture.
Mesoudi et al. have helpfully situated memetics within the frame-
work of theories of cultural evolution. I disagree with parts of their
formulation and suggest some further reasons why memetics is
essential for understanding cultural evolution.
First, Mesoudi et al. claim that “A common assumption of
memetics is that cultural knowledge is stored in brains as discrete
packages of semantic information” (target article, sect. 3.5.2,
para. 1). I disagree. This was not assumed by Dawkins (1976)
when he invented the term “meme” thirty years ago this year,
nor by Dennett (1991; 1995), nor by me (Blackmore 1999;
2001). Aunger (2002) does take this view, but otherwise it is
mostly the critics of memetics who do so – aiding their attempts
to demolish memetics.
There are at least three issues here: whether memes must be
stored in brains, whether they are discrete, and whether they
consist of semantic information. The discreteness issue is
clearly dealt with by the authors, so I shall comment on the
other two. Like others, I have argued that memes need not
exist in brains, and this follows directly from Dawkins’s original
formulation. He derived the term “meme” from the Greek
mimeme, meaning “that which is imitated,” giving as examples
“tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making
pots or of building arches.” Ideas (if such a vague term can be
pinned down) may arguably be thought of as semantic infor-
mation in brains – depending on one’s definition of
“idea” – but what about skills and fashions? A new skill copied
from someone else undoubtedly involves changes in the brain,
but these changes are not “semantic information” and in any
case they are not what is copied; somehow, through the complex-
ities of the human capacity for imitation, a second person ends up
acquiring a new skill from having observed the first. By defi-
nition, whatever is copied in that process is the meme. This
may be a hard concept to pin down and to build theories upon,
but we miss the point if we think of memes as little bullets of
information inside heads.
Mesoudi et al. also claim that “cultural information is repre-
sented primarily in the brain” (sect. 3.5.3). Since it is hard to
measure quantities of cultural information, I cannot dispute
this, but I would like to point out that as every day passes, more
and more cultural information is being stored in computers and
digital media of various kinds. Just as we can reconstruct a little
of ancient Greek philosophy from the memes left behind by its
proponents, so a future civilisation might reconstruct a great
deal of our culture from the far more extensive memetic debris
left behind. Memetics can handle this far better than other the-
ories of cultural evolution, including the possibility that memes
might continue to thrive and evolve even if all humans died.
Mesoudi et al. comment that there is no clear equivalent of the
genotype/phenotype distinction in culture, an issue bearing on
the vexed question of whether cultural inheritance is “Darwinian”
or “Lamarckian.” I agree with them that without further advances
the distinction is speculative, but I would like to go further.
Memes are relatively new on this planet, and their replication
and storage has not yet settled down to anything like the efficient
system adopted by genes. If evolutionary systems themselves
evolve, then we should expect improvements in their copying
and storage systems over time. The process of separating the
genotype and phenotype protects against information loss and
is an obvious improvement (more generally conceptualised
as a shift from “copy-the-product” to “copy-the-instructions”;
Blackmore 1999).
We can see that this shift has happened in memetic evolution
in the past and it is still going on today. Unaided human imitation
is crude and unreliable, entailing huge information loss, but
human meme machines were only a first step in the coevolution
between memes and their copying machinery. The evolution of
language improved fidelity, and writing and printing presses
improved fecundity and longevity, but more recently new pro-
cesses have appeared that have a clear distinction analogous to
Weismann’s barrier. An example is the program with which
this commentary is being written – Microsoft Word. All over
the planet there are millions of copies of this program that are
all identical, or very nearly so. Yet each copy of Word leads to
completely different documents, and it is the success of these
documents that prompts people to buy copies of Word and the
factories to turn out more of them. Copying the instructions for
making documents leads to much faster evolution than copying
the documents themselves.
So do we need memetics? Yes, because of the fundamental
difference between memetics and all other theories of cultural
evolution. This is best illustrated by Dennett’s (1995) powerful
question “Who benefits?” According to other theories, culture
is an adaptation, and (in spite of occasional maladaptive cultural
traits) the genes will always, as Wilson puts it, “keep culture on a
leash” (Lumsden & Wilson 1981). In this view humans or their
genes are the ultimate beneficiaries. Until recently Boyd and
Richerson’s theorising appeared to be close to memetics, but
they have now made it clear that they do not consider memes
to be replicators that evolve for their own sake (Richerson &
Boyd 2005). So for them, too, culture is an adaptation.
According to memetics, culture is not and never was an adap-
tation. It began as a by-product of the evolved capacity for imita-
tion that then took off on its own evolutionary trajectory, using us
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humans to grow and evolve for its own benefit. It is more like a
parasite turned symbiont than an adaptation.
This makes a big difference not only to how we understand
human evolution but to our predictions for the future.
Memetic evolution constructed human brains and is now build-
ing better, higher fidelity meme machines, including computers,
the Internet, and digital media. For the moment we humans are
essential to the further evolution of the memosphere, but there
are already many memes created that never have contact with
a human being, and there will be more. Memetics alone makes
sense of this and will help us understand what is happening.
Analogies are powerful and dangerous things
Monique Borgerhoff Mulder,a,b Richard McElreath,a,b and
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Abstract: The analogy between biological and cultural evolution is not
perfect. Yet, as Mesoudi et al. show, many of the vaunted differences
between cultural and genetic evolution (for example, an absence of
discrete particles of cultural inheritance, and the blurred distinction
between cultural replicators and cultural phenotypes) are, on closer
inspection, either illusory or peripheral to the validity of the analogy.
But what about horizontal transmission? We strongly agree with the
authors that the potential for horizontal transmission of cultural traits
does not invalidate an evolutionary approach to culture. We suggest,
however, that it does require a different evolutionary treatment.
Here, not to admonish the authors for oversight but to emphasize
potential pitfalls in conceiving of the culture–biology analogy too
narrowly, we list some common misconceptions about trans-
mission modes.
1. First, any trait can be fed into a software program to
produce, or map, a phylogeny. This does not mean that the phy-
logeny is the most accurate depiction of the trait’s history, nor
that vertical transmission best accounts for its distribution. This
may seem obvious, but a number of studies cited in the target
article are founded on such erroneous logic.
The absolute value of a goodness-of-fit measure, such as RI or
CI or even the familiar R^2, is rarely informative. Rather, the
same data must be analyzed with multiple models to make
sense of measures of fit. Statistical measures developed to test
for “treeness” are also of little help. They are based on strong
assumptions about evolutionary process that cannot be casually
applied to data produced by any evolutionary process. Indeed,
all existing phylogenetic methods make strong assumptions
about independence of lineages, rates of evolution, and other
important aspects of descent, and biologists rarely employ any
such method without first exploring its sensitivity to violations
of these assumptions with simulated data. We fail to see how,
without explicit models of cultural evolution and simulation
studies, we can infer from published work that phylogeny pro-
vides the most accurate depiction of a trait’s history.
2. Most cultures are of course made up of multiple traits,
each of which may have a different phylogeny. Untangling the
distinct phylogenies of separate traits is complicated (McElreath
1997), but assuming that all traits have the same tree simply
avoids the issue. Using a narrow range of conserved vocabulary
to construct language classifications yields a narrow view of
language evolution – other aspects of language typically have
different histories (Thomason & Kaufman 1988). Even among
well-behaved biological species, different loci sometimes have
different phylogenies (Enard & Pa¨a¨bo 2004). Indeed, few geneti-
cists would even attempt to construct a single phylogeny for the
entire genome. The bulk of what we know about human history
suggests strong mixing at many scales. Hence, assuming popu-
lations evolve independently, as typical maximum likelihood
does, for example, is something few biologists are now willing
to assume (Relethford 1998).
3. The authors support the use of a phylogenetic approach in
comparative analyses to deal with Galton’s problem, claiming
(sect. 4, para. 2) that “evolutionary methods . . . (e.g., the phylo-
genetic analyses) work equally well for both biological and cul-
tural evolution.” Unfortunately, this is not true. A recent
simulation study shows that as the prevalence of horizontal trans-
mission of cultural traits between populations increases, so do
Type I errors (rejection of a true null hypothesis) (Nunn et al.
2006). Importantly, a tiny amount of horizontal transmission is
sufficient to cause serious problems. This parallels recent empiri-
cal work in biology which shows that trying to correct for phylo-
geny when working with rapidly evolving traits such as bird song
can introduce serious error (Rheindt et al. 2004). More to the
point, how can we claim that methods developed for analyzing
genetical evolution work “equally well” for culture when we
know, for example, how sensitive phylogenetic contrast analyses
are to topological inaccuracies (Symonds 2002)?
4. The authors scrupulously differentiate macroevolutionary
from microevolutionary questions, but others they cite have
been less careful. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) adopted
the terms vertical and horizontal transmission from the field of
epidemiology to denote, respectively, parent-offspring trans-
mission and transmission between any two (usually unrelated)
people. Soon these terms were adopted for use at the inter-
group level, referring to traits that were spread from parent to
daughter populations and between neighboring populations. Is
an extrapolation from micro- to macroevolutionary processes
legitimate? For example, from a study of Aka pygmies showing
vertical transmission (parent-to-child) to account for a large
majority of skills learned by children (80% of skills studied), is it
appropriate to infer that Aka culture as a whole is highly conser-
vative (Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza 1986, p. 933)? The unstated
assumption here is that the transmission patterns that occur
within populations are the same as those that occur between
populations. This, however, is untested because we have no
measure of the extent of horizontal transmission between differ-
ent populations, for example, between Aka and other pygmy
populations, or between Aka and non-pygmy populations. Fur-
thermore, even if all transmission is vertical, if there is any inter-
marriage between groups (or other kinds of immigration), vertical
transmission within groups will not preserve variation between
groups. A particularly clear example of the mismatch between
transmission modes within and between populations, specifically
inferringmicro frommacro patterns, comes from language. There
is good reason to believe that portions of language are highly con-
served within cultural lineages (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1992), and yet
we know that parents have limited influence on the language of
their children after an early age; immigrant children do not
speak their new national languages with their parents’ accents.
To be clear, we are not arguing that cultural evolution, because
of horizontal transmission, invalidates an evolutionary approach,
only that it requires novel treatment within a general evolution-
ary framework. More specifically, we think that some tree-
based approaches are highly flawed (Borgerhoff Mulder et al.
2006) and need more thought (Eerkens et al. 2006). Analogies
are powerful things. But returning to first principles and consid-
ering how cultural evolution functions in its own right are, in the
long run, more powerful yet.
More generally, we think that this is a fabulous article – a
wide-ranging and truly creative review, bristling with insight
Commentary/Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
350 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4
and offering an inspirational glimpse into a very new kind of
social science that may exist in the future. Our only concern is
that readers may run with the ideas without thinking carefully
about each step.
Evolutionary theory and the riddle of the
universe
Denny Borsboom
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam,
The Netherlands.
d.borsboom@uva.nl http://users.fmg.uva.nl/dborsboom
Abstract: An effective restructuring of the social sciences around the
evolutionary model requires that evolutionary theory has explanatory
power with respect to the spread of cultural traits: The causal
mechanisms involved should be structurally analogous to those of
biological evolution. I argue that this is implausible because
phenotypical consequences of cultural traits are not causally relevant to
their chances of “survival.”
That there exists a certain likeness between the evolution of
species and the manner in which cultural traits are propagated,
stands beyond doubt. Before we jump to conclusions and start
remodeling the social sciences according to the evolutionary
blueprint that biology provides, however, it is important to
have a clear indication that the evolution of cultural traits is not
merely similar to biological evolution, but structurally analogous
to it. Therefore, the important question is not whether models
based on evolutionary theory are roughly descriptive of the
spread of cultural traits, but whether the evolutionary model
has explanatory power with respect to the process by which
that spread occurs. And for this to be the case, the model has
to get the causal mechanisms of the process right.
In the story “The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution,”
Czerniak (1981) describes a situation that would allow for a posi-
tive verdict on this score. It is useful to examine this situation,
because it rather glaringly differs from the situation that we
find ourselves in with respect to the propagation of ideas and
other cultural traits. Czerniak imagines that, for humans, there
exists an idea analogous to a Go¨del sentence for computers.
People who have this idea go into a catatonic state from which
they are unable to recover. The propagation of such an idea (or
rather, the process by which it goes extinct) would be truly ana-
logous to biological evolution. The reason for this is that the
causal system at work would be structurally analogous to
selection of genes by biological evolution: A phenotypical
consequence of having the Go¨del idea (namely, going into
catatonic state) is itself responsible for its lower chances of
being propagated – just as the phenotypical properties associated
with genes may cause their bearers to go extinct.
The fact that this story strikes us as science fiction suggests
that, in reality, it does not work like this. At least on the face of
it, the propagation of ideas and other cultural traits does not
involve selection on their phenotypical properties (if that term
is at all well defined). Ideas, artifacts, and other cultural traits
are subject to changing levels of popularity, sometimes as a
result of their becoming more or less useful over time, sometimes
because of other factors. But surely the decline in popularity of,
say, Dixieland music is not due to any phenotypical consequences
of liking Dixieland music. In point of fact, liking Dixieland music
does not prevent one from giving away Dixieland records for free,
however much the decline in popularity of such records in the
human population may resemble the evolutionary process by
which genes become infrequent in a population of animals. In
contrast, such a connection does exist between having a gene
and being able to propagate it (namely, if the gene is bad for
you, you die before you get the chance to propagate).
Mesoudi et al. attempt to anticipate the problem of identifying
such causal mechanisms by stating that “just as Darwin formu-
lated his theory of evolution with little understanding of genes
or Mendelian inheritance, a theory of cultural evolution likewise
does not necessarily have to rest on the existence of memes or
particulate cultural transmission” (sect. 1, para. 12). But this con-
fuses an ontological condition with an epistemological one. The
relevant issue here is not whether Darwin knew about the mech-
anisms of inheritance via genetics; the relevant issue is that such
mechanisms exist and are causally relevant to the biological
phenomena that we want to explain. In other words, what con-
vinces us of the usefulness of the evolutionary framework in
biology has nothing to do with the epistemological position
Darwin was in when working out the principles of evolutionary
theory; it has to do with the fact that his theory, by and large,
appears to be true.
The biological sciences are organized around evolutionary
theory because evolution has causal relevance for each of the dis-
ciplines involved. For a similar organization of the social sciences
to be an effective restructuring, rather than a case of plastic
surgery, it is important to show that such causal relevance also
exists for the various disciplines that make up the social sciences.
Hence, the mechanisms by which cultural traits are propagated
cannot be sidestepped as easily as Mesoudi et al. suggest, and
they would, therefore, do well to offer some convincing argu-
ments for the existence of such mechanisms. Otherwise our
restructured social science, modeled after the biological plan,
will be like a toy model of a Boeing 747. It will look just the
same, but it won’t fly.
It is not evolutionary models, but models in
general that social science needs
Bruce Bridgeman
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz,
CA 95064.
bruceb@ucsc.edu http://psych.ucsc.edu/faculty/bruceb/
Abstract:Mathematical models are potentially as useful for culture as for
evolution, but cultural models must have different designs from genetic
models. Social sciences must borrow from biology the idea of
modeling, rather than the structure of models, because copying the
product is fundamentally different from copying the design. Transfer of
most cultural information from brains to artificial media increases the
differences between cultural and biological information.
Mesoudi et al. make a plea for the use of evolutionary models,
developed for analyzing genetic evolution, in analyzing cultural
influence and change. Indeed, they provide many illuminating
examples of the usefulness of modeling in social sciences, but
the connection to mathematical models of biological evolution
is often indirect, sometimes only metaphorical. For example, in
section 2.1.2 the authors cite Mace and Pagel (1994), who treat
cultural traits as equivalent to biological characters, with inde-
pendent instances of cultural change occurring when a cultural
trait is invented, acquired from another culture, changed, or
lost. This situation is very different from biological evolution,
though, where “acquired” is not a possibility. Further, cultural
traits are not like Mendelian units, independent of one
another – they influence one another, they have different sizes
and different nestings, and, as Mesoudi et al. note, they are frus-
tratingly difficult to define.
Under these conditions, it is surprising that models developed
to analyze biological evolution are also useful for looking at cul-
tural development. But the value of the models may stem not
so much from their link to evolutionary theory as from the way
that they force investigators to define terms, use consistent
categories, and in general discipline their data. Mathematical
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models are also useful to identify ill-defined concepts or relation-
ships, and to find unsuspected relationships among variables.
A particularly useful function of modeling is to uncover hidden
assumptions in a discipline. A ground assumption of cultural
anthropology, for example, might be that cultures are coherent,
independent entities, and that a given person belongs to only
one of them. Perhaps it was inevitable that many anthropologists
came to think in this way, because our evolved capabilities for
social reasoning revolve around individual people who have dis-
tinct traits and personalities; we use this capability to assign
characteristics to groups, using the mental machinery that
evolved in us to understand individuals (Bridgeman 2003, pp.
178–79). The pioneering modeling of Boyd and Richerson
(1985), done without the concept of culture as a critical variable,
showed the value of modeling social interactions but also showed
how different the resulting models were from mathematical
descriptions of biological evolution. In short, what social sciences
must borrow from biology is not the models themselves, but a
commitment to mathematical description of phenomena and
modeling of the processes in which they engage.
The studies of cultural selection reviewed in section 3.3.3 high-
light the structural differences between models of biological
evolution and models of cultural change. The “selection” of
cultural traits is different from selection of genes in a way that
Susan Blackmore (1999) colorfully and effectively explained in
her example of copying a pumpkin soup. I can ask for the
recipe, and reproduce the soup according to a constant set of
instructions, so that the similarity of my soup to hers is limited
only by the similarity of available ingredients (the environment).
If I change the soup, most of the recipe remains the same.
Copying the recipe is analogous to genetic inheritance. Alterna-
tively, I could go home and try to reproduce the soup by guessing
at the ingredients, basing my guesses on the flavor and texture of
the soup that I had experienced. This copy-the-product strategy
is the pattern of cultural inheritance, which Blackmore points out
is fundamentally different from copy-the-plan structures.
Another questionable assumption about the informational con-
tents of culture appears in section 3.5.3, where Mesoudi et al.
assume that cultural information is represented primarily in the
brain. Merlin Donald (1991) has pointed out that this was once
the case, before reading and writing made it possible to store
information outside the brain. Today not only books but a vast
array of technical aids store information and move it around the
world, making much of the content of our culture so accessible
that it is no longer necessary or even advantageous to store
content in the head. Our minds are filled largely with pointers
to the information we need, rather than the information itself.
The transfer of cultural information to film, video, books, and
other media vastly increases the richness and magnitude as well
as the accessibility of the information, potentially enhancing cul-
tural change even while making brain-basedmodels of it obsolete.
In conclusion, I will stick with Plotkin (2002a): Differences
between genetic evolution and cultural change are fundamental.
They follow different rules and should be kept distinct even while
both are modeled mathematically.
Intelligent design in cultural evolution
Lee Cronk
Department of Anthropology and Center for Human Evolutionary Studies,
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1414.
lcronk@anthropology.rutgers.edu
http://anthro.rutgers.edu/faculty/cronk.shtml
Abstract: Intelligent design, though unnecessary in the study of
biological evolution, is essential to the study of cultural evolution.
However, the intelligent designers in question are not deities or aliens
but rather humans going about their lives. The role of intentionality in
cultural evolution can be elucidated through the addition of signaling
theory to the framework outlined in the target article.
Darwinian aspects of cultural evolution were first identified long
ago (e.g., Schleicher 1863). Mesoudi et al. update this analogy
and make a convincing case for a unified science of cultural evo-
lution that parallels the science of evolutionary biology. However,
as Mesoudi et al. acknowledge, such a science must differ from
evolutionary biology in a number of ways. One important differ-
ence, which they deal with quickly, is the active, often intentional
role that humans play in cultural transmission and, thus, in cul-
tural evolution. Although the notion of intelligent design is
unnecessary in the study of biological evolution, it is essential
to the study of cultural evolution. The intelligent designers in
question, however, are not deities or aliens but rather humans
going about their lives.
When they do address the active role that individuals play in
cultural transmission, Mesoudi et al.’s interest in long-term cul-
tural evolutionary trends leads them to focus on technological
innovation and creativity. They are correct that the impact of
human intentionality on long-term cultural change in those
realms is an empirical question and that recognition of intention-
ality does not undermine the approach they advocate. But those
of us who live, work, and study in the here-and-now, minute-by-
minute, day-by-day, down-and-dirty, nitty-gritty reality of every-
day human social life are constantly faced with the fact that the
cultural pools in which we swim are at least stirred, if not
created, by human intentions. When we study cultural change
and other human phenomena on the short timescales of everyday
life, grand analogies between biological and cultural evolution
tend to become less interesting than the question of how our
evolved psychological and behavioral propensities play them-
selves out in the things we say and do.
Furthermore, even very drastic cultural change is possible on
short timescales, and even if such episodes can be phrased in the
language of cultural evolution, it is not clear what is gained by
doing so. For example, I have documented a brief episode of
extreme culture change among the Mukogodo of Kenya (Cronk
1989; 2002; 2004). In the space of little more than a decade, the
Mukogodo shifted from speaking a language called Yaaku, living
in caves, hunting, and keeping bees to speaking Maa, living in
houses, and keeping livestock. This was surely an instance in
which a particular meme pool was drained and refilled in short
order, but pointing that out seems much less interesting than
exploring the reasons why Mukogodo individuals chose to make
such a swift and radical change. Those reasons certainly do
involve the question of what memes they had available to
them – they adopted those of their new neighbors rather than
inventing entirely new ones or adopting those of some more
distant group – but they also concern the strategies Mukogodo
individuals employed to obtain food, find mates, communicate,
keepwarm at night, stay dry when it rained, gain respect, and so on.
One interpretation of this argument might be that even if cul-
tural evolutionary theories like those described by Mesoudi et al.
are relevant to long timescales, human phenomena at shorter
timescales are best studied using non-evolutionary methods. I
reject that interpretation and seek instead a way to remain
within an evolutionary framework while focusing on phenomena
that people experience in their everyday lives. Elsewhere (Cronk
1991; 1994; 1995; 1999; 2005) I have argued that this can be
accomplished by using animal signaling theory to study signals
that humans construct primarily out of the cultural raw materials
they have at hand.
With signaling theory, one can simultaneously acknowledge
the role of intentionality in human affairs, remain within an evolu-
tionary framework, and study human culture. Mukogodo ethnic
signaling, for example, is better understood through an appli-
cation of signaling theory (Cronk 2004). Since the early twentieth
century, the Mukogodo have had limited success in raising their
status by adopting the language, clothing, subsistence, religion,
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and even stated offspring sex preferences of higher-status
Maasai. Their difficulties in convincing anyone that they are
real Maasai makes sense in light of signaling theory. Signals,
including ones about ethnicity, are believable only if there is
some guarantee of their truthfulness. One way to provide such
a guarantee is to make a signal difficult to fake, and ethnic
signals generally have that quality. Mukogodo awareness of this
is shown by the fact that they chose to emulate the Maasai,
who were removed from the area by the British in the early twen-
tieth century, rather than the remaining high-status Maa speak-
ers in the region, the Samburu. Whereas no Maasai were left
to challenge Mukogodo claims to Maasai identity, any claims to
Samburu identity could easily have been dismissed by the
Samburu themselves. Other applications of signaling theory to
human affairs include studies of fishing (Sosis 2000), hunting
(Bliege Bird et al. 2001), dancing (Brown et al. 2005), cosmetics
(Cronk et al. 2002), engagement rings (Cronk & Dunham 2003),
political rhetoric (Johnson 1986; 1987; 1989; Salmon 1998), kin
terms (Chagnon 1988; 2000), religion (Cronk 1994; Irons 1996;
Sosis & Alcorta 2003), and interpersonal communication
(Gerkey & Cronk 2005).
Signaling, which generally occurs at very short timescales,
clearly belongs in the category of microevolutionary processes.
The question arises, therefore, of how to relate it to other micro-
evolutionary process and to cultural macroevolution. One
approach to this problem is to emphasize the aspects of signaling
theory that focus on receiver psychology (Guilford & Dawkins
1991). The basic idea is simple: Signals, whether they are
designed by natural selection or by advertising executives,
should be designed to fit the psychology of the intended receiver.
Similarly, cultural traits may be more successful in persisting in
the minds of individuals and in being replicated if they are
memorable and attention-grabbing (e.g., Boyer 1994 on religious
concepts). In this way, evolved human psychology becomes the
link between the short life of an individual signal and the long
life of a cultural tradition, and intentionality can be given the
role it deserves in the unified science of cultural evolution
outlined by Mesoudi et al.
A continuum of mindfulness
Daniel Dennett and Ryan McKay
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Abstract: Mesoudi et al. overlook an illuminating parallel between
cultural and biological evolution, namely, the existence in each realm of
a continuum from intelligent, mindful evolution through to oblivious,
mindless evolution. In addition, they underplay the independence of
cultural fitness from biological fitness. The assumption that successful
cultural traits enhance genetic fitness must be sidelined, as must the
assumption that such traits will at least be considered worth having.
Mesoudi et al. provide a valuable survey of the parallels between
biological and cultural evolution, but they ignore or underesti-
mate several other parallels that go some way to explaining the
intensity of the distaste with which many researchers in the
humanities and social sciences view any attempt to introduce
Darwinian thinking into their domains. When Darwin first pro-
posed sexual selection as a significant factor in biological evo-
lution, it was greeted with both dismay and delight: To some it
was an ominous backslide from the mindless purity of natural
selection, whereas to others it was a welcome relief, restoring
cherished elements of “mind” into evolution (Cronin 1991;
Dennett 1995). But Darwin had already shown us the continuum
from foresighted attempts to redesign nature through to utter
mindlessness in his trio ofmethodological selection (in deliberate
breeding and crossing), unconscious selection (in early domesti-
cation – which we might call domestication without intent), and
natural selection proper, which invokes no minds or cognitive
discriminations at all. It is important to avoid the common mis-
construal that views methodical and unconscious selection as
alternatives to natural selection, rather than as special varieties
of natural selection, in which the selection pressure is focused
through events in the nervous systems of the domesticating
species. There is nothing counter-Darwinian, of course, in
either phenomenon; intelligence did evolve by natural selection
“proper” and thereupon became a potent selective force in the
environment. Early domestication was thus an interspecific vari-
ation on sexual selection, in which the (cognitive) eye of the selec-
tor plays a crucial – but, of course, non-miraculous – role (Miller
2000). Neither the choosy females nor the early keepers of
animals needed to understand their role in the “improvement of
the breed.” To these selective phenomena we can add the more
recent and still more mind-requiring tinkerings of genetic
engineering. The processes of generate-and-test that yield the
would-be replicators come in all varieties of intelligence, but in
the end, as Crick reminds us, Orgel’s Second Rule applies:
Evolution is cleverer than you are (Dennett 1995).
What many thinkers in the humanities and social sciences find
abhorrent in evolutionary perspectives is the imagined impli-
cation that any such model will replace the traditional freedom
of will, rational authorship, and artistic genius imputed in their
disciplines with mindless random mutation and mechanical
selection. And indeed, in cultural evolution, as Mesoudi et al.
make abundantly clear, there are undeniable cases of cultural
features that evolve by Darwinian processes without any need
to invoke authors, designers, or other intelligent creators. Most
obviously, languages – words and pronunciations and grammati-
cal features – evolve without any need for grammarians, delibe-
rate coiners, or other foresighted guardians of these cultural
items. But what Mesoudi et al. never properly acknowledge is
that the traditional perspective of the humanities, in which intel-
ligent authorship, foresighted, purposeful reasoning, and artistic
judgment occupy center stage, also has a place in the evolution-
ary picture, so the dread of the humanists is misplaced. Again,
there is a continuum, with many different levels of mindfulness
or rational engagement to be discerned. There is unconscious
selection (as Darwin would say) of musical styles, for instance,
methodical selection (with much planning and debate) of politi-
cal arrangements and elements of religious dogma, for example,
and attempts at memetic engineering by advertisers and even
scientists seeking the best – most vivid and unforgettable – acro-
nym for their novel theory or investigative method. And here, as
before, Orgel’s Second Rule applies. No matter how intelligent,
foresighted, and purposeful the local process may be, most of
the brainchildren of human cultural vectors fail to found long-
lived lineages.
Another point that is underplayed in the target article is the
extent to which cultural traits can flourish or perish indepen-
dently of their effects on our genetic fitness. Because cultural
evolution can occur in orders of magnitude faster than genetic
evolution, many of its prominent patterns must be stabilized by
forces that are only weakly related, at best, to the reproductive
success of their vectors. The default presumption that all cultural
traits that do evolve will be fitness-enhancing needs to be firmly
set aside. Mesoudi et al. are right that this assumption is not uni-
formly made, but it is often tacitly implied or suggested by the
way people write about cultural evolution. For example, the
fact that some form of religion is found in every human group
that has ever been studied leads many to conclude that religion
must be enhancing to either individual or group fitness, but
this is a serious non sequitur; the common cold also is found
wherever there are people, but presumably it is not fitness-
enhancing at all. It has evolved because it could evolve.
One may, of course, treat these shifting features of human
culture as mere “noisy” variation around the few cultural traits
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that do have a clear and measurable positive impact on genetic
fitness, but this squanders the opportunity to see them as
having their own fitness, as symbionts competing for rehearsal
space and for opportunities to leap from host to host. The arms
races that are conducted within each of us between our
immune systems and our pathogens are themselves evolutionary
phenomena, on a fast timescale, and they, too, have their parallels
in cultural evolution. We certainly do not evaluate our ideas on
the basis of their contribution to our genetic fitness – most of
us do not care much about that goal – and the standards we do
adopt are themselves products of cultural evolution. Even the
presumption that any cultural item that spreads widely will at
least be deemed (rightly or wrongly) to be worth having must
be set aside, as it may instead be an unappreciated or even
detested item that is just too well entrenched for the local
coalition of cultural antibodies to remove. Advertising jingles
are good examples.
We are largely in agreement with Mesoudi et al. about the par-
allels they describe, but think they have overlooked these further
points that may prove equally fruitful in the project of studying
culture with a unifying evolutionary framework.
Evolution is important but it is not simple:
Defining cultural traits and incorporating
complex evolutionary theory
Agustı´n Fuentes
Department of Anthropology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556.
afuentes@nd.edu
Abstract: Examining homology in biological and cultural evolution is of
great importance in investigations of humanity. The proposal presented
in the target article retains substantial methodological weaknesses in
the identification and use of “cultural traits.” However, with refined
toolkits and the incorporation of recent advances in evolutionary
theory, this overall endeavor can result in substantial payoffs for
biological and social scientists.
Mesoudi et al. present the premise that human culture under-
goes Darwinian evolution and that key aspects of biological evo-
lutionary patterns can be applied to the understanding of cultural
change. The goal of this article is to promote a “more progressive
and rigorous science of culture” (sect. 1, para. 3). However, as
with the majority of treatments of this topic (cf. Richerson &
Boyd 2005), the authors rely too heavily on psychological and lin-
guistic examples. They do not attempt incorporation of a wide
range of ethnographic data sets (the most overt nod to ethnogra-
phy is a few paragraphs in sections 2.3.2 and 3.3.2) and they focus
on uses of “culture” and “cultural traits” that most anthropologists
will find problematic. Here I critique this key area and suggest a
few additional evolutionary perspectives that could be useful in
this project.
Simplifying assumptions have become a mainstay in biological
theorizing. The immense complexity in genomic, developmental,
and other biological systems has led to the use of simple models
to create baseline parameters for assessing the mechanisms of
said systems. Cultural systems, however, may not be as homolo-
gous to biological ones as is assumed by the authors of this article.
They assert that one can overcome Galton’s problem by treating
“cultural traits” as equivalent to biological characters. They also
suggest that because vagaries in biological units (such as
“gene”) do not inhibit the use of evolutionary models, the rela-
tively vague “cultural trait” units are also amenable to similar
applications (see sect/2.1). They state that the “apparent lack
of discrete particles in culture equivalent to genes” (sect. 3.5.2)
is not an inhibitor to the use of basic Darwinian models for cul-
tural change. The authors do address the contention that there
may be substantial differences between patterns of biological
and cultural change (see sect. 4), but do not incorporate these
perspectives into their analyses of mechanisms in any central
manner (sects. 2 and 3).
The authors use the term “cultural trait” at least 27 times
without offering an explicit definition. In section 2.1.2 they
suggest that cultural traits are things such as “language, tools,
customs, or beliefs.” Of the many cultural traits mentioned in
the article, the majority used in concrete examples supporting
homology with biological systems are aspects of language or
results from tests conducted by English-speaking experimental
psychologists and economists. Others include patents, guns,
teddy bears, stone tools, kinship patterns, behavioral rules,
dairy farming, justice, money, the electric motor, the
QWERTY keyboard, and religious beliefs, for example. A signifi-
cant problem with this use of “cultural trait” is the lumping
together of diverse elements that may not share common struc-
tural components or patterns of heritability.
If we are interested in modeling selection on cultural traits, we
can look to two levels: phenotypic interactions with environments
and other phenotypes, and trait-trait competition. That is, traits
do not exist in a vacuum (biological or cultural), and therefore
understanding of the phenotype (or the phenogenotype for bio-
cultural contexts, sect. 3.1.2) in which they participate is core
to modeling an evolutionary system. Alternatively, one can
ignore the complexity at the phenotypic level and model trait-
trait competition (usually seen as allelic competition in
biology). However, any competition model must utilize similar
“competing” units. Although section 3 of the article goes to
great lengths to suggest that cultural and biological patterns of
inheritance and change are roughly equivalent, the examples
Mesoudi et al. provide often do not form compatible units for
comparison. Psychological and economic experiments using
two-choice option models may not be equivalent units to multiple
chain event transmission sequences (sect. 3.2.2). Transmission of
how to behave at a restaurant (a highly culturally contextual
“unit”) may not break down into the same units as anagram-
solving choice tests.
The biological examples provided in section 3 use overt beha-
vioral and physiological measurements or assessments, whereas
most psychological and anthropological research relies on percep-
tions, semantic exchanges, and culturally contingent decision pro-
cesses. Measuring the constituent “traits” in cultural phenotypes
can be a very different process with distinct results compared to
biological systems and traits (however they are defined). A signifi-
cant contribution to this endeavor would be the creation of specific
definitions and measurement tools that can effectively represent
diverse types of cultural patterns and elements. By moving these
inquiries beyond an over-reliance on the most easily quantifiable
cultural elements, such as those emerging from many language
studies, we could achieve a more accurate comparison between
systems of biological and cultural change.
It is possible that the landscape (environment or ecology) in
which culture exists and changes may not be best, or primarily,
amenable to modeling by standard neo-Darwinian approaches.
However, recent enhancements of Darwinian perspectives
such as developmental systems theory (Oyama et al. 2001) and
niche construction theory (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) may offer
more appropriate tools for the synthesis that Mesoudi et al. are
proposing. Kevin Laland, an author of the target article, is also
one of the major proponents of niche construction theory. I am
surprised at the relative absence in the target article of this
important addition to modern evolutionary perspectives. I
suggest (echoing Odling-Smee et al. 2003) that niche construc-
tion may be a highly appropriate model for understanding pat-
terns of human change. It may also be that developmental
systems theory, with its emphasis on joint determination by mul-
tiple causes, extended inheritance, context sensitivity and contin-
gency, and development as construction (Oyama et al. 2001),
provides a more complex and contingent, but ultimately more
satisfying, model for understanding homologies between
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biological and cultural systems. The target article would have
benefited from the inclusion of these theoretical perspectives
as potential means for examining the homologies between cul-
tural and biological evolutionary patterns.
I think that there is a great potential for collaboration between
social and biological scientists in assessing the patterns and con-
texts of biocultural change. However, any such attempts
(whoever initiates them) must make greater efforts to include
multiple voices and perspectives, even if they make it increas-
ingly difficult to rely on simple modeling as a major explanatory
tool. Evolution is important, but it is not simple.
The role of psychology in the study
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Abstract: Although we are enthusiastic about a Darwinian approach to
culture, we argue that the overview presented in the target article does
not sufficiently emphasize the crucial explanatory role that psychology
plays in the study of culture. We use a number of examples to illustrate
the variety of ways by which appeal to psychological factors can help
explain cultural phenomena.
The target article makes three main claims. The first, a claim
about culture itself, maintains that culture exhibits key Darwi-
nian evolutionary properties. The second and third claims are
about the study of culture. According to the second, research
on culture can and should take a broadly Darwinian stance that
borrows many of the theoretical assumptions, analytic tools,
and experimental methods of evolutionary biology. The third
claim is an account of a unifying framework within which that
research should be organized: “the structure of a science of
cultural evolution should broadly resemble the structure of
evolutionary biology” (sect. 1, para. 2). Though we agree
wholeheartedly with the first two claims, we find the third less
convincing. For while the proposed account is useful, it is also
importantly incomplete because it fails to clarify or sufficiently
emphasize the central explanatory role that psychology is likely
to play in the emerging science of culture.
Research has already shown that a number of features of the
species-typical human psychological endowment influence cul-
tural evolution along a variety of dimensions. For instance, the
content of some cultural variants makes them more likely to be
socially transmitted than others, and the increased frequency of
such variants is often explained by the influence of content
biases on social transmission processes. These content biases
are, in turn, often explained by appeal to the operation and pro-
perties of psychological mechanisms. For example, Heath et al.
(2001) showed how the psychology of disgust can influence the
horizontal transmission of cultural variants. They found that
the more likely an urban legend was to trigger disgust, the
more likely it was to be passed along to peers and to appear on
urban legend Web sites. Nichols (2002) showed that disgust
can also bias the vertical transmission of cultural variants. He
found that etiquette norms of the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries that prohibited actions likely to induce disgust were signifi-
cantly more likely to have survived to the present than those
that did not.
Appeal to psychological mechanisms can also help uncover and
explain other important regularities relevant to the science of
culture. Fessler and Navarrete (2003) showed that although
details differ from one culture to the next, taboos regulating the
consumption of meat were found in nearly all investigated cul-
tures. The cross-cultural recurrence of meat taboos is explained,
in part, by psychological factors, specifically the salience of meat
to the human disgust mechanism. Machery and Faucher (2005;
forthcoming) call attention to another instance of the pattern of
local variations on a theme that is present in all or most cultures.
Although races are conceptualized differently across cultures, a
common theme is identifiable in the various conceptualizations:
Races are cross-culturally conceptualized as biological entities.
Following Gil-White (2001), Machery and Faucher argue that
this puzzling regularity is explained by the character of the
psychological mechanisms that underlie racial cognition: The
observable cues associated with race mistakenly trigger a hypoth-
esized system for ethnic cognition, and that system employs a folk
biological mechanism as one of its constituent subsystems.
Other, more comprehensive projects, such as the recent work
on religions and religious beliefs (Boyer 2001; Atran 2002), offer
additional rich and suggestive examples of the substantive expla-
natory role psychology can play in the investigation of culture.
Although the complex intersection of psychological and cultural
phenomena is not yet completely understood, these examples
begin to illustrate the range of ways in which psychological
factors have already been shown to exert profound influence on
social transmission and cultural evolution. This suggests to us
that psychology should be deeply integrated into the foundations
of a science of culture.
This perspective points to potentially fruitful lines of future
inquiry as well. For instance, some of the most promising theor-
etic work on cultural evolution might be enhanced by more
detailed psychological research. Theoretical models and experi-
mental evidence show that the transmission of cultural variants
is strongly influenced not just by their content, but also by the
local social context of their transmission: Conformity and prestige
biases lead people to adopt, respectively, cultural variants
common among their peers, and variants adopted by prestigious
members of their culture (Boyd & Richerson 1985; 2005). In
much of that work, conformity and prestige are characterized
behaviorally, and little is yet known about the nature of the
psychological mechanisms underlying conformity and prestige
biases (though see Henrich & Gil-White 2001; McElreath et al.
2005). Discovering more about those mechanisms’ internal struc-
ture, the observable cues in the social environment to which they
are sensitive, and the manner in which they process information
about those cues promises to shed light on the cultural evolution-
ary dynamics that they influence. Perhaps more important, as in
the case of racial cognition, idiosyncrasies uncovered in the func-
tioning of the psychological mechanisms underlying conformity
and prestige bias could provide resources for explaining the
more puzzling aspects of the cultural phenomena they affect.
Despite the valuable overview provided by the target article,
the organizational framework it proposes does little to emphasize
or elucidate the significance of such psychological factors in
explaining cultural phenomena, and thus leaves an important
ingredient out of its account. Perhaps this indicates that the simi-
larity to evolutionary biology is at best a partial one, and that
nothing in evolutionary biology corresponds to the central role
we maintain psychology will play in the study of cultural evo-
lution. Alternatively, it could indicate that the analogy indeed
holds, but the account of evolutionary biology is incomplete as
well. Indeed, psychological factors such as sensory biases have
been shown to have a powerful influence on biological evolution
via the process of sexual selection (Miller 2000). Either way, we
agree with the authors that such limitations do not “invalidate” an
evolutionary approach to culture. Rather, they suggest that the
account needs to be enriched to underscore the important role
of psychology in the study of culture.
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Evolutionary social science beyond culture
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Abstract: Mesoudi et al.’s case can be improved by expanding to
compelling selectionist explanations elsewhere in the social sciences
and by seeing that natural selection is an instance of general
selectionist process. Obstacles include the common use of extreme
idealizations and optimality evidence, the copresence of nonselectionist
social processes, and the fact that selectionist explanations often
presuppose other kinds of social explanations.
Mesoudi et al. do a nice job of arguing for the usefulness of evo-
lutionary models in the social sciences. In what follows, I suggest
that they both understate their case and underestimate some of
the problems that evolutionary models face in the social sciences.1
There are substantial bodies of social science research employ-
ing variation/selection/retention models that Mesoudi et al. do
not cite, and some of that work is probably more rigorous than
the work they do cite. One such area is organizational ecology
in sociology (Hannan & Freeman 1989). This work develops
large databases to show that different organizational strategies –
generalist and specialist – cause differential survival and persist-
ence of organizations in different kinds of environments (fine-
grained, patchy, etc.). The arguments made parallel much of
Endler’s reasoning which Mesoudi et al. cite as a paradigm. In
my view, this work is very well done and strongly supports
Mesoudi et al.’s case.
Another important body of work comes from the enormous
amount of work done in game theory in economics, political
science, and history. The most obviously relevant is evolutionary
game theory, which took its inspiration from Maynard Smith but
has since been developed with considerably more mathematical
rigor by economists (e.g., Gintis 2000). But even standard
rational-choice game theory studies are relevant, since the
Nash equilibrium they describe is unlikely to be reached by
rational agents working out in their heads the relevant equili-
brium but, instead, by a trial-and-error process where strategies
are competing with each other and survive because of their
payoffs. The work of Bates et al. (1998) is a particularly strong
instance of this research program that combines detailed histori-
cal evidence with rigorous modeling.
Mesoudi et al. also understate their case at a theoretical level in
several ways. First, they claim that borrowing of models and
formalism across fields is unusual, when in fact it is standard
practice in several areas. It is standard practice in physics, par-
ticularly in the search for what are called “universalities” (see
Morgan & Morrison 1999; Batterman 2002). Applying the
same formalism across multiple domains is a way of unifying
different fields without reducing them to some more fundamen-
tal level. Advocates in evolutionary game theory explicitly invoke
this rationale for their work (Gintis 2000).
Second, the authors’ case could be made stronger by explicitly
noting that evolutionary mechanisms can be described at various
levels of abstraction in terms of details of the process. At the most
abstract, selectionist mechanisms identify a causal effect of a
character (strategy, practice, etc.) and show that having that
effect causes the trait to persist. There are various ways to
realize such causal processes, where direct copying and differen-
tial survival of genes is a paradigm case. But even in biology,
literal copying is not essential (heritability can be achieved by
other routes). So the common doubts about evolutionary
accounts in the social sciences on the grounds that social selec-
tion is not analogous to the biological, miss the point. At one
level, they are trivially analogous: As causal processes they are
dynamical systems that we can trace through state space. The
real question is whether there is differential survival and persist-
ence, not whether there are social “genes.” You can think the
memes idea hopelessly fuzzy and still think there are good
selectionist explanations. The work of Hannan and Freeman
(1989) is a case in point.
I would argue that Mesoudi et al. miss such support for their
case because they restrict their discussion to explanations of
culture. Obviously there is much more to the social sciences than
cultural anthropology or the study of ideas, beliefs, and so on.
Moreover, there are good reasons to think that culture as infor-
mation in people’s heads sets up an unnecessarily difficult situation.
There are multiple problems here. Identifying units is hard, even if
it can sometimes be done. Moreover, there is much cognitive
science and social science research that suggests that “information
in the head” is the wrong way to think about culture. From cogni-
tive science the support comes from the idea that mental process
are essentially tied up with an external “scaffold” that makes infor-
mation processing possible in the first place (Clark 1997). From the
social sciences, the argument is that knowledge and culture are
distributed across individuals and embedded in institutions,
social practices, and organizations (Hutchins 1995). These facts
explain both why the narrow notion of culture may be hard to
work with and why the social sciences gravitate toward selection
mechanisms of practices, institutions, organizations, and so on.
On the downside, there are four important obstacles that
Mesoudi et al. do not much discuss. (1) On their view, formal
models are an important route to progress and should be in the
social sciences as well. However, at least one social science –
economics – uses formal models extensively; models based on
idealizations that will make your head swim. So there is the big
question of when and where evolutionary game theory is telling
us something about the world. (2) Selectionist explanations in
the social sciences are often supported by optimality arguments
rather than direct evidence of selection, and the value of these
arguments is an open question. (3) Selectionist causal processes
are not incompatible with other, nonselectionist processes
acting at the same time, as Mesoudi et al. acknowledge in the
case of drift. A norm, for example, may promote coordination
and persist in part because it does so, but may also exist in part
because it furthers the interests of the powerful. This is not an
inherent problem, but it may be a common one in the social
case and it definitely does complicate things. (4) It is unclear
how far selectionist stories can go in the social sciences,
because frequently a selectionist account (cf. Bates et al. 1998)
takes as given the organizational and institutional structures
that determine payoffs and possible strategies. Perhaps these
situations describe a social parallel to the kind of issues that
worry advocates of niche construction and developmental
systems in biology, and so these ought to be issues the authors
are sensitive to, given their own work in this area.
NOTES
1. The comments that follow are based on Kincaid (1996, Ch. 4; 2006)
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Abstract: Advancing a general Darwinian framework to explain culture is
an exciting endeavor. It requires that we face up to the challenge of
identifying the specific components that are effective in replication
processes in culture. This challenge includes the unsolved problem of
explaining cultural inheritance, both at the level of individuals and at
the level of social organizations and institutions.
Commentary/Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
356 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4
The central argument of this stimulating article is the need for a
unifying evolutionary framework to span the social and biological
sciences. We endorse the argument and also agree with Mesoudi
et al. – against the views of some of our fellow social scien-
tists – that such an evolutionary framework must essentially be
Darwinian.
Arguments against extending the theory of evolution from the
biological to the social domain are quite common. The critique of
such arguments by Mesoudi et al. is considerably weakened by
their neglect of an immense literature in the social sciences, par-
ticularly in evolutionary economics (e.g., Nelson & Winter 1982;
Young 1998) and organizational ecology (e.g., Hannan &
Freeman 1989), where Darwinian themes are central. Their
stance is further weakened by its neglect of the recent develop-
ment of general Darwinian concepts of replication and selection
in the theory and philosophy of biology (e.g., Frank 1998; Hull
2001; Knudsen 2004; Price 1995). Even though David Hull’s
work is mentioned, one of its central messages is neglected: An
adequate definition of selection processes where variety is
replenished demands consideration of the causal relation
between interaction and replication.
This neglect involves much more than inadequate referencing:
It means the underdevelopment of a number of crucial themes
concerning the units and mechanisms of cultural inheritance,
which are highly relevant for a generalized Darwinian framework
in the social domain (Hodgson & Knudsen, in press b). For
example, refined concepts of replication and selection are essen-
tial to identify the causes of cultural change. Mesoudi et al. do not
provide an explicit definition of cultural selection processes. Con-
sequently, they overlook the fact that some of the most important
cultural (and biological) selection processes are defined in terms
of differential replication caused by environmental interaction
(Hull et al. 2001). Crucially, without an adequate definition of
selection processes and an identification of the entities involved
in these processes (the interactors and replicators), there is no
way of knowing whether cultural changes are outcomes of selec-
tion processes, drift, or something else.
Mesoudi et al. skip over these issues by loosely describing
culture as information and referring to the literature on
memes. They defend the meme concept against the criticism
that it is vague and inadequately defined, by explaining that the
concept of the gene also has changing and different meanings.
But this ducks the fact that we know much more about the
emergence and replication of genetic combinations than we do
about the emergence and replication of cultural combinations.
Furthermore, the genotype-phenotype distinction (or replicator-
interactor distinction) is well established in biology, but largely
unacknowledged in the literature on memetics. The status of a
meme as a genotype (replicator) or phenotype (interactor)
remains unresolved – a testimony to its inadequate definition.
Biology has a well-developed theory of inheritance but there has
been little progress in explaining cultural inheritance, a problem
that involves identification and empirical verification of the specific
components that are effective in the replication of cultural combi-
nations. Neither do studies of cultural inheritance compare to the
empirical studies that helped establish Mendel’s laws in biology,
nor do models of cultural inheritance command explanatory
power similar to Mendel’s laws. The way in which cultural com-
ponents combine and replicate is presently unknown.
Apart from pointing to possible future advances in neuro-
science, Mesoudi et al. largely ignore these problems and many
recent attempts to resolve them. Their message for social scien-
tists is to wait for the neuroscientists to situate cultural inheri-
tance in the human brain, ignoring the significant contributions
that some social scientists have already made to the theory of
social evolution.
Indeed, the authors make matters worse by suggesting that in
the social domain the genotype-phenotype distinction is “specu-
lative” and possibly “unproductive.” They go on to argue that
further progress in this area will “also bear on whether cultural
inheritance can be described as ‘Darwinian’ or ‘Lamarckian’”
(sect. 3.5.3, para. 5). Mesoudi et al. thus replicate the widespread
but mistaken dichotomy that Darwinism and Lamarckism are
mutually exclusive (Dawkins 1983; Hodgson & Knudsen, in
press a), and provide an unwarranted excuse to dismiss the appli-
cation of Darwinian principles in the social domain because of
the common (but conceptually problematic; Hull 1982) assump-
tion that acquired social characters can be inherited.
For a number of reasons, we need at least a preliminary under-
standing of cultural inheritance. First, we must explain continuity
and stability in the social realm. Second, we must avoid the erro-
neous attribution of phenomena to absent or ineffective causes. It
matters whether cultural changes are outcomes of selection pro-
cesses, drift, or something else. Indeed, analyzing time-series of
trait distributions without properly identifying the underlying
causes is highly problematic; we must account for cultural inheri-
tance, cultural fitness components, and more.
Inheritance at the level of individuals is very different from
inheritance at the level of social organizations and institutions.
For evolution to be truly social, it must involve social units.
Social units are more than mere collections of individuals: They
entail structured interaction. The idea that institutions or organi-
zational routines can also be considered as organism-like or
gene-like units in the evolutionary process has been around for
more than 100 years (Hodgson 2004) but it is unmentioned by
Mesoudi et al. Their vision is confined to “ideas” as evolutionary
units, which they treat largely as neurological phenomena in the
brain. It is necessary to consider social entities as well. Signifi-
cantly, recent literature rehabilitates group selection in culture
as a higher-level complement to individual-level selection
(Henrich 2004a). Mesoudi et al. mention the issue of group selec-
tion once, but fail to elaborate on its significance. Institutions are
mentioned only once in passing. There is no mention of social
structure, one of the central concepts of the social sciences.
They fail to elaborate on key differences between human and
nonhuman culture, where the former involves a developed
abstract language and capacities to attribute intentions and mean-
ings (Bogdan 2000; Richerson & Boyd 2005; Tomasello 1999).
This amounts to a neglect of critical aspects of culture that pose
interesting challenges for the identification of the specific
content of a general Darwinian framework applied to culture.
Overall, Mesoudi et al. make a commendable attempt to gene-
ralize Darwinism across the social and the biological sciences but
engage inadequately with the nature of the social realm. Advan-
cing a general Darwinian framework to explain culture is an excit-
ing endeavor. It requires that we face up to the challenge of
identifying the specific components that are effective in replica-
tion processes in culture. This challenge includes the unsolved
problem of explaining cultural inheritance at the level of indivi-
duals, as well as social organizations and institutions. In essence,
we submit that cultural evolution is more than neurological
evolution. It involves social processes beyond those that can be
situated in the human brain. An adequate theory of cultural
evolution must therefore build on the combined efforts of
neuroscience, psychology, and social science.
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Abstract: Modern efforts to model cultural transmission have struggled
to identify a unit of cultural transmission and particular transmission
processes. Anthropologists of the early twentieth century discussed
cultural traits as units of transmission equivalent to recipes (rules and
ingredients) and identified integration as a signature process and effect
of transmission.
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I agree with Mesoudi et al. that much of value can be borrowed
from what we know of Darwinian biological evolution and
adapted (not just adopted) to cultural phenomena (e.g., Lyman
& O’Brien 1998; O’Brien & Lyman 2002a). But I also think
that Mesoudi et al. and those who hope to develop Darwinian
social sciences have some significant work to do. Mesoudi et al.
touch on one topic that is critical to the enterprise but that has,
as yet, received limited attention from socio-behavioral scientists:
What is the unit of cultural transmission? Mesoudi et al. mention
memes, the still ambiguously and incompletely conceived unit of
choice for many; I found Aunger’s (2002) discussion of memes
helpful to my own conceptualizing, but it focused largely on
modern ideas about such units and ignored historically antece-
dent ones. The tendency today is to devote considerable atten-
tion to modern studies of the pathways of cultural transmission
(e.g., Richerson & Boyd 2005 and references therein) and to
ignore the deep history of studies of cultural transmission mech-
anisms, modes, and processes (see Lyman [in press] for a review
of pertinent early ideas). Hence, many researchers seem unaware
of the historical conceptualization of a unit of cultural trans-
mission in anthropology (Lyman & O’Brien 2003). That unit is
the “cultural trait,” a term Mesoudi et al. use like many
modern researchers in the social and behavioral sciences use
it – without an explicit definition; though how Mesoudi et al.
and others use it does imply that a cultural trait, whatever else
it might be, is a unit of cultural transmission.
Those interested in developing Darwinian social science
should study the history of their discipline, whether anthropo-
logy, sociology, or psychology, to learn what our intellectual
ancestors thought about cultural transmission. From what I
have read of their ancient writings (Lyman, in press; Lyman &
O’Brien 2003), they had some good ideas that might help us
build models of cultural transmission that include explicitly con-
ceptualized units and processes of transmission. To illustrate, I
summarize how a cultural trait was, and is still, conceived by
many anthropologists, and I describe one key process of cultural
transmission and its effects discussed more than 100 years ago.
To early twentieth-century anthropologists, cultural traits were
units of cultural transmission that were diffused, learned, bor-
rowed, and perpetuated (usually but not always) by face-to-face
contact. A trait could vary in scale from the color of a decorative
motif on a ceramic vessel to an entire behavioral complex such as
the nineteenth-century Ghost Dance – a revitalization move-
ment with elements of Christianity and indigenous religion and
ritual that appeared and spread across portions of the western
United States several times (DuBois 1939; Mooney 1896; Spier
1935). A modern conception of a cultural trait would be that of
a recipe – how, when, where, and why to produce a behavior
or an artifact (a behavioral by-product). A cultural trait (recipe)
includes a set of ingredients, rules for acquiring ingredients,
rules for preparing and measuring ingredients, rules for mixing
and cooking (metaphorically) ingredients, and what to do with
the finished product (Lyman & O’Brien 2003). Rules, ingredi-
ents, or both can be transmitted individually or as a more or
less complete set, and can be mixed or altered to produce (meta-
phorically) a chocolate cake or a yellow cake, or a cookie or a pot
roast.
Conceiving a cultural trait to be such a plastic entity is advan-
tageous. A trait can vary in terms of its scale (inclusiveness),
whether it is empirical or not, its mechanical constraints, and
its tolerance limits (how closely must a recipe be followed to
result in a suitable product?). With respect to transmission pro-
cesses, can a cultural trait be integrated in a recipient culture
or not? Integration was a process that seminal American anthro-
pologist Franz Boas identified that allowed the tracking of cul-
tural traits across time and space. Integration was the process
by which a cultural trait was “adapted and changed in form
according to the genius of the people who borrowed it” (Boas
1896, p. 5). The “adapting and changing” of a cultural trait com-
prises integration. Boas believed that in order for a newly
acquired cultural trait to be retained and replicated, it had to
be modified to fit its new cultural context (Hatch 1973).
Because many traits were acquired piecemeal from many and
disparate sources, and such acquisition never stopped within a
culture, integration was ongoing and resulted in a culture com-
prising a set of functionally and structurally interrelated traits
that were modified to greater or lesser degrees from their original
state. In Boas’s view, integration was one of, if not the, “creative
force” of culture. Thus, it was not only a process of transmission
(on the receiving end), but it also had an effect on the general
processes of cultural evolution and cultural transmission
because it created new variants of cultural traits (which were
subject to sorting processes such as natural selection, though
Boas did not refer to sorting).
Mesoudi et al.’s effort is thoughtful, and it is also up-to-date con-
ceptually. But to borrow a worn cliche´, they and we ignore history
at the peril of repeating old mistakes, and, I would add, at the peril
of forgetting what our intellectual predecessors learned.
A long way to understanding cultural
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Abstract: Understanding cultural evolution is one of the most
challenging and indispensable scientific tasks for the survival of
humankind on our planet. This task demands, besides an adoption of
theories and models from biological evolution, theories for culture-
specific processes as well. Language evolution and language acquisition
offer interesting objects of study in this respect.
Mesoudi et al.’s review of concepts and models from biological
evolution theory and their demonstration of numerous,
amazing analogies and parallels between bio-evolution and cul-
tural evolution is commendable. The long tradition, the generally
high scientific level, and the wealth of reliable results of
bio-evolution theory provide an excellent starting point for deve-
loping a scientific theory of cultural evolution. We strongly
support the authors’ view that it is a promising strategy to
exploit these parallels and to apply the rich inventory of
methods from biological evolution theory as far as possible.
This should be done not only in terms of heuristics, but also in
terms of mathematical modeling to the extent and depth as the
necessary verifications allow.
Despite the fascinating parallels between biological and cul-
tural evolution, however, which are mostly due to the structural
similarity of certain interaction processes, there also exist certain
essential differences between the two kinds of evolution pro-
cesses. Complementing the examples given by Mesoudi et al.,
we would like to draw attention to the following: Traits in cultural
evolution are more difficult to define and to identify; and they
often have lower persistence and resilience. There is no stringent
translation of the terms individual, species, population, gene, and
so on, in corresponding analogs. Additional complications come
up when we investigate cultural evolution as historical process:
Often we find ourselves as acting a part on the stage. Decisions
and valuations at all levels of society may act as selective forces.
Expectations, beliefs, and predictions may become self-
enforcing, even self-fulfilling, or self-defeating. Ecosystems are
generally robust, resilient, and structurally stable against local
impacts and disasters; cultural communities are, in contrast to
this, much more vulnerable and manipulable. Local disturbances
may have long-range and long-term consequences, and could
become amplified violently and epidemically. In investigating
Commentary/Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
358 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4
the cultural evolution of real historical communities, one has to
consider economic subsystems, metabolism with the environ-
ment, corresponding energy flows, and information streams, as
well as driving forces and constraints all the way down to the
basic physical and thermodynamic laws. Otherwise we cannot
understand the emergence, progression, and eventual collapse
of these communities (see Diamond 1999; 2005). However, it
should be possible to incorporate these culture-specific aspects
in more advanced models of cultural evolution. The best-
quality criteria are exhaustive tests of their predictive power.
Following Richerson and Boyd (2005), Mesoudi et al. adopt a
rather wide definition of “culture” as “information capable of
affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other
members of their species” (target article, sect, 1, para. 10).
According to this wide definition, language should get a high
valuation because language qualifies as one of the most powerful
tools affecting individuals and groups. We missed all the more a
discussion of language beyond cladistics and learning. Language
is such a primordial and fundamental constituent of culture that
it deserves closer and specific attention. Moreover, language is
also a unique motor of human cultural evolution, without any
parallels in the history of nonhuman life. From the phylogenetic
perspective, there is clearly a close coevolution of culture and
language. This causes a deep impact of language on cultural evo-
lution. Application of spoken or written language has dramatically
shaped nearly all fields of culture, especially communication, on
all scales and continuously creates new selective forces with
sometimes high fluctuation amplitudes. Language is also respon-
sible for fast-changing spiritual vogues, for intellectual fashions
and ideologies, all unique to the human being – again, with no
counterpart in the natural history of other biota.
Language evolution and language acquisition could therefore
provide interesting objects of study for cultural evolution processes:
The hereditary predisposition of an infant for the acquisition of any
language is a clear vertical transmission process; the fast and see-
mingly effortless acquisition process itself is a maturation-
controlled learning process with prevalent horizontal transmission.
Both processes are coupled by the unique feature of testing and
reshaping of coevolving language by a co-developing brain
(Wermke & Mende 2006). Language acquisition is universal and
at the same time highly flexible. The mastering of native languages
is one of the necessary preconditions of cultural traditions.
To illustrate the growing gap between evolution of biota and
cultural evolution, one should also consider the breathtaking
acceleration made by the energy technology of the nineteenth
century and even more so by contemporary information techno-
logy. The hyperlinked, interlocked global village has no counter-
part in biological evolution. It is threatened by an intrinsic
explosion of complexity, by the outbreak of good and evil fanta-
sies, and urgently needs new strategies of stabilisation.
Supreme effort is required to model and, most important, to
understand these cultural evolution processes and to make
reliable predictions and decisions. Modeling approaches have
to take into account that far-reaching decisions are the result of
the interaction of a large number of human brains and that
even individual responses are generally the result of a huge
potential for imagination and fantasy inside and outside of
human brains. The progeny of Darwin, vertically and horizontally
fairly well instructed, has to solve this puzzle as soon as possible.
A deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of
cultural evolution might be crucial for finding the trail toward a
balanced and sustainable future of humankind.
Archaeology and cultural macroevolution
Michael J. O’Brien
Department of Anthropology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211.
obrienm@missouri.edu cladistics.coas.missouri.edu
Abstract: Given the numerous parallels between the archaeological and
paleontological records, it is not surprising to find a considerable fit
between macroevolutionary approaches and methods used in
biology – for example, cladistics and clade-diversity measures – and
some of those that have long been used in archaeology – for example,
seriation. Key, however, is recognizing that this methodological
congruence is illusory in terms of how evolution has traditionally been
viewed in biology and archaeology.
Mesoudi et al.’s general premise is that human culture exhibits
central Darwinian properties. They then ask a question that
grows out of this premise: What sort of structural relationship
might exist between a science of cultural evolution and the
science of biological evolution? They divide biological evolution
into macro- and microevolution and then align various methods
and approaches used to examine each with corresponding
methods and approaches used to examine cultural evolution.
They find a considerable fit between macroevolutionary
approaches in biology and some of the approaches used in
anthropology and archaeology, and less fit between microevolu-
tionary approaches. This is not surprising, given the numerous
parallels between, say, the archaeological and paleontological
records, which lend themselves to macroevolutionary methods
such as cladistics, seriation, and clade-diversity measures. Like-
wise, the history of anthropology makes it clear that macroevolu-
tionary approaches such as comparative anthropology are the
backbone of the discipline.
Because of their focus, Mesoudi et al. necessarily bypass dis-
cussion of the “evolution” of these interests, approaches, and
methods in anthropology and archaeology – a topic that Lyman
and I have detailed elsewhere (e.g., Lyman & O’Brien 1997;
1998; Lyman et al. 1997; O’Brien & Lyman 2000). Here I
point out that the considerable fit that Mesoudi et al. find
between macroevolutionary approaches, methods, and issues in
anthropology/archaeology and those in biology is a recent
phenomenon rather than a long-standing tradition in the social
sciences. The irony is that despite the parallels between subject
matter, and despite the “naturalness” of traditional anthropologi-
cal and archaeological methods for addressing cultural-evolution-
ary issues, social scientists have often been downright hostile
toward even considering cultural evolution in Darwinian terms.
Rather, they retreat to the cozy confines of nineteenth-century
unilinear and progressive cultural evolutionism of Tylor (1871)
and Morgan (1877).
Anthropologists and archaeologists have been encouraged in
this retreat by several prominent biologists and paleobiologists
such as Gould (e.g., 1987; 1996; 1997) and Mayr (1982; Angier
1997), who have done what countless anthropologists have
done for more than a century – moved culture from the Darwi-
nian realm into the Lamarckian realm. Note how Gould (1996,
p. 222) viewed the situation:
[the] uniquely and distinctively Lamarckian style of human cultural
inheritance gives our technological history a directional and cumulative
character that no natural Darwinian evolution can possess. . . .
[C]ultural change is potentially progressive or self-complexifying
because Lamarckian inheritance accumulates favorable innovations
by direct transmission, and amalgamation of traditions allows any
culture to choose and join the most useful inventions of several separ-
ate societies.
This misguided gambit locates cause in the wrong place
(O’Brien 1996). Although the mode and tempo of transmission
are different when culture is involved, do these differences
lead to the inescapable conclusion that humans have stopped
evolving – that they somehow are beyond the reach of selection?
The answer is an emphatic “no.” Humans today are no more
immune to evolutionary processes than they were ten thousand
or fifty thousand years ago.
All that is important in Darwinian terms – and it is difficult to
overemphasize this point – is that variation, however it is gener-
ated, exists, and that transmission, however it is realized, takes
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place. Reproductive success among variant forms of organisms
will result primarily from selection and drift. Similarly, replicative
success (Leonard & Jones 1987) among variant artifact forms will
result from both selection and differences in transmission. There-
fore, I cannot agree with Gould’s (1996; 1997) plea that the
phenomenon of cultural evolution be labeled “cultural develop-
ment” rather than “evolution” because the latter carries too
many biological connotations. It is precisely these connotations
that it should carry.
Lyman and I have argued (Lyman & O’Brien 1997; O’Brien &
Lyman 2000; 2002b) that archaeology today is in a period similar to
that of the 1970s, when paleobiologists such as Eldredge and
Gould (1972) proposed a new way of looking at the fossil record
that involved some retooling of biological evolutionary theory.
Despite more than a decade of squabbling, the success of their
endeavors is abundantly clear. Evolutionary archaeology, too, is
moving past the squabbling period, but challenges remain at
both the macro- and the microevolutionary levels. Nonetheless,
I suspect that within a decade we will see a modern synthesis in
archaeology that will parallel what occurred in biology in the
1940s with the unification of the naturalists and the experimenta-
lists (Huxley 1942). The basic theory requisite to archaeology,
conceived of as an unabashedly historical science concerning
people and their cultures, has been around since 1859, the year
Darwin penned On the Origin of Species. The basic problem for
archaeology is that Darwin did not write a theory that can be
applied directly to the study of the archaeological record
(O’Brien & Holland 1990). But we cannot, as Rindos (1989) put
it, blame Darwin for not doing our work for us. Rather, we
should heed the advice of one of the foremost archaeologists of
the early twentieth century, who explained to his colleagues that:
the sooner we roll up our sleeves and begin comparative studies of axes
and arrowheads and bone tools, make classifications, prepare accurate
descriptions, draw distribution maps and, in general, persuade ourselves
to do a vast deal of painstaking, unspectacular work, the sooner shall we
be in position to approach the problems of cultural evolution, the solving
of which is, I take it, our ultimate goal. (Kidder 1932, p. 8)
Sober (1992, p. 30) pointed out that “biologists interested in
culture are often struck by the absence of viable general theories
in the social sciences. All of biology is united by the theory of
biological evolution. Perhaps progress in the social sciences is
impeded because there is no general theory of cultural evo-
lution.” Sober is correct in noting that there is no general
theory of cultural evolution, but if the survey by Mesoudi et al.
is any indication of the analytical landscape, then it appears
that help is indeed on the way.
Darwinian cultural evolution rivals genetic
evolution
Mark Pagel
School of Biological Sciences, University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading
RG6 6AJ, United Kingdom.
m.pagel@rdg.ac.uk
Abstract: The study of culture from an evolutionary perspective has
been slowed by resistance from some quarters of anthropology, a poor
appreciation of the fidelity of cultural transmission, and misunderstandings
about human intentionality.
Why is it so easy to accept that Darwinian evolution characterises
genetic systems but not elements of culture? Mesoudi et al. begin
their welcome and thoughtful article by suggesting that biology’s
success relative to anthropology as a scientific discipline derives
from a willingness to simplify and from the synthetic nature of
the theory of evolution. An additional problem that Ruth Mace
and I alluded to in 1994 is that large branches of post-war anthro-
pology adopted the view that “facts themselves should be
considered as social constructs . . . and much of anthropology
redefined itself as an interpretive humanity rather than a
science, concerned with cultural specificity rather than compari-
son across cultures” (Mace & Pagel 1994, p. 549, emphasis added).
This belief in specificity – that particular human cultural
elements are each sui generis – suggests a reluctance to adopt
functional explanations for many aspects of culture: that cultural
elements serve purposes, and those purposes may promote well-
being, standing, reputation, or other important social attributes
that could be related to fitness. Not all elements of culture will
be amenable to functional analysis, but it is a useful gambit to
assume they are until shown otherwise, and to search for the
common link among apparently homologous or analogous traits
across cultures. Elsewhere (Pagel 1994), I have called this
gambit “the adaptationist wager.”
There may also be an under-appreciation and misunderstand-
ing of the fidelity of cultural transmission. Because cultural
elements can, in principle, change every generation, they are
often not seen as serious candidates for study as replicators.
However, language is one part of the dual-inheritance system
of culture and genes that is so prominent in humans. Among
the Indo-European languages, the words for two, three, five, I,
andwho each form a single cognate set across the entire language
family: Every Indo-European language speaker has used a related
sound for each of these meanings. Given that Indo-European
probably arose as a language family about 8,000 years ago
(Gray & Atkinson 2003), this translates into rates of evolution
(Pagel 2000) as low as that of some genetic elements.
Because cultural elements can be transmitted with high fide-
lity, then perhaps where they are not, fidelity may be unimpor-
tant and not just inherently noisy. For example, we might not
expect the fidelity of linguistic transmission to exceed that
required for three generations to talk to each other: There is
no need to invest in the replication machinery to improve on
this. What we observe is that even the most rapidly evolving
parts of the fundamental vocabulary of languages change slowly
enough to allow communication among generations (Pagel
2000). Biologists have come to treat replication fidelity as a vari-
able of interest in its own right. The human immunodeficiency
virus has some of the highest rates of mutation (lowest fidelity)
observed in a functioning replicator. Its poor fidelity may allow
it to escape detection by the human immune system.
The human capacity for intentionality or goal-directedness is
thought by some to undermine the study of culture from
within the framework of natural selection. Mesoudi et al.
demur (see also Mesoudi et al. 2004), and I would like to add
that this criticism may conflate intentionality with omniscience
or omnipotence. Late Homo erectus may have frequently
wished to make fire but could not work out how to produce
matches. What matters is that attempts at solving problems,
whether or not underpinned by intention or goal-direction, can
be placed in a list ordered along a continuum of success. If
success matters, those who find their way to the top of this list
will outcompete those who do not.
The existence of intentionality makes plausible the argument
that horizontally transferred elements of culture can be used to
study cultural adaptation. Horizontal transmission or borrowing
of cultural elements is often used as a stick with which to beat
those who use cultural phylogenies to study the coevolution of
cultural elements. But intentionality makes it plausible to apply
the research gambit mentioned at the outset: the belief that hori-
zontally transmitted elements of culture are adopted because
they serve some function. This gambit will not always pay off,
such as when the element of culture has been forced upon a
society, but without intentionality the gambit would be fanciful.
Human cultures seem to divide up the world as if they were so
many biological species (Pagel & Mace 2004). There is every
reason to believe that studying variation among these cultural
groups from an adaptationist perspective will yield the same
sorts of insights as it has for nonhuman organisms.
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Cultural evolution is not equivalent to
Darwinian evolution
Dwight W. Read
Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles,
Los Angeles, CA 90095.
dread@anthro.ucla.edu
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/read/
Abstract: Darwinian evolution, defined as evolution arising from
selection based directly on the properties of individuals, does not
account for cultural constructs providing the organizational basis of
human societies. The difficulty with linking Darwinian evolution to
structural properties of cultural constructs is exemplified with kinship
terminologies, a cultural construct that structures and delineates the
domain of kin in human societies.
Cultural anthropologists, according to Mesoudi et al., are con-
cerned with the same kind of issues and questions as evolutionary
biologists. Because variability, inheritance, and selection also
apply to cultural phenomena, then cultural anthropology, they
suggest, could benefit by taking advantage of the theoretical
and methodological advances made by evolutionary biologists.
The only barrier, they note, is the unwarranted refusal by cultural
anthropologists to drop their assumption that evolution (read:
Darwinian evolution) is not relevant to understanding culture
change. Yet cultural evolution, though not in the form of Darwi-
nian evolution, has long been a central concept in anthropology:
“Cultural selection . . . operates not on individuals but on cultural
traits and on societies” (Carneiro 1985, p. 77, emphasis in the
original). However, despite championing Darwinian evolution
for understanding cultural evolution, the authors admit in the
end that the matter may be more complex: “‘social constructions’
. . . have no real equivalent in the biological domain . . . [and this]
requires a different evolutionary treatment from the one deve-
loped within biology” (target article, sect. 4, para. 5). So can we
account for change within “culture as a kind of mental pheno-
menon” (D’Andrade 2001, p. 243) by reference to Darwinian
evolution, where selection is based on properties of individuals?
The answer is no (Read 2003). To see why, consider a universal
cultural construct fundamental to human social systems, namely
kinship, as it is expressed through a kinship terminology.
By a kinship terminology, I mean the terms that identify one’s
(cultural) kin; for example, mother, aunt, cousin, and so on, for
English speakers. The terms are culture-specific (e.g., unlike
some kinship terminologies, English speakers do not have sepa-
rate terms for mother’s sister versus father’s sister); hence,
there is a problem translating the terms from one language/
culture to the terms of another language/culture. Analytically
the translation problem is circumvented by mapping kin terms
to a common genealogical domain that makes possible genealogi-
cal definitions of kin terms regardless of language, such as aunt =
{parent’s sister, parent’s brother’s wife} for English speakers.
We can see the social importance of kinship terminologies by
considering the role of kinship in small-scale societies. Typically,
societal membership is determined through kinship. Hunter-
gatherers in the Kalahari Desert of Botswana, for example,
refer to themselves as the ju/wasi, which means, roughly, “we,
the real people” (Marshall 1976, p. 17). Real persons are one’s
kin, and one’s kin are those persons included in the scope of
reference of kin terms. The distinction between kin and non-
kin is nontrivial, and for some groups, such as the Waorani of
Ecuador, it meant the difference between being able to engage
in social interaction or being killed on sight (Wilson & Yost 2001).
Terminological knowledge is located in individuals and hence
can be considered to be part of the phenotype of individuals. Yet
individual benefit does not arise, unlike for many biological traits,
simply from having terminological knowledge as a trait. Instead,
individual benefit arises from the properties of the social group
formed of persons sharing the same terminology and who
thereby are mutually kin.
How do we account for the macro-level phenomena of social
relations and individual benefit structured through a kinship ter-
minology? Mesoudi et al. consider that evolution occurs at the
trait level because they accept uncritically the idea that macro-
evolution is Darwinian microevolution writ large (but see
Erwin 2000; Carroll 2001; Simons 2002; among others, for
some of the issues involved). However, their argument does
not work for kinship terminologies.
A terminology is not just a collection of terms, as it has a struc-
tural form (in the algebraic sense) determined by the way we
compute kin relations using kin terms (Read 1984; 2001; 2005).
If John, Mary, and Jim are English speakers and John refers to
Mary by the kin term aunt and Mary refers to Jim by the kin
term son, then when John refers to Jim by the kin term cousin,
cousin is the product of the kin terms aunt and son. More gene-
rally, if person A (properly) refers to person B using the kin term
K and person B (properly) refers to person C using the kin term
L, then the product of K and L is the kin term M (if any) that A
properly uses for person C. Through ethnographic elicitation of
this kind of kin term usage, we can make evident a conceptual
structure that expresses the manner in which the kin terms
forming a particular terminology constitute a structured set of
symbols (¼terms).
The form of the structure is highly constrained. It can be con-
structed algorithmically by expanding a core structure so as to
structurally introduce two basic properties of kinship terminolo-
gies: (1) reciprocity of kin terms, and (2) sex marking of kin terms.
The core structure is generated algebraically by applying repeat-
edly the kin term product to the generating term(s), such as the
kin term parent for the American kinship terminology.
Terminologies differ from one another with respect to the set
of generating kin terms and the algorithms for introducing the
above two terminological properties but share commonality by
having structures that can be generated in this manner. Even
more, the generative logic leads to 100% correct predictions of
the genealogical definitions of kin terms, even though seemingly
simple changes to a terminology (such as introducing the terms
aunt-in-law and uncle-in-law into the American kinship termi-
nology) would negate the ability to correctly predict genealogical
definitions of kin terms.
The generative logic of terminologies would not arise from his-
torically contingent selection based on phenotypic properties of
individuals acting at the level of individual kin terms. Further,
though terminologies are mental constructs transmitted in a
social context through a developing child’s enculturation,
knowing in more detail the mapping of individual kin terms –
seemingly good candidates for memes – onto neurological
location(s) will not tell us much either about the structural
arrangement of kin terms or about the processes used by the
brain to infer the implicit organizational structure of a kinship
terminology. The structural logic of kinship terminologies
appears to be inferred, much as the brain infers the implicit
organizational structure of a language. The selection acting on
kinship terminologies occurs at the level of structural properties
and their consequences for the social organization of kin deter-
mined through the kinship terminology.
Evo-devo, modularity, and evolvability:
Insights for cultural evolution
Simon M. Reader
Department of Behavioural Biology and Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University,
Utrecht 3508 TB, The Netherlands.
s.m.reader@bio.uu.nl http://www.bio.uu.nl/behaviour/Reader/
Abstract: Evolutionary developmental biology (“evo-devo”) may provide
insights and new methods for studies of cognition and cultural evolution.
For example, I propose using cultural selection and individual learning to
examine constraints on cultural evolution. Modularity, the idea that traits
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vary independently, can facilitate evolution (increase “evolvability”),
because evolution can act on one trait without disrupting another. I
explore links between cognitive modularity, evolutionary modularity,
and cultural evolvability.
Mesoudi et al. argue that the methods and tools used to study
biological evolution can profitably be applied to the evolution
of culture, particularly human culture. Evolutionary develop-
mental biology (“evo-devo”) is a major research axis of evolution-
ary biology, given little attention in the target article. Evo-devo
studies the mechanisms that generate the phenotype, and
whether these channel, bias, or limit evolution (Brakefield
2003). Issues studied include the evolutionary origins of pheno-
typic novelty, how fitness improvements are made without com-
promising past adaptation, influences and constraints on the rate
and course of evolution, and whether evolvability, evolutionary
adaptability, can itself evolve (Kirschner & Gerhart 1998;
Wagner & Altenberg 1996; West-Eberhard 2003). Parallel
issues are key to understanding cultural evolution, so there is
potential for cross-fertilisation of ideas.
Of particular relevance is the notion that modularity can favour
evolvability, the capacity to generate heritable, selectable pheno-
typic variation (Hansen 2003; Kirschner &Gerhart 1998;Wagner
& Altenberg 1996; West-Eberhard 2003). In evo-devo,
“modular” describes traits that have some degree of genetic
and developmental independence: they are semiautonomous
units. Such independence is argued to facilitate biological evo-
lution, allowing traits to change without interfering with other
traits’ functions (Hansen 2003). For example, a common theme
in biological evolution is differentiation of repeated modules,
such as teeth along a jaw or segments of an insect body. Replica-
tion, and the resulting redundancy, facilitates evolutionary
change without the disadvantage of loss of original function. Cul-
tural evolution may provide similar examples. During language
evolution, single words might be duplicated to form several
words of similar meaning. This could facilitate subsequent cul-
tural evolution, because some of these duplicated words can
diverge in meaning without loss of the original word’s meaning.
Cognition may also have a modular structure, although the
extent and developmental causes of cognitive modularity are
hotly debated (Fodor 1983; 2000; Panksepp & Panksepp 2000;
Sperber 2002). This modular structure could influence the
tempo and course of both cognitive evolution and cultural evo-
lution. Critical defining characters of cognitive modules, such as
computational distinctiveness and informational encapsulation,
imply independence between modules (Fodor 1983; Shettle-
worth 2000). Independence could facilitate cognitive evolution,
because selection can act on one cognitive module without affect-
ing the function of others. Hence, although the Fodorian and
evo-devo modularity literatures have generally developed sepa-
rately (but see, e.g., Sperber 2002), Fodorian cognitive
modules may be modular in the evo-devo sense. Cognitive struc-
ture and processes are essential in supporting and moulding
culture (Mesoudi et al. 2006; Sperber & Hirschfeld 2004).
Now, the question is: are the cognitive processes that support
cultural evolution modular, do cultural traits themselves form
modules, and does this influence cultural evolution?
Culturally transmitted traits often occur in clusters. For
example, speaking French is associated with religious, dietary,
technological, and societal preferences and norms. Causes of
trait clustering and consequences for cultural evolution are
important issues: How and why are these stable clusters main-
tained? Do they act as modules? And does clustering limit or
facilitate cultural evolution? Traits may occur together because
each trait is an independent adaptation to a shared physical or
socio-cultural environment, and/or because of cognitive, histori-
cal, or phylogenetic constraints. In addition, trait acquisition may
facilitate acquisition of other traits. Evo-devo can inspire empiri-
cal methods to address these issues. For example, across-species
comparison of butterfly wing patterns revealed that posterior and
anterior forewing spots varied in size, and that some size
combinations were observed in nature (e.g., both eyespots
large or both small), whereas others (e.g., posterior eyespots
large, anterior small) were not (Brakefield 2003). This would
be equivalent to finding only particular combinations of cultural
traits in comparative studies of natural populations (e.g., reliance
on tools A and B is observed, as is reliance on neither tool, but
reliance on A without B is never observed). Such a pattern of
inter-group differences could suggest an evolutionary constraint:
particular trait combinations evolve readily, and others, rarely.
Evo-devo can go beyond comparative investigation of whether
traits are separable and modular. One can artificially select one
trait (e.g., posterior eyespot size) and observe effects on other
traits (e.g., anterior eyespot size). Moreover, by selecting for
combinations of traits, constraints on evolution can be examined
(Brakefield 2003). Such studies may produce counterintuitive
results. For example, the natural distribution of eyespot patterns
suggested an evolutionary constraint. However, under artificial
selection, pattern combinations not observed in natural species
evolved as readily as combinations observed in the field (Brake-
field 2003). This suggests that other reasons beyond developmen-
tal or genetic constraints, such as ecological demands, are
responsible for the natural distribution of these trait combi-
nations. Thus, artificial selection experiments can help address
why particular traits co-occur.
Similarly, artificial cultural selection could be used to identify
and pull apart clusters of cultural traits. For example, the coevo-
lution of culturally transmitted traits could be studied using labo-
ratory microsocieties and transmission chain approaches (e.g.,
Baum et al. 2004). Another possibility would be examination of
learning within individuals to assess the stability and integrity
of culturally acquired trait clusters. If reinforcement of one
trait facilitates or impedes production of another, cultural coevo-
lution of the two traits will be affected. For instance, learning one
tool technique (e.g., termite fishing; Whiten et al. 1999) may
facilitate acquisition of another technique (e.g., nut-cracking) if
common skills are involved, but may hinder acquisition if training
in one skill reduces competence in another.
Finally, can evolvability itself evolve?Within biology, it is contro-
versial as to whether architectures that favour evolvability are them-
selves adaptations (Earl & Deem 2004; Kirschner & Gerhart 1998;
Radman et al. 1999). There is evidence that, for example, mamma-
lian immunological systems are designed to favour the production
of variability, on which selection can act. Furthermore, these vari-
ation-generating mechanisms are not general but targeted to the
immunoglobulin genes (Radman et al. 1999; Weill & Reynaud
1996). The evolvability question is relevant to cultural evolution:
Are there cognitive structures, artefacts, or societal designs that
favour or hinder cultural evolution, do they target particular
domains of cultural evolution, and have these structures evolved
because of their optimising effect on rates of cultural evolution?
If the production of cultural variants is too fast, beneficial variants
may be lost, and if too slow, adaptability may be compromised. In
conclusion, the evo-devo viewpoint suggests important questions
for cultural evolution, but also provides a body of theory and
methods that could help provide answers.
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A unified science of cultural evolution should
incorporate choice
Barry Sopher
Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901.
sopher@econ.rutgers.edu
Abstract: Analogies between biological and cultural evolution may be
illuminating and suggest methods to pursue in the quest for a unified
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science of cultural evolution. Significant progress, however, is unlikely to
be made by trying to fit cultural evolution neatly into a biological
evolution schema. A key element defining and differentiating cultural
evolution may be the role of conscious human choices.
The very extensive review of Mesoudi et al., and their proposed
taxonomy of a theory of cultural evolution parallel to biological
evolution, is useful insofar as it identifies a wide range of
approaches to use in analyzing cultural evolution and in identify-
ing possible underlying processes by which cultural evolutionary
change may be explained. I have some doubts, however, that this
is the way in which the goal of a unified theory of cultural evo-
lution will be achieved.
When Charles Darwin proposed his theory of natural selec-
tion, he had only the evident (living and fossil) results of a
process, but essentially no clue as to the precise mechanics of
that process. Mendelian genetics was the process; it came to
light years later, and further refinements and deeper understand-
ing (e.g., the fundamental biochemistry of genetics) followed on
from this initial discovery. Moreover, the genetic process, the
mechanics of which accomplish the natural selection Darwin
posited, is not the only process at work in biological evolution.
We now know that there is non-adaptive genetic change,
genetic drift, which accounts for some of what we see today in
the living world. More recently, the synthesis of evolutionary
thinking with developmental biology, popularly known as “evo-
devo,” is suggesting yet other processes, either to augment or
to replace those processes that biologists believed to be the
basis for evolution as recently as 20 years ago.
The point of this (coming from a non-expert in biology) for
what I want to say here is that the discovery of these processes
was not necessarily the outcome of an explicit search for a unify-
ing theory of biological evolution, but rather the outcome of a
search to understand very specific mechanisms. I believe that
progress in achieving a unified theory of cultural evolution will
similarly be composed of findings in a number of specific
research programs that are not obviously or mainly targeted at
an overarching unified theory of evolution (although some may
be), but rather, more typically, are targeted at understanding a
specific mechanism, such as how people use natural language
to persuade others that one course of action is superior to
another.
The authors’ treatment of research in anthropology is quite
detailed, and I will not presume to add anything of substance
to what they have said about the many fascinating research
avenues along which anthropologists are working. In this connec-
tion, though, work by writers such as Richerson and Boyd (2005)
provides a challenge to their approach. Richerson and Boyd
adopt the view that cultural evolution is an aspect of evolution
generally and cannot or should not be separated from things bio-
logical. I do not know if Richerson and Boyd have had the final
word on the question, but they have stated a compelling counter-
point to that of Mesoudi et al.
A treatment of economic phenomena is largely absent in the
article, and I would like to draw attention to a number of
strands in the literature that I believe to be relevant and,
perhaps, even central to the project the authors propose.
Though some people may conduct their economic lives more
or less instinctively, it is clear that much economic behavior is
quite purposeful and goal-oriented, even if it is not always clear
to the actors what the ultimate impact of their actions on
others or on society as a whole will be. The ability to organize
themselves in complex ways and to transmit information and
knowledge to others, even others who are far removed, must
be the defining characteristic of humans vis-a`-vis other
mammals. Indeed, our ability to consciously manipulate
symbols and to communicate across time and space is unparal-
leled in the biological world.
Schumpeter (1934) asserted that economic history evolves
according to a process of “creative destruction.” In this we
have, analogous to what Darwin did, an observation that
economic institutions and activities do evolve, and a conjectured
process to explain that evolution, but the detailed mechanics of
how that process operates are not really uncovered. The “new
institutional economics” (e.g., Nelson & Winter 1982; North
1978; Schotter 1981; Williamson 2000) organize our thinking
about economic life by the conjecture that economic institutions
arise and evolve as a way of solving a variety of coordination pro-
blems that arise in organizing economic interaction.
Recent work on the role of networks in economic activity (e.g.
Goyal 2005; Jackson & Watts 2002) add a bit more detail and
suggest specific processes whereby economic activity might
evolve. Research on social learning (e.g., Anderson & Holt
1997; Banerjee 2002; Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Gale & Kariv
2003; Young 1993; 1998) treats the important role of information
transfer in the learning process. Research that explicitly makes
use of natural language in social learning (e.g., Chaudhuri et al.
2005; Nyarko et al., forthcoming; Schotter & Sopher 2003;
2006; forthcoming; Weber & Camerer 2003) is beginning to
show that communication with natural language, and not just
observations of others, may play a critical role in solving problems
in economic life.
In all of these cited works, conscious, or at least deliberate,
actions by economic agents are involved. Multinational conglo-
merates are not formed by accident. Someone has to make a
decision to put all of his or her money into high-risk assets
rather than into safer but lower-yielding government bonds.
The processes that biologists use to organize their thinking
about biological evolution, though, are largely unconscious pro-
cesses. Whether we will ultimately find, as Richerson and Boyd
(2005) suggest, that cultural evolution is just part of one big
theory of evolution, or that there is a distinct theory that
organizes the data on cultural evolution as such, there clearly is
a need to investigate those distinct processes in cultural evolution
that involve conscious human choices.
The uses of ethnography in the science of
cultural evolution
Jamshid Tehrani
Centre for the Evolution of Cultural Diversity, Institute of Archaeology,
University College London, London, WC1H 0PY, United Kingdom.
j.tehrani@ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: There is considerable scope for developing a more explicit role
for ethnography within the research program proposed in the article.
Ethnographic studies of cultural micro-evolution would complement
experimental approaches by providing insights into the “natural”
settings in which cultural behaviours occur. Ethnography can also
contribute to the study of cultural macro-evolution by shedding light
on the conditions that generate and maintain cultural lineages.
In this insightful and thought-provoking article, Mesoudi et al.
build a convincing case for modelling the study of cultural evo-
lution on the disciplinary structure of evolutionary biology. Their
use of this framework succeeds on two levels, producing a
wide-ranging and coherent survey of the current state of the
field while also making an important and timely contribution to
its further development. Although in recent years evolutionary
approaches to culture have proliferated and grown in popularity,
there has been surprisingly little (e.g., Shennan 2002) explicit
theorising over how different approaches such as memetics,
dual inheritance theory, and cultural phylogenetics might
actually fit together. The evidence presented here demonstrates
that a cultural equivalent to the “evolutionary synthesis”
in biology is both possible and necessary: It is possible because
of the progress that has been made in so many different areas
of study, and necessary in order to prevent the development of
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serious ontological divergences like those which have split the
traditional social sciences.
In support of a unified theoretical framework that is concep-
tually flexible and inclusive, Mesoudi et al. propose a program
of research that is methodologically pluralistic, incorporating
techniques imported from evolutionary biology as well as ones
that are better established in the social sciences. Unfortunately
though, it appears that the authors take such a dismal view of
social anthropology that they rather downplay the role that eth-
nography could play in this enterprise by subsuming it within
ethnology – the synthesis of ethnographic case studies into
cross-cultural databases (e.g., Murdock 1967) – and a more
generic and less well-defined category of “anthropological field
studies.” The latter encompasses a wide range of research
styles, some of which differ markedly from ethnographic field-
work – particularly in the degree to which they employ a “top-
down” rather than a “bottom-up” approach. Thus, question-
naire-based studies (e.g., Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza 1986),
psychological experiments (e.g., Barrett 2004), and economic
games (Henrich et al. 2005) in small-scale societies are designed
to investigate specific anthropological problems using highly
structured data-collection strategies that are implemented over
relatively short periods of time. The time frame of ethnographic
research is much greater, requiring months and often years of
fieldwork, the aims and outcomes of which are only loosely con-
tained within the parameters set by a predetermined research
question. Compared to other approaches, ethnographic
methods are more informal and typically consist of unstructured
or semi-structured interview techniques and “participant-
observation,” which involves immersing oneself in the lifeways
of a community and learning the language and habits of its
members firsthand (e.g., Bradburd 1998).
Rather than focusing on isolated subsets of cultural complexes,
ethnographers attempt to situate behaviours within wider con-
texts of cultural meaning, event histories, and social relationships.
For example, whereas an economic game experiment (e.g.,
Henrich et al. 2005) would investigate norms of reciprocity and
punishment through performance in a money allocation task,
an ethnographer might focus instead on different orders and cur-
rencies of exchange within a particular culture. Thus, an ethno-
graphic analysis might compare and contrast the sorts of
expectations that individuals have of monetary transactions
with strangers, with the social and moral obligations implied by
the giving and receiving of gifts among kin, friends, and allies
(Bloch & Parry 1989). Moreover, ethnographic accounts of the
“natural” settings in which cultural behaviours are expressed
and evaluated are certainly compatible with more structured
experimental studies (e.g., Astuti et al. 2004; Henrich et al.
2004). Using the framework developed by Mesoudi et al., these
approaches could be combined to investigate cultural micro-
evolution within populations in exactly the same way as field-
based studies of animal behaviour in the wild complement
studies carried out in captivity and in laboratory conditions.
Ethnographic studies can also make a useful contribution to
our understanding of cultural macro-evolution. Although
studies indicate that cladistic methods can be as useful for recon-
structing cultural histories as they are for recovering and classify-
ing the relationships among species (e.g., Collard et al. 2005;
2006), the underlying mechanisms responsible for generating
and maintaining cultural lineages remain poorly understood.
Using evidence from the ethnographic record, Durham (1990;
1992a) has proposed that the apparent prevalence of warfare,
language barriers, endogamy, and ethnocentricism in human
societies may act in a similar way to reproductive isolating mecha-
nisms that restrict gene flow among biological populations and
which are believed to be important in speciation. Collard and I
found evidence of these mechanisms in the phylogenesis of
Turkmen textile designs, which, we argued, might be explained
by ethnographic reports relating to the extent of intertribal
warfare and endogamous marriage practices (Tehrani & Collard
2002). However, it should be noted that the presence and influ-
ence of these mechanisms cannot be assumed to be universal
(e.g., Jordan & Shennan [2003] found branching processes to
be much less dominant in Californian basketry traditions) and
nor can they be assumed to be constant: Blending among
Turkmen textile traditions increased in importance following
the pacification of the Turkmen tribes in the late nineteenth
century and the introduction of commercial craft production
(although branching continued to dominate). Thus, as well as
varying from case to case, the processes responsible for genera-
ting patterns of cultural diversity can change significantly within
a few generations. Ethnographic studies can advance our under-
standing in this area by shedding more light on the specific social,
economic, and political conditions that cause groups to become
isolated from one another or encourage them to interact. More-
over, long-term participant-observation studies of cultural learn-
ing can help to establish which traditions are likely to be strongly
affected by social change and rates of inter-group contact, and
which ones are more stable and long-lasting (e.g., Pe´trequin &
Pe´trequin 1999).
Unfortunately, in recent decades there have been relatively
few ethnographic studies that have directly addressed the
issues that I have raised here. This can largely be accounted
for by the rise of so-called hermeneutic approaches (e.g., Clifford
& Marcus 1986; Geertz 1973) which focus on the problems of
interpreting meaning and experience in different cultures, and
which are inspired more by movements in literary criticism and
philosophy than by the social or biological sciences. However,
while the idea of a science of culture has fallen out of fashion
in mainstream social anthropology, I have attempted to show
that there is considerable potential for developing an ethno-
graphic research agenda within the framework proposed by
Mesoudi et al. The starting point for this agenda is recognising
that by carrying out long-term fieldwork in a single community
and observing the interactions and behaviours of its members
in the absence of experimental controls, ethnographers can
provide important insights into the evolution of culture that
would complement – or possibly challenge – those obtained by
the approaches discussed in the article.
Generative entrenchment and an evolutionary
developmental biology for culture
William C. Wimsatt
Philosophy and Committee on Evolutionary Biology, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL 60637.
wwim@midway.uchicago.edu
Abstract: Mesoudi et al.’s new synthesis for cultural evolution closely
parallels the evolutionary synthesis of Neo-Darwinism. It too draws
inspiration from population genetics, recruits other fields, and,
unfortunately, also ignores development. Enculturation involves many
serially acquired skills and dependencies that allow us to build a rich
cumulative culture. The newer synthesis, evolutionary developmental
biology, provides a key tool, generative entrenchment, to analyze them.
In 1982, Mayr and Provine celebrated the evolutionary synthesis,
the articulation of disciplines into a population genetic – driven
theory of evolution (Mayr & Provine 1980). Sewall Wright’s
absence was widely felt (Mayr did not invite him). His place
and that of mathematical theory had to await Provine’s (1986)
masterful biography. Present but not felt was Viktor Hamburger,
representing embryology, the disenfranchised mother of evo-
lution (Richards 1992). But not disenfranchised for long: Disco-
verers of HOX genes, phylogeneticists, embryologists, and
renaissant paleontologists recruited partners to a fusion as evo-
lutionary developmental biology became the newer synthesis,
one increasingly overreaching the original. Raff (1996), Arthur
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(1997), Davidson (2001), Schlosser and Wagner (2004), Carroll
(2005), and others drive an expansive adaptive radiation of the
new theory that even reaches culture, with Oyama et al. (2001),
Jablonka and Lamb (2005), and Odling-Smee et al. (2003).
This list could have been quadrupled (Maienschein & Laublicher
2006).
Mesoudi et al. survey and inform a synthesis increasingly
stimulating research throughout the human sciences. They
embrace the mathematics that Mayr avoided but reproduce the
other mistake: development is far too central to be ignored in
an account of cultural change, even more so than for biological
evolution. Crucial to the architecture of the theory, development
also gives handles on classes of phenomena not addressed effec-
tively by any part of their new synthesis (Wimsatt & Griesemer
2006).
Biological life cycles begin with zygotic genomes, complete at
birth, participating on cue in rich downstream interactions with
their embodying and embedding contexts. Surviving organisms
differentially become parents to make new zygotes. In this frame-
work, one can abstract and separate out heredity, development,
and selection (Wimsatt 1999), simplifying components not
being directly studied or modeled, often treating problems as
“nearly decomposable” without major distortions of evolutionary
dynamics. In this problematic limit (Griesemer 2005), develop-
ment is commonly lumped with selection as a black-box scalar
multiplier for gene frequencies, and then ignored.
By contrast, transmission of cultural information is not com-
plete at birth: it has barely begun. As the authors note, cultural
transmission is commonly horizontal, generating different
dynamics from those possible for biology. As they fail to note,
individual enculturation is most often sequentially dependent:
We must learn arithmetic (and many other things) well before
calculus. Agents accumulate, coadapt, and construct contents
and practices throughout the life cycle. Earlier assimilations
potentiate, filter, and amplify, selecting and often transforming
(Sperber 1996) later acquisitions. New contents may transform
agents’ connections in the social network mediating reception
and transmission. Such sequential dependencies are not
modeled in any extant theory. Furthermore, in development,
selection and heredity are almost impossibly confounded and
path-dependent, and details of individual history matter
(Wimsatt 1999). Evolutionists and creationists taking the same
curriculum in population genetics and developmental biology
would draw, systematically, quite different lessons from it.
Why are some elements of a different culture readily diffusible,
others rejected, and others transformed nearly unrecognizably?
Epidemiological models of infectibility and resistance can
utilize networks to model contacts but ignore cultural contents.
Conformity bias and broad categories of “content-based bias”
do not have the structure to deal with sequence-dependent
skill acquisition or model the specificity and relatedness of
ideas or technologies. One needs structures capable of dealing
with the content.
One way looks promising. Developmental dependency of
elements in the life cycle characterizes both biological and cul-
tural evolution: You generate what comes later from what you
have earlier. Inferential structures (including scientific theories
and legal codes) have dependencies too. Biological, cognitive,
and cultural architectures are all constrained by and tuned to
creatively elaborating these dependencies. We can use them to
build theory.
To Lewontin’s (1970) three requirements for evolution (herita-
ble variance in fitness) add two more: (4) developmental trajec-
tories show sequential dependencies (generativity), and (5)
systemic elements differ in downstream consequences and mag-
nitude of effect (differential generative entrenchment). These
provide a minimal but absolutely general account of develop-
ment. All nontrivial evolutionary systems satisfy all five assump-
tions (Wimsatt 2001). And much more follows. Differential
generative entrenchment yields a robust evolutionary dynamics
and many new consequences (B. Arthur 1994; Schank &
Wimsatt 1988; 2000; Wimsatt & Schank 1988; 2004). The key
is neo-Darwinian: Larger mutations give more places for some-
thing to go wrong and so are exponentially less likely to be adap-
tive. So they are also less likely to be incorporated in evolution,
generating a differential conservatism. An evolutionary dynamics
arises simply from differential dependency, a general feature of
organizational structure.
Here are some of the new consequences:
1. Features earlier in development that are more generatively
entrenched should tend to be more evolutionarily conservative.
1a. This yields von Baer’s “laws,” roughly, that earlier deve-
lopmental stages tend to look more alike than later
stages (Gould 1977).
1b. Generative entrenchment in early development also pre-
dicts life cycles: Successive generations must start in
places like their parents, however much they diverge
later, until reproduction “closes” the cycle (Wimsatt
2001).
2. New population-genetics models of entrenchment
(Schank & Wimsatt 1988) give purchase on “complexity cata-
strophes” and the evolution of modularity (Wimsatt & Schank
1988; 2004) that are also suggestive for culture.
3. An entrenchment account of phenomena spoken of as
“innate” captures the maximal consistent subset of criteria for
innateness and predicts new ones (Wimsatt 1986; 2003).
4. For culture, as things get more deeply entrenched, we resist
changing them, suggesting how things become conventional,
standardized, and acquire a normative loading.
5. Standardization is crucial to technological progress when
further developments require common components, a more
general feature of the truly cumulative culture sought by Richer-
son and Boyd (2005).
6. In literary theory, Turner (1991) employs entrenchment to
explain differences between literal and figurative meaning.
7. Differences between biology and culture in how we can
generate and deal with deeply entrenched changes are crucial
to the rapidity and sometimes revolutionary character of cultural
change (Wimsatt & Griesemer 2006).
Evolutionarily recent changes in deep structures provide
apparent exceptions worth closer study (Raff 1996). Some
changes (e.g., bicoid; Schmitt-Ott & Wimmer 2004) first
appear as fine-tuning for a control structure, then co-opting
and amplifying the role of that control structure to become
deeply entrenched (like our information technologies). Other
organizational features matter in determining entrenchment.
Selection in evolutionary genetics is modulated by linkage,
drift, and population structure and makes a richer theory for
that. Similarly, a mature theory of generative entrenchment
should articulate with other systematic organizational factors,
such as redundancy, sequestration, modularity, and canalization.
All decrease entrenchment in diverse ways with further impli-
cations. There are other fruitful complications for biology and
many more for culture (Wimsatt & Griesemer 2006).
Differential dependencies – what remains invariant, and what
changes with what – can produce organizational information
from comparative data. In 1987 Rasmussen proposed a tentative
architecture for Drosophila development inferred from 22 deve-
lopmental mutations (Rasmussen 1987) – still often correct
despite massive amounts of new data. Still key in evolutionary
developmental biology, analyses of relative stasis and depen-
dency help to unravel developmental programs and predict
phylogenetic relationships (Arthur 1997; Davidson 2001). They
can be used to good advantage in studying cultural change:
Dependency relations are often more readily discovered and
analyzed than is selection, and complement other methods in
the powerful new paradigm.
Population structure is crucial for biological evolution (Wade &
Goodnight 1998), but the breeding population for one trait does
for all. Enculturated individuals getting traits piecemeal have as
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many breeding populations as reference groups and the salience of
these groups shifts over time. Acquisition of sequential skills
organizes many of these transitions (Wimsatt 2001). Divergent
specialties and values midwife heterogeneous societies and sub-
cultures as we bootstrap institutions, technologies, and material
cultures to maintain and elaborate them (Basalla 1988). Molar
structures – settlements, schools, governments, legal codes,
religions, firms, and markets that scaffold our enculturation –
organize, regulate, and contribute to its content. Entrenchments
organize contingencies of practice into more stable structures,
only to be modulated by the next round of contingencies. This
produces for history and culture a fractal organization of relevant
detail onmany size and time scales (Gaddis 2002). Entrenchments
thereby help to generate a qualitative understanding of the
organization and richness of even “thick” culture through the
development of individuals and the more stable superindividual
structures (Wimsatt & Griesemer 2006).
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Abstract:We are encouraged that the majority of commentators
endorse our evolutionary framework for studying culture, and
several suggest extensions. Here we clarify our position,
dwelling on misunderstandings and requests for exposition. We
reiterate that using evolutionary biology as a model for unifying
the social sciences within a single synthetic framework can
stimulate a more progressive and rigorous science of culture.
R1. Introduction
We are pleased and encouraged by the generally positive
tenor of the commentaries. The majority of commentators
(Barkow;BorgerhoffMulder,McElreath,&Schroeder
[Borgerhoff Mulder et al.], Cronk;Dennett & McKay;
Kincaid; Lyman; Mende & Wermke; O’Brien; Pagel;
Reader; Tehrani; Wimsatt) accept the core features of
our evolutionary framework, and many of them go on to
recommend additions or extensions to our approach.
These additions are discussed in more detail in section R2.
Several other commentators (Aunger; Blackmore;
Fuentes; Kelly, Machery, Mallon, Mason, & Stich
[Kelly et al.]; Knudsen & Hodgson; Sopher) agree with
the need for an evolutionary approach to culture, but take
issue with our particular framework or appear to reserve
judgement until certain key issues are dealt with. Finally,
Borsboom, Bridgeman, and Read appear to reject the
premise that any (Darwinian) evolutionary approach can
be applied to culture. The objections of all of these com-
mentators are dealt with in section R3.
R2. Suggested extensions
We are very encouraged that the commentators have
already proposed new branches to the synthetic evolution-
ary framework for studying culture that we illustrated in
Figure 1, either by drawing new parallels with subfields
of evolutionary biology that we omitted, or by drawing
our attention to existing subfields of the social sciences
that might appropriately fit into a unified science of
cultural evolution. We do not see this as a failing of our
original proposal and are broadly receptive to their
suggestions. On the contrary, a significant test for our syn-
thetic framework is whether it can usefully accommodate
such additions, which we believe it can and does. After
all, the modern synthesis that unified evolutionary
biology (Huxley 1942) was far from complete when it
was first outlined in the 1930s and 1940s, and evolutionary
biology continues to incorporate new subdisciplines to this
day (Carroll 2000; Kutschera & Niklas 2004).
R2.1. Omitted social science literatures
Kincaid, Knudsen & Hodgson, and Sopher point to
areas of the social sciences that have already adopted
evolutionary methods with some success, but which we
failed to acknowledge in the target article. Kincaid and
Knudsen & Hodgson cite “organisational ecology” in
sociology (Hannan & Freeman 1989), whereas Knudsen
& Hodgson and Sopher reference “evolutionary econ-
omics” (Nelson & Winter 1982). We welcome this oppor-
tunity to draw attention to such work and encourage its
integration with our broader evolutionary framework.
Given these fields’ emphasis on large-scale and long-
term interactions between entire organisations, this
might require a new branch of the macroevolution
section of Figure 1, perhaps drawing a parallel between
population or community ecology (biology) and organis-
ational ecology (culture).
Kincaid also mentions evolutionary game theory
(Danielson 2004; Gintis 2000), which, although currently
used extensively within economics, in fact represents a
methodological tool that can be used to model cultural
evolution more generally. This would complement the
methods derived from population genetics discussed in
section 3.1.2, and although game-theoretic methods are
already used extensively within gene-culture coevolution-
ary theory (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 1985), there are clear
opportunities to broaden their application to cultural
phenomena.
Agent-based modelling (Axelrod 1997; Epstein & Axtell
1996; Kohler & Gumerman 2000) represents yet another
means to model cultural evolution, and we are happy to
highlight the potential utility of this within our framework.
Indeed, this is a methodology that we ourselves have used
to explore the coevolution of paternity beliefs and genetic
variation underlying human mating behaviour (Mesoudi
2005). All of these mathematical tools have strengths
and weaknesses, and each can be applied, in a “horses
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for courses” manner, to address a broad range of issues
related to cultural evolution.
R2.2. Further parallels with evolutionary biology
Reader, Wimsatt, Fuentes, and Cronk point to other
theories, tools, and concepts from evolutionary biology
that may also apply to the study of culture. Although we
restricted our schematic of the structure of evolutionary
biology to that given by Futuyma (1998: left side of our
Figure 1), we are happy to explore the applicability of
other areas which have not yet been fully integrated into
mainstream biology.
Cronk proposes that signalling theory (Krebs &Dawkins
1984), originally developed within biology, might be used to
solve a problem that he perceives with evolutionary
approaches to culture: that human culture is directed by
intelligent action or foresight. We agree that this approach
has great potential within the human sciences and discuss
this further in section R3.6. Here we focus on two other
parallels, “evo-devo” and “niche construction.”
R2.2.1. Evo-devo. Reader and Wimsatt explore how the
emerging findings of evolutionary developmental biology
(“evo-devo”) might be applied to culture. We agree that
evo-devo is having increasing influence within evolution-
ary biology and subscribe to the view that it will soon be
integrated fully into the mainstream of that discipline.
We also accept that evo-devo may contribute important
concepts to the study of cultural evolution, such as
Reader’s proposal that cultural traits may occur in clusters
because of cognitive constraints on learning.
However, before rushing to apply concepts and findings
from evo-devo to cultural evolution, it needs to be care-
fully and explicitly stated exactly what is developing. In
biology, development is the process through which inter-
action between a genotype (together with various extra-
genetic sources of hereditary material) and various
environmental factors generates and maintains a pheno-
type. If we treat the semantic information that is stored
in brains and in external storage devices (e.g., books or
computer memory) as the cultural equivalent of the geno-
type and the expression of that culturally acquired infor-
mation (e.g., motor behaviour, spoken language, material
artifacts, or social organisations) to be the equivalent of
the phenotype, or extended phenotype (see sects. R3.1
and R3.2), then cultural evo-devo would therefore
describe how this transition shapes and constrains
subsequent cultural evolution. This would, therefore,
require an understanding of how neural structures gene-
rate behaviour, how artifacts are constructed, and how
organisations are formed.
Neither Reader nor Wimsatt appear to take this
approach, in which development is seen from the per-
spective of the transmitted information (the “meme’s-
eye-view,” as Blackmore [1999] puts it), although we
suspect they might be sympathetic to it. They instead
appear to see development from the point of view of the
individual in both biological and cultural evolution.
Hence, Reader talks of clusters of multiple traits within
an individual brain or within a group (“speaking French
is associated with religious, dietary, technological, and
societal preferences and norms”), while Wimsatt discusses
changes in cultural traits during an individual’s development
(“individual enculturation is most often sequentially
dependent: We must learn arithmetic well before
calculus. . . . You generate what comes later from what you
have earlier”).
We are not saying that the first of the views of cultural
evo-devo outlined above is correct and those of Reader
and Wimsatt are wrong, simply that we need to avoid
confusion by stating exactly what is developing from
what and into what. This is particularly important given
that simplistic ideas about relationships between evolution
and development have in the past caused considerable
harm within the social sciences and are among the
reasons why Darwinian evolution is misunderstood and
rejected by many social scientists. Early practitioners of
cultural “evolution” such as Tylor (1871) and Morgan
(1877), continuing to White (1959), Steward (1955), and
Sahlins and Service (1960), saw cultural change not in
terms of Darwinian evolution but as a process of linear
development, resulting in attempts to fit entire contem-
porary societies into fixed and inevitable developmental
stages. It is important to emphasise that this is a gross
distortion of Darwinian evolution. O’Brien reminds us
that Gould (1996; 1997) wished cultural evolution to be
relabelled as “cultural development” to disavow the parallels
that we are highlighting and thus maintain the separation of
the biological and social sciences. As Lyman notes, “we
ignore history at the peril of repeating old mistakes.”
R2.2.2. Niche construction. Aunger, Fuentes, Kincaid,
Knudsen & Hodgson, and Wimsatt, explicitly or
implicitly, place emphasis on a role in the cultural evo-
lutionary framework for niche construction, in which
organisms actively modify sources of natural and/or cul-
tural selection in their environments (Laland et al. 2000;
Odling Smee et al. 2003). We welcome this suggestion,
which concords fully with our views, and below we
discuss the specific application of niche construction to
the issue of external storage of cultural information (sect.
R3.2) and intentionality (sect. R3.6).
Here we note that niche construction affects develop-
mental environments as well as selective environments,
as stressed by Wimsatt. Human mental processes build
on an “external scaffold” (Kincaid), which is itself a
product of the niche-constructing activities of the
members of a society. Niche-constructing organisms
modulate flows not only of energy and matter but of infor-
mation, because they are, advertently or inadvertently,
constructing the learning environment for other indivi-
duals. Several commentaries stress that knowledge and
culture are distributed across individuals and embedded
in institutions, social practices, and organisations. This,
in turn, determines payoffs and possible strategies
(Kincaid). Knudsen & Hodgson refer to the unsolved
problem of explaining cultural inheritance at the levels
of social organisations and institutions, whereas Mende
& Wermke refer to the challenge of understanding
the emergence of “the hyperlinked, interlocked global
village.” Related issues concern Read. The challenge is
to explain how such group-level phenomena can come
into existence.
One possibility is through group-level selection (see
sect. R3.4), but it is not the only possibility. The collective
social niche construction of individuals may create insti-
tutions and conventions (evocative of generative
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entrenchment:Wimsatt), where they construct a learning
environment biased towards the currently performed
behaviour, or enhance the payoffs of that behaviour. For
example, circumstantial evidence suggests that wild chim-
panzees (Whiten et al. 1999) and orang-utans (van Schaik
et al. 2003) possess local cultures defined by extensive
suites of different kinds of tradition (e.g., foraging tech-
niques, tool use, grooming customs) that extensively
shape the repertoire of successive generations. Recent
experimental evidence indicates a conformity bias that
has the potential to strengthen the effect of the culturally
shaped niche to which each developing individual is
exposed (Whiten et al. 2005). Among both human and
nonhuman societies, such culturally constructed niches
may be instantiated not only materially, as in the case of
accumulations of useful tools at chimpanzee termiting
sites (Sanz et al. 2004), but in social conventions. For
example, Perry et al. (2003a; 2003b) have described
several types of intimate social interactions and games,
including bizarre actions like resting one’s fingers deep
in companions’ mouths and noses, that have the hallmarks
of local conventions among different communities of wild
capuchin monkeys. Variation in such conventions is not
obviously attributable to differences in ecological resource
distribution or genetic differences across sites, and the
monkeys may use group-specific social conventions to
test the quality of their social relationships. Their activity
creates a social niche within which such otherwise improb-
able actions become readily acquired and may further
adapt and evolve.
Conventions may also be important in circumstances
where it is costly for individuals to acquire information
about resources, such as food or mates, or to solve pro-
blems alone. For instance, many fishes exhibit traditions
for feeding, resting, and mating in particular places and
for traditional routes to and from such sites (Helfman &
Schultz 1984; Warner 1990). Experimental studies
suggest these traditions are stable because individuals
would be more vulnerable to predation without the pro-
tection of being in a group (Laland & Williams 1998). In
game-theoretic terms, the traditions are Nash equilibria,
in which it never pays any individual to abandon the tra-
dition unilaterally, leaving populations locked into conven-
tions. Here members of the population performing the
tradition construct a social niche that biases both the
optimal behaviour and the learning environment of naı¨ve
individuals to leave it more likely that they, too, will
adopt the same behaviour. There are many examples
among humans, for instance, language learning: If most
individuals in a child’s region speak English, not only is
it optimal for the child also to become an English
speaker, but there will be many more opportunities for
the child to learn English than an alternative language.
As Wimsatt notes, socially constructed institutions
scaffold human enculturation.
R2.3. Additional methodologies
Fuentes and Tehrani both argue that we failed to
acknowledge that ethnography can play an important
role in an evolutionary science of culture, and Tehrani pre-
sents a number of potentially relevant lines of investigation
using ethnographic methods. We are largely in agreement
with these researchers over the need for long-term obser-
vational studies of cultural evolution in natural settings.
Tehrani notes that to date there has been a general lack
of interest from social anthropologists in the kinds of issues
raised by evolutionary approaches, such as who learns
what from whom and how. We also note that ethnogra-
phers seldom make a set of clear theoretical predictions
that they then test by collecting quantitative data and
using comparative methods. This may be due to the anti-
science position thatBarkow suggests is held by many cul-
tural anthropologists, and a tendency, remarked on by
Pagel, to see societies as specific and unique rather than
subject to more general principles. Ethologists and beha-
vioural ecologists who study animal behaviour face
similar problems to ethnographers, yet have reacted not
by abandoning the scientific method but by employing
sophisticated methodological and statistical techniques to
deal with the complexity of their subject matter (e.g.,
Krebs & Davies 1997). The facts that proposals for such
practices to be adopted in ethnography (e.g., Aunger
1995) have gone largely unheeded, and that studies
which apply such techniques (e.g., Aunger 2000a)
remain in a minority, are unfortunate reflections on the
current state of socio-cultural anthropology. Hopefully
some of the scientific alternatives outlined in this paper,
along with positive proposals like those of the ethnogra-
pher Tehrani and the work he cites, will stimulate more
such work.
Finally, Barkow argues that another, complementary
way to stimulate a more scientific study of culture is by fol-
lowing his principle of vertical integration, which he hopes
will “salvage the bulk of humanities-oriented anthropo-
logy.” We agree with Barkow that our framework and his
methodology are “entirely compatible,” and we encourage
its application.
R3. Points of contention
A number of commentators took issue with how we
defined key terms and with our position on certain theore-
tical matters. Although we feel that some of these criti-
cisms were actually dealt with in the target article, some
points bear repeating. For example, Bridgeman argued
that cultural change is not like biological evolution
because in biology there is no equivalent of traits being
acquired across societies, and “cultural traits are not
like Mendelian units, independent of one another.” In
section 2.1.2 we highlighted the presence of horizontal
gene transfer in biology (migration of individuals into
new groups is also an example of genetic material being
transferred between groups), and section 3.5.2 was
devoted to illustrating, on the basis of findings from mole-
cular biology, how genes can neither be accurately
described as neat discrete units nor as independent of
one another. In spite of these complications within the bio-
logical domain, simple models still have considerable
utility.
Other commentators raised issues and criticisms that we
did not address, and we deal with these below. In the
target article we tried to avoid certain thorny theoretical
issues that we feel have sidetracked previous debates
regarding cultural evolution, preferring to draw together
the growing number of compatible empirical studies that
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have emerged in recent years. However, this response is
an appropriate place to further clarify and expand our
theoretical position.
R3.1. Culture as semantic information
Blackmore expresses reservations regarding our defi-
nition of culture as “semantic information” that is “rep-
resented primarily in the brain,” whereas Knudsen &
Hodgson argue that we have inadequately identified
replicators and interactors in cultural evolution. We reiter-
ate our position that culture is most usefully regarded as
semantic information that is transmitted from individual
to individual via social learning and expressed in behaviour
and artifacts. This information is what is replicated and is
the counterpart to genetic information in biology. This
follows Williams’ (1966) and Dawkins’ (1995) conception
of genes (biological replicators) as information in an
abstract sense, independent of its physical instantiation
in molecules of DNA.
This replicating cultural information may be encoded in
the brain, or it may be stored externally in artifacts, from
the hammerstones of chimpanzees and early hominins,
to the Internet. Aunger, Bridgeman, Blackmore, and
Kincaid take issue with our original statement that “cul-
tural information is represented primarily in the brain”
and argue that we did not sufficiently acknowledge the
role that artifacts play in cultural transmission. We did,
in fact, also state that “cultural knowledge does not exist
solely in human brains and does not rely exclusively on
face-to-face communication for transmission” (target
article, sect. 3.4.2, para. 6), and cited numerous studies
of archaeological and technological artifacts in section
2.2.2 and elsewhere. Nevertheless, let us clarify our
belief that cultural information is also located in external
memory stores in the environment (Donald’s [1991] “exo-
grams”), explicitly, such as written text in books or digital
code in computer memory, or more implicitly in the struc-
ture of manufactured items such as tools, and that this
route of information transmission is important, perhaps
increasingly so. There is also growing evidence that arti-
facts, tools, and other constructions are important to
some nonhuman species as well as ourselves (van Schaik
et al. 2003; Whiten 2005b). Terkel (1996), for example,
offered elegant experimental evidence that young black
rats learned how to manipulate and extract seeds from
pine cones via the incompletely but expertly processed
cones abandoned by their mothers.
However, while acknowledging the possibility that
culturally transmitted information may be stored in
artifacts, we maintain that the brain plays a central role
in cultural transmission. Semantic information is useless
unless there is a brain capable of decoding it. For those
of us unfamiliar with the language, a text written in
ancient Greek contains only configural information and
precious little meaning. Contrary to Blackmore’s claims,
we believe our definition is perfectly consistent with
Dawkins’ original definition of a meme: “A meme should
be regarded as a unit of information residing in a brain”
(Dawkins 1982, p. 109). We also disagree with Blackmore
when she states that “skills and fashions” are not caused by
semantic information stored in the brain, because this
would imply that humans typically have no knowledge
of, say, what clothes they buy or choose to wear.
Her assertion that “memes might continue to thrive and
evolve even if all humans died” would be plausible only
if there were another form of intelligent life with a
brain-like, information-processing organ akin to the
human brain. Brains are not empty vessels that simply
store (or are “infected by”) memes: rather, there are
rich, biologically evolved, developmentally generated cog-
nitive structures in the brain that shape cultural
transmission, as noted by Cronk and Kelly et al. (see
sect. R3.7).
R3.2. Cultural traits
Culturally transmitted semantic information, whether it is
stored in brains or in external memory stores, may be
expressed in a variety of forms, including motor behaviour,
material artifacts, and social organisations (Knudsen &
Hodgson highlight the latter). These expressed forms,
which can be considered the cultural equivalents of
the phenotype, can also be seen as synonymous with the
term “cultural trait.” Again, this echoes Dawkins: “The
phenotypic effects of a meme may be in the form of
words, music, visual images, styles of clothes, facial or
hand gestures, skills such as opening milk bottles in tits,
or panning wheat in Japanese macaques. They are the
outward and visible (audible etc.) manifestations of the
memes within the brain” (Dawkins 1982, p. 109).
Fuentes argues that it may be unproductive to lump all
cultural traits together in this way. If “cultural traits” are
seen as phenotypic cultural expressions, however, this
diversity is not necessarily problematic (although it is
important to distinguish between the information and its
expression and to acknowledge, as in biology, that there
is no one-to-one correspondence between the two). The
traits are simply different ways in which semantic infor-
mation is expressed. Indeed, biological traits (i.e., the
phenotypic expression of biologically inherited genetic
information) are similarly diverse and range from beha-
viour to morphology to artifacts (“extended phenotypes”),
interlinked in a complex manner and differentially
expressed. Indeed, it may be useful to consider cultural
traits in a similar way, with artifacts as equivalent to
extended phenotypes, behaviour as equivalent to pheno-
types, and information as equivalent to genes (Laland &
Brown 2002). The niche-construction perspective in evo-
lutionary biology similarly stresses the importance of
living organisms in constructing artifacts and other fea-
tures of their environments, thereby modifying selection
pressures and codirecting evolution. Individuals inherit
not only genes but also a legacy of modified selection
pressures, manifest in a developmental environment
part-constructed by their ancestors. Human cultural arti-
facts and constructions are merely a special case of a
more general process. In cultural organisms, such niche
construction is as likely to affect cultural selection as
natural selection.
Lyman proposes that cultural traits can be seen as
“recipes” (seemingly independently of Blackmore’s
recipe example, which we discuss below), interrelated
conceptual structures that link physical characteristics,
behavioural rules and raw materials that, combined, com-
prise the knowledge required to construct an artifact. This
may be a good way of capturing the interrelated structure
of cultural traits noted above, as well as bringing in the
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evo-devo approach discussed earlier (indeed, recipes are
also a common metaphor for how genes operate: Dalton
2000; Ridley 2003). Cognitive psychologists (Weber et al.
1993; Weber & Perkins 1989) have independently
arrived at a similar concept to the recipe using schema
theory, where an artifact is seen as a “frame” which has
variable “slots” (representing the ingredients or physical
characteristics of the artifact) and which is associated
with “action scripts” (the behavioural rules required to
make or use the artifact). Plotkin (1999; 2000) makes a
similar point that cultural traits are best conceived of as
hierarchically organised knowledge structures such as
schemas, scripts, or frames (although it remains to be
seen whether these concepts apply to other aspects of
culture, such as organisations: Knudsen & Hodgson).
What is needed now is an integration of psychological
data and theory regarding how information is represented
in the brain (e.g., as scripts and frames) with ethnographic
data regarding how that information is expressed as arti-
facts (i.e., how the artifacts are manufactured and used,
equivalent to their “development”) and an exploration
within a “cultural evo-devo” framework of how that deve-
lopmental process affects macroevolutionary changes in
artifact forms, as studied by evolutionary archaeologists.
R3.3. Cultural inheritance
The distinction between cultural information (or replica-
tors) and cultural traits (or interactors) allows us to
discuss inheritance. In Blackmore’s recipe example
(also mentioned by Bridgeman), the written recipe con-
stitutes an external memory store that contains the infor-
mation required to bake a cake, while the cake itself is
the physical expression of that information. Information
can be acquired directly from the external information
store – the recipe – in what Blackmore calls copy-the-
instructions (although, as noted above, a recipe is useless
without a brain to understand it). Information can also
be acquired indirectly from the expression of the informa-
tion – the cake – in what Blackmore calls copy-the-
product. Laland and Brown (2002) also proposed “copy-
the-process,” in which the behaviour required to bake a
cake is imitated. We stress that all of these forms of trans-
mission – copy-the-instructions, copy-the-product, and
copy-the-process – are consistent with an evolutionary
approach to culture. In the words of O’Brien, “[a]ll that
is important in Darwinian terms is . . . that transmission,
however it is realized, takes place.”
One common source of confusion is that the term “Dar-
winian” has two different uses in this context. “Darwinian” is
used to describe the general theory of biological evolution
that is accepted by modern biologists and which we are
arguing in this paper can be applied to culture. However,
“Darwinian” is also used to describe a theory of biological
inheritance in whichWeissman’s barrier separates the repli-
cator and the interactor (resembling “copy-the-instruc-
tions”: Blackmore), in contrast to “Lamarckian”
inheritance in which acquired phenotypic characteristics
are inherited genetically (resembling “copy-the-product”:
Blackmore). Somewhat confusingly, Charles Darwin
himself held Lamarckian views regarding biological inheri-
tance (Darwin 1859/1968), so we might more accurately
talk here of “Weissmanian” inheritance rather than “Darwi-
nian” inheritance. To clarify, in the last paragraph of section
3.5.3 in the target article, our use of “Darwinian” referred to
Darwinian inheritance, or, as we should have called it,
Weissmanian inheritance. A Darwinian theory of cultural
evolution is therefore perfectly compatible with either a
Lamarckian or aWeissmanian theory of cultural inheritance
(or both, at different times for different traits). We were not
arguing that the issue of inheritance (whether Weissmanian
or Lamarckian) could ever “dismiss the application of
Darwinian principles in the social domain” (Knudsen &
Hodgson), as we also made clear in a previous paper
(Mesoudi et al. 2004).
R3.4. Cultural selection
Knudsen & Hodgson complain that we “do not provide
an explicit definition of cultural selection processes,”
which is a fair point and one we address now. As noted
above, culturally transmitted semantic information may
be expressed at multiple levels, from individual-level
traits such as motor behaviour or some material artifacts,
to group-level traits such as social organisations and
other complex artifacts. In principle, it is possible to con-
ceive of group-level cultural traits being aggregated
together into higher-order group-level traits. Hence, we
anticipate that it may be useful to regard culture as a
multi-layered phenomenon, with these different levels
linked together through recipes and schemas. Cultural
selection refers to any case in which there is differential
replication of cultural variants relative to their alternatives,
as a consequence of differences in their longevity, trans-
mission fidelity, and probability of spreading. Cultural
selection may act on any of the aforementioned levels, as
helpfully highlighted by Knudsen & Hodgson.
Contrary to Read’s claim that in Darwinian evolution
“selection is based on properties of individuals,” in the
past few decades multilevel models of selection have
become widely accepted within evolutionary biology, as
we note in section 4 of the target article. Hence, biologists
frequently model natural selection acting not only on the
individual (Darwin 1859/1968), but at any level that exhi-
bits variation, differential fitness, and inheritance of
fitness-related characters (Lewontin 1970). This may
include levels below the individual, such as the case of
selfish DNA (Orgel & Crick 1980) which is selected
within the genome but which does not directly affect
selection at the phenotypic level, or above the individual,
as in the case of group selection (Sober & Wilson 1998;
Wilson & Sober 1994), species selection (Stanley 1975),
or clade selection (Vermeij 1996).We see no difficulty envi-
saging similar multilevel selection occurring in cultural
evolution, negating much of Read’s criticism that Darwi-
nian evolution cannot deal with selection operating at the
social level, as with kin terminology (“The selection
acting on kinship terminologies occurs at the level of struc-
tural properties”). However, we are not convinced that
multilevel selection is necessary to explain the phenomena
to which Read refers. We note that kinship terminology is
an example of language use, and as Pagel and Mende &
Wermke emphasise, language is a prime example of cul-
tural evolution, several examples of which we used to illus-
trate sections of our target article. We also note that many
of the properties of kinship terminology that Read regards
as problematic for Darwinian evolution can be found
in animal communication, a topic for which there are
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well-established Darwinian theoretical foundations (e.g.,
Hauser 1996).
Selection above the level of the individual means that
macroevolutionary change cannot always be explained
exclusively through microevolutionary principles, leading
to a partial uncoupling of micro- and macroevolution.
This is possible for both biological and, we would argue,
cultural evolution. Contrary to Read, therefore, we do
not “accept uncritically the idea that macroevolution is
Darwinian microevolution writ large.” However, we
acknowledge that our statement in section 3 is a little mis-
leading and perhaps should have read “large-scale macro-
evolutionary patterns of change are often the result of
small-scale microevolutionary changes in gene frequencies
within populations.” Nevertheless, our original point still
stands – that the connection between micro- and macroe-
volution was hugely important in the unification of biology
(Mayr 1982; Mayr & Provine 1980), notwithstanding more
recent models of multilevel selection. A similar connection
between cultural micro- and macroevolution, although
occasionally proposed (e.g., Schwartz & Mead 1961), has
not yet occurred.
R3.5. Mechanisms of cultural transmission
Knudsen & Hodgson argue that there is currently little
understanding of cultural transmission (“Biology has a
well-developed theory of inheritance but there has been
little progress in explaining cultural inheritance. . . . The
way in which cultural components combine and replicate
is presently unknown”), as does Borsboom (“the mechan-
isms by which cultural traits are propagated cannot be
sidestepped as easily as Mesoudi et al. suggest, and they
would, therefore, do well to offer some convincing
arguments for the existence of such mechanisms”).
Aunger goes further and takes the somewhat extreme
position that social scientists have yet to determine
whether behavioural distributions are due to cultural
transmission, as opposed to the evoked responses to
immediate environmental conditions that are already
present because of biological evolution or individual learn-
ing, citing Tooby and Cosmides’ (1992) “jukebox model.”
We note that Tooby and Cosmides (1992) never argued
that the jukebox model could explain all human beha-
vioural variation (“complex shared patterns that differ
from group to group may be evoked by circumstances or
may be produced by differential transmission . . . the
jukebox thought experiment is an unrealistically extreme
case”; Tooby & Cosmides 1992, pp. 116–17), and that
they also acknowledge a transmitted “epidemiological
culture” (p. 121).
We believe that there is solid evidence against the
extreme position that all human culture is evoked and
none is transmitted, and we maintain that very much
more is known regarding cultural transmission than is
often realised. Although understanding of cultural inheri-
tance is far from complete, we take issue with the claims by
Borsboom and Knudsen & Hodgson that little progress
has been made in this area. Moreover, we reiterate the fact
that the principles of biological inheritance are also far
from fully understood – indeed, they have changed dra-
matically over the last decade (Gilbert 2000; Mousseau
& Fox 1998; Wolf et al. 2000). It is therefore a distortion
to portray biological and cultural inheritance at opposite
poles of a spectrum representing scientific understanding.
We have discussed some of the available evidence that
demonstrates cultural transmission and the mechanisms
that underlie it in a previous paper (Mesoudi et al.
2004), and Richerson and Boyd (2005) have recently
made a parallel case. However, this evidence is perhaps
worth summarising here.
First, there are many cross-cultural studies that demon-
strate a double dissociation between culture and the
environment. For example, Hallpike (1986) describes
how East African and Indo-Iranian pastoralists, who live
in the same ecological environment and have the same
means of subsistence, differ in social organisation and reli-
gious beliefs, whereas two Ethiopian societies that inhabit
very different environments have essentially identical
social institutions, religious beliefs, and cultural values.
Many other cross-cultural comparisons demonstrate evi-
dence for cultural inheritance (e.g., Guglielmino et al.
1995; Hewlett et al. 2002), as do phylogenetic analyses
of present cultural diversity (e.g., Collard et al. 2005;
Mace & Pagel 1994; Tehrani & Collard 2002). Ethno-
graphic studies provide evidence of cultural transmission
within these societies (e.g., Aunger 2000a; Hewlett &
Cavalli-Sforza 1986; Ohmagari & Berkes 1997).
Second, longitudinal studies demonstrate how cultural
traits persist over long periods of time even when the
bearers of those traits migrate large distances into novel
environments. One such study, Rice and Feldman
(1997), found that variation across the United States in
behaviour relating to civic responsibility (e.g., voting or
donating to charity) can be predicted from similar vari-
ation in their parent European populations. For
example, both Scandinavian countries in Europe and
U.S. communities founded by Scandinavians have high
levels of civic responsibility relative to other European
countries and other areas of the United States respect-
ively. This implies that the strong civic-responsibility
values of the colonists have persisted via cultural trans-
mission over the last few hundred years through to
present day U.S. populations. Rice and Arnett (2001)
further document this persistence over the last 100 years.
Third, extensive archaeological, historical, and socio-
logical studies have shown that when culture does
change, it frequently does so independently of the ecologi-
cal environment and too rapidly to be explained by genes.
Hence, there are (a) archaeological seriations that consti-
tute lineages of artifacts causally linked by cultural trans-
mission (O’Brien & Lyman 2000); (b) detailed historical
studies of the cumulative evolution of technological arti-
facts (Basalla 1988; Petroski 1994; Ziman 2000), docu-
menting how inventors have built on previous inventions
and borrowed components from different lineages of
inventions, such as Carlson’s (2000) reconstruction of
the invention of the telephone through a detailed analysis
of Thomas Edison’s notebooks; and (c) sociological studies
that have documented the rapid horizontal diffusion of
technological or behavioural innovations within single bio-
logical generations, not plausibly explained by population-
genetic or demographic changes, as summarised in Rogers
(1995). More generally, it is unclear that psychological
adaptations, supposedly favoured in the ancestral Pleisto-
cene environment labelled by Tooby and Cosmides (1992)
and others as the “Environment of Evolutionary Adapted-
ness,” would necessarily evoke successful and functional
Response/Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland: Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4 371
behavioural responses in contemporary human popu-
lations that are living in quite different ecological and
social environments. It is yet more difficult to envisage
that responses that are merely evoked can account for con-
struction of novel cultural phenomena ranging from space
travel to the Internet. We find it difficult to conceive how
culture can change and accumulate in the new, diverse,
and often progressive ways it has in postindustrial societies
without some form of cultural transmission.
Fourth, as highlighted by Pagel and Mende &
Wermke, scientific approaches to culture have already
made headway on the evolution of languages, and there
is a large existing literature on language acquisition that
has documented how children readily acquire the
language spoken by people around them (Bloom 2001;
Pinker 1995; Tomasello et al. 1993). This vast literature
provides detailed studies of cultural transmission that
counter Knudsen & Hodgson’s claims that the mechan-
isms of cultural transmission are presently unknown. Here
we will simply make the following observations that
counter Aunger’s “evoked culture” argument: There is
no sense in which the English or Chinese languages fit
in any significant way with the environments of England
or China respectively; languages such as English or
Chinese are spoken by people in many different physical
environments; languages spoken in the same environment
change over time; and children of English-speaking
parents who are brought up by Chinese parents acquire
Chinese, not English. In short, children raised in China
culturally inherit the lexicon and grammar of the language
their parents and others speak there. Such observations
significantly count against the notion that the specific
languages that people speak are either tied to the environ-
ment or fully specified genetically.
Fifth, experimental studies have demonstrated and elu-
cidated the cultural transmission of information under
controlled settings in the laboratory. Developmental psy-
chologists have demonstrated high-fidelity imitation by
subjects of the behaviour of a model, from Bandura’s
classic studies on aggression (e.g., Bandura et al. 1961)
through to comparative studies of observational learning
in children and chimpanzees (Horner & Whiten 2005;
Nagell et al. 1993; Whiten 1998; Whiten et al. 1996;
Whiten et al., in press), and the role of pedagogy in cul-
tural transmission (Csibra & Gergely 2005; Gergely &
Csibra 2006; Wood et al. 1976). Other studies have
tracked the transmission of text along linear chains of par-
ticipants (Bangerter 2000; Kashima 2000; Mesoudi &
Whiten 2004; Mesoudi et al., 2006). Finally, studies have
demonstrated the cultural transmission of behavioural
strategies within small groups of participants (Baum
et al. 2004; Insko et al. 1980; McElreath et al. 2005).
Taken together, these studies provide strong converging
evidence against Aunger’s claim that “genetic evolution
may be able to account for the phenomena we consider
to be cultural.” At the very least, the case for cultural trans-
mission is stronger than the evidence supporting any
exclusively genetic explanation. We agree with Aunger
that genetic evolution has shaped our capacity for the
acquisition, storage, and expression of cultural knowledge
and that this will impose biases on the content of culture
(see sect. R3.7). However, it does not follow from this
that the content of culture is fully specified by genes, or
even by gene-(ecological) environment interactions. We
are satisfied that there is sufficient empirical evidence to
be able to state with some confidence that a theory of
culture that denies cultural transmission is untenable.
More generally, we believe that Aunger, Borsboom, and
Knudsen & Hodgson are underestimating the evidence
amassed by countless studies from psychology, anthro-
pology, sociology, history, and linguistics. Ultimately, this
may be because these strands of research are often devel-
oping independently of one another. Perhaps if the social
sciences were more integrated, as we hope to facilitate
with this article, more social scientists would be aware of
these different studies, the connections between them,
and the coherent collective message they impart.
Although Aunger may be correct that the tools of
neuroscience are not currently advanced enough to be
able to observe changes in brain states corresponding to
the cultural transmission of information (although see
Iacoboni 2005; Williams et al. 2006), we refer him to
Barkow’s notion of vertical integration, which implies
that valuable studies of cultural transmission can be per-
formed without a full understanding of that phenomenon
at the neural level. Although an understanding of the
neural basis of cultural information is desirable, what is
necessary at this stage is for these studies to be consistent
with the findings of neuroscience, which appears to be the
case for the studies cited above.
R3.6. The role of “intentionality”
Cronk,Dennett & McKay, Pagel, and Sopher raise the
issue of what they variously describe as “the active, often
intentional role that humans play in cultural transmission
and, thus, in cultural evolution” (Cronk), “intelligent
authorship, foresighted, purposeful reasoning, and artistic
judgment” (Dennett & McKay), “the human capacity for
intentionality or goal-directedness” (Pagel), and “those
distinct processes in cultural evolution that involve con-
scious human choices” (Sopher).
The notion that human action is often intentional, goal-
directed, conscious, teleological, mindful, intelligent,
directed, purposeful, guided, or designed is a common
argument against adopting an evolutionary approach to
culture (see commentaries on Rindos 1985). However,
Dennett & McKay and Pagel both make the valuable
point that there is a continuum of “intentionality,” from
blind, unconscious, undirected selection to goal-directed,
conscious, directed selection, and the full range of this
continuum is likely present in both biological and cultural
evolution. Elsewhere (Laland et al. 2000; Mesoudi et al.
2004) we have referred to the acquisition of “smart” var-
iants, cultural traits that have been tried and tested by
other individuals. Once again, we believe it is important
to stress that the existence of such variants does not inva-
lidate the concept of cultural evolution or the use of evol-
utionary models and methods (although it may affect the
characteristics of such models).
Cronk also rejects the notion that intentionality invali-
dates a science of cultural evolution, and proposes the
use of signalling theory and receiver psychology to under-
stand how and why people produce signals that fit and
shape the psychology of the intended receiver. This has
parallels with Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance
theory of language use, in which utterances are tailored
to be maximally relevant to the intended target, and also
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Gergely and Csibra’s (2006) studies of pedagogical
learning, in which human infants and adults have been
found to exhibit species-specific cognitive adaptations to
facilitate high-fidelity cultural transmission of behaviour
when the efficacy or functional relevance of the behaviour
is unclear. Chimpanzees have been found to have a
contrasting tendency to preferentially acquire only those
modelled actions that are functionally relevant to solving
a task (Horner & Whiten 2005).
We suspect that one of the motivations behind these
kinds of criticisms of cultural evolution is the desire to sep-
arate humans from other species. Knudsen & Hodgson
similarly argue that we “fail to elaborate on key differences
between human and nonhuman culture, where the former
involves a developed abstract language and capacities to
attribute intentions and meanings.” Although the wide-
spread use of symbolic language does seem to be specific
to humans, a capacity to use symbols and attribute inten-
tions and meanings is to some extent shared with other
species (Tomasello et al. 2005). Indeed, one of the benefits
of the evolutionary approach that we advocate is the use of
the comparative method, where the approaches outlined
in section 5 can be used to identify homologous or conver-
gent cognitive adaptations in other species that may
underpin the biologically evolved capacity for culture in
humans.
Niche construction offers another way of integrating
both human and nonhuman agency with a biological and
cultural evolutionary framework (Laland et al. 2000).
Fuentes states that “most psychological and anthropologi-
cal research relies on perceptions, semantic exchanges,
and culturally contingent decision processes.” One charac-
teristic of the niche-construction perspective that poten-
tially makes it more palatable to the human sciences
than the conventional view of evolutionary biology, is
that it stresses the active role of organisms in evolution
and development. Moreover, because niche construction
can result from learned and socially transmitted beha-
viour, some organisms are able to modify selection pro-
cesses in a manner that is “goal directed,” “intentional,”
and “intelligent” (Odling Smee et al. 2003). We note that
other researchers have already started to use this niche-
construction perspective to explore how culturally trans-
mitted “expectancies” – the mind-shaping effects of our
mind-reading dispositions – can become an important
developmental resource for humans, and critically affect
the evolution of cognition (Mameli 2001).
R3.7. The relationship between biological and cultural
evolution
Blackmore and Dennett & McKay argue that it should
not be assumed that culture is always biologically adaptive.
Their position contrasts with Pagel’s “adaptationist
wager” that it is often useful to assume culture is adaptive.
These both contrast, again, with the work of Neiman
(1995), Bentley and Shennan (2003), and others who use
the neutral-drift model of cultural change as a null hypoth-
esis. Although these different approaches seem inherently
contradictory, they can potentially complement each
other, given that different elements of culture may be bio-
logically adaptive, biologically maladaptive, and biologi-
cally neutral at different times and in different contexts.
Ultimately, however, it should be an empirical issue
whether a specific cultural trait is biologically adaptive,
maladaptive, or neutral for its carriers, to be tested on a
case-by-case basis. Although we acknowledge the power
and utility of adaptationist reasoning, we prefer to adopt
an “open-minded” stance rather than taking an a priori
position that the entire contents of culture are always bio-
logically adaptive or always biologically maladaptive. It is
also important to clarify each use of the term “adaptive”
and “maladaptive” as to what entity is benefiting in each
case (e.g., genes, memes, individuals, or groups).
We stress the importance in this context of distinguish-
ing between the capacity for culture and the contents of
culture. Richerson and Boyd (2005) make a convincing
argument, supported by extensive mathematical theory
(Boyd & Richerson 2005), that the capacity for culture is
a biological adaptation. At the same time, however, fea-
tures of that biological adaptation, such as “fast and
frugal” social learning strategies like conformist or indirect
bias (Boyd & Richerson 1985), may in certain circum-
stances lead to the spread of biologically maladaptive cul-
tural contents. We think Blackmore misunderstands this
distinction when she claims that Richerson and Boyd’s
(2005) “culture is an adaptation” position implies that
the contents of culture will be biologically adaptive.
Boyd and Richerson would no doubt agree with Black-
more, as would we, that some cultural traits spread parasi-
tically in spite of imposing fitness costs on their human
carriers. Presumably, Blackmore would agree with Boyd
and Richerson, and us, that some cultural traits confer
fitness benefits on their carriers.
We find puzzling Blackmore’s claim that “culture is not
and never was an adaptation. It began as a by-product of
the evolved capacity for imitation.” If her use of the
term culture here refers to the capacity for culture, then
for what function did the ability to imitate initially evolve
if not the acquisition of knowledge and skills (i.e.,
culture)? Most researchers in this field, ourselves
included, would regard the ability to imitate as a key com-
ponent of the capacity for culture. Although in principle
one could argue that imitation is necessary but not suffi-
cient for culture, to our knowledge Blackmore has not
adopted this position. Conversely, if (as we suspect) Black-
more’s use of the term refers to the content of culture,
there is no major difference between her position and
that of Boyd and Richerson or ourselves. A biological
adaptation is a character favoured by natural selection
for its effectiveness in a particular role, and none of us
believes that pepperoni pizza or baseball exists primarily
because of natural selection on genes. The content of
culture is rarely itself a biological adaptation: rather, it is
the product of more general adaptations, such as the
capacity to learn, to acquire information from others, to
conform, and so forth. Although we might differ from
Blackmore with respect to our intuitions as to the pro-
portion of cultural phenomena that are parasitic, we see
no fundamental disagreement here.
The relationship between culture and biological fitness
also relates to Borsboom’s argument that culture can be
said to evolve only if cultural traits have the ability to kill
individuals (i.e., reduce their biological fitness to zero).
Although biologically lethal cultural traits will have a dra-
matic effect on both cultural and biological evolution, it is
long established that the contents of culture may spread
independently of biological fitness (Cavalli-Sforza &
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Feldman 1981; Boyd & Richerson 1985), as Dennett &
McKay helpfully reiterate. Borsboom’s argument is also
predicated on a distorted view of biological evolution in
which single genes “cause their bearers to go extinct” in
a single generation, and gene frequencies change
because of their lethal effects (“if the gene is bad for
you, you die before you get the chance to propagate”).
In reality, biological evolution commonly involves small
differences in fitness causing gradual changes in relative
gene frequencies over multiple generations. Moreover,
these are usually genetic differences in rates of reproduc-
tion that are not necessarily tied to survival.
Kelly et al. discuss various content biases (e.g., disgust)
and context biases (e.g., conformity) that have been shown
to affect the cultural transmission of information, as we
acknowledge in section 3.4.2. Many of these psychological
biases appear to serve biologically adaptive functions,
representing an interaction between biological and cul-
tural evolution. We therefore wholeheartedly agree with
Kelly et al. that psychology should play an important role
in any science of cultural evolution. We also share
Barkow’s lament that sociocultural anthropology is non-
psychological or even anti-psychological. Evolutionary
psychologists have not always been sympathetic to the
idea of cultural evolution (e.g., Daly 1982). However, the
two perspectives are perfectly compatible, and evolution-
ary psychology can valuably contribute to the cultural
evolutionary synthesis by specifying and delineating bio-
logically evolved biases that affect cultural transmission.
However, while agreeing that psychology will be
important, we maintain that no single discipline should
be given a “central explanatory role” (Kelly et al.) in pre-
ference to any other branch of Figure 1. This is highlighted
by recent work in cross-cultural psychology (Choi et al.
1999; Nisbett et al. 2001) which has found cultural differ-
ences in the psychological dispositions of East Asians and
Westerners, and by Henrich et al.’s (2005) studies showing
that cultural differences influence how different societies
interact in various experimental economic games. Such
work emphasises that psychological processes may not
be biologically evolved universals, and that cultural differ-
ences uncovered by anthropologists may influence psy-
chology and the transmission of cultural knowledge.
R3.8. Assumptions underlying cultural phylogenies
Borgerhoff Mulder et al. provide a valuable contri-
bution to our article by raising for debate some of the
key underlying assumptions in the use of phylogenetic
methods to analyse cultural data, as employed by many
of the studies that we cite in section 2.1.2. We agree that
the details of cultural transmission (horizontal or vertical,
individual- or group-level) will affect such methods in
important ways and that it is essential that practitioners
consider whether the data in hand are appropriate to the
method’s assumptions. Simulation studies that explore
the effects of non-vertical cultural transmission on phylo-
genies (e.g., Eerkens et al. 2006; Nunn et al. 2006) are
extremely helpful, as are better ethnographic data regard-
ing actual cultural transmission, echoing Tehrani. We also
agree that cultures are “made up of multiple traits, each of
which may have a different phylogeny” and that it is typi-
cally necessary to treat cultural elements on a trait-by-trait
basis.
However, we reiterate the point we made in section
2.1.2, that biologists face the same problem, for example,
with horizontal gene transfer in bacteria (Doolittle 1999;
Rivera & Lake 2004) and plants (Abbott et al. 2003).
Although we agree with Borgerhoff Mulder et al. that
it is vital that the parallels between biological and cultural
evolution should not blind researchers to the differences,
the significance of horizontal transfer to the two disciplines
is a matter of degree, not kind. Indeed, there have been
almost identical arguments in biology for the use of
alternative methods more sensitive to horizontal cross-
lineage transmission (Ragan 2001). Such methods might
include reticulated phylogenetic networks (Bandelt et al.
1999), which have already been used to analyse the
Indo-European language family (Forster & Toth 2003)
and North European Mesolithic fishing spear data
(Riede, in press). Such methods might yet be used to
detect a “core phylogeny” resulting from vertical cultural
transmission, for example of the common words noted
by Pagel to change very slowly (e.g., “two,” “three,”
“five”), surrounded by a reticulated network generated
by horizontal cultural transmission, as highlighted by Bor-
gerhoff Mulder et al. This parallels recent proposals that
prokaryotes feature a core phylogeny resulting from verti-
cal genetic inheritance surrounded by a reticulated
network generated by horizontal gene transfer (Philippe
& Douady 2003).
In sum, we hope that Borgerhoff Mulder et al.’s ana-
lyses will lead to a healthy debate and ultimately to the
development of improved methodological tools for study-
ing evolutionary systems subject to horizontal transfer, be
they biological or cultural. We believe that such debates
and refinements are a sign of strength within any pro-
ductive science. However, we do not think it necessary
to return to “first principles,” given that many of their cri-
ticisms can also apply to biological phylogenies and that
methods are beginning to be developed to deal with
these issues. Phylogenetic methods will be an important
set of tools in the developing evolutionary science of
culture irrespective of whether there is more horizontal
transmission in cultural than in biological systems.
R3.9. Other theories of cultural evolution
There have been many different theories of “cultural evol-
ution” in the past. O’Brien helpfully restates the distinc-
tion between the “unilinear and progressive cultural
evolutionism of Tylor (1871) and Morgan (1877)” and
the modern Darwinian theory of evolution that we advo-
cate here. Other commentators, however, see differences
where none exist. For example, Sopher describes Boyd
and Richerson’s (1985) work as a “compelling counter-
point” to our evolutionary framework, and states that
Boyd and Richerson (1985) “adopt the view that cultural
evolution is an aspect of evolution generally and cannot
or should not be separated from things biological.” This
again confuses the capacity for culture (a biological adap-
tation) and the contents of culture (a separate evolutionary
process that may interact with biological inheritance,
within what Boyd and Richerson [1985] themselves refer
to as “dual-inheritance theory”), as discussed in section
R3.7.
We would like to clarify that our position is in no way
counter to Boyd and Richerson’s, who, along with
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Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), have made probably
the most important contribution to the evolutionary fra-
mework proposed here by establishing that a rigorous
and conceptually accurate version of Darwinian evolution
can be successfully applied to culture. And in a related
aside, we were slightly puzzled by Bridgeman’s assertion
that Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) modelling was “done
without the concept of culture as a critical variable,”
given that their 1985 book almost exclusively focussed on
transmitted culture (they even called it Culture and the
Evolutionary Process). As we have made clear in earlier
sections and writings (Mesoudi et al. 2004), biological
and cultural evolution are inextricably interwoven
processes.
Bridgeman also sets up a false dichotomy between our
position and that of Plotkin (2002b). According to Bridge-
man, Plotkin argues that “differences between genetic
evolution and cultural change are fundamental. They
follow different rules and should be kept distinct even
while both are modeled mathematically.” Plotkin (2002b)
actually stated with regard to the mathematical modelling
of culture:
Perhaps the best image to take from gene-culture co-evol-
utionary modelling is of two parallel tracks of evolving pro-
cesses, the biological and the cultural. The forms of
evolution of the tracks may or may not be identical in terms
of process. What is certain is that quite different mechanisms
underlie each track. But the tracks are not independent of
one another: they interact and influence one another. They
do this through lines of force, through causal connections,
that link them and mediate the interactions between them,
and these lines of force are the mechanisms of human intelli-
gence. (Plotkin 2002b, p.140)
Furthermore, it is clear from Plotkin’s earlier writings
(Plotkin 1995; 1997) that he is fully committed to evol-
utionary explanations for culture.
Blackmore repeatedly argues that “memetics” provides
a superior alternative to our evolutionary framework (e.g.,
“Memetics can handle this far better than other theories
of cultural evolution,” and “Memetics alone makes sense
of this”). “Memetics,” however, does not seem to be an
alternative to our framework. To the extent that memetics
can be characterised as a body of empirical research or a
set of methodologies for studying culture, it is reliant on
a subset of the kinds of data and methods that we empha-
sise. We view memetics as a set of conceptual tools (e.g.,
taking the “meme’s eye view”) and concepts (the meme
itself) that, as we showed in section 3.5, have a potentially
valuable place within a larger evolutionary science of
culture. Unlike others (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 2000;
Richerson & Boyd 2005), we have attempted to accommo-
date these tools and concepts into our framework.
However, in our view, it is neither accurate nor useful to
regard “memetics” as a competing alternative, nor is
memetics sufficient to provide a satisfactory evolutionary
framework for the social sciences. After all, genetics is
not an alternative to evolutionary biology; it is but one
branch of a larger evolutionary science.
R4. Concluding remarks
In section 1 of the target article we state that our primary
aim in this paper is “to stimulate a more progressive and
rigorous science of culture.” In the following sections we
have argued that this can be achieved by placing the
social sciences within a unified evolutionary framework
modelled after the structure of evolutionary biology, and
by borrowing and adapting various tools, theories, and
methods that have been developed by evolutionary biol-
ogists in order to solve similar problems facing researchers
studying culture.
Although the majority of commentators here are recep-
tive to our argument, we share Barkow’s suspicion that
had the paper appeared in Current Anthropology rather
than Behavioral and Brain Sciences, then the responses
might have been less positive. O’Brien similarly notes
that “social scientists have often been downright hostile
toward even considering cultural evolution in Darwinian
terms.” Nonetheless, given that social scientists regularly
read and contribute to this journal, we are tempted to
interpret the absence of criticism as signifying that the cul-
tural evolutionary framework is no longer easily dismissed.
Perhaps the modern theory of cultural evolution has now
reached the stage where it has shed the historical
baggage acquired by (inappropriate) associations with
erroneous nineteenth-century progressive conceptualis-
ations, or twentieth-century human sociobiological argu-
ments. Hopefully, social scientists will now accept that
cultural evolution is not synonymous with genetic or bio-
logical determinism, that it does not foster prejudice or
support political or ideological arguments, that biology is
not simple and well-understood relative to culture, and
that, while there are differences between the processes
that underpin biological and cultural change, the parallels
are sufficiently real to be worth taking seriously.
The problem, however, may be broader than a hostility
to Darwinian evolution. Barkow remarks that we “pay
scant attention to the likelihood that very few [anthropol-
ogists] are interested in modeling their endeavor on any
science” (his italics), let alone evolutionary biology.
While this may be true, we hope that the body of work
that we have reviewed in this target article sends the
message that there is now a clear, vibrant, productive,
and rapidly growing alternative to this hostile-to-evolution,
hostile-to-science tradition in the social sciences. This
alternative is also culture-friendly and conversant with
other social science findings and methods. We invite
social scientists frustrated with the negativity of post-
modernist, deconstructivist, and other anti-scientific
movements within their discipline to join us in building
a scientific theory of culture.
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